

authentic news; indeed, on board her were the crews of five vessels captured by Captain von Müller in the area between Colombo and Minikoi. From Pondichery he had made out into the Bay of Bengal, and then rounded the South of Ceylon on the usual track almost within sight of land. Somewhere in this passage he must have come fairly close to the *Chikuma*. A prisoner taken from a ship by the *Emden* in October reports "being told by her officers that "on seeing a Japanese "cruiser approaching, *Emden* promptly hoisted the British "Ensign, whereupon the Japanese saluted and passed on."¹

Off the Point de Galle on September 25th, the *Emden* met the first prize of what was to be the new batch. This was the *King Lud* on the way to Calcutta direct from Suez; she had called at no intermediate port and was quite unaware of danger. After embarking her crew and sinking her, Captain von Müller continued Northward. So close did he go to Colombo, then well illuminated by searchlights, that he was able to watch the black hull of a steamer coming out, and decided to follow and capture her.² She was showing the usual navigation lights and the chase was easy. After they had gone some 50 miles towards Minikoi Captain von Müller thought he was far enough from land and called on the steamer by Morse to stop. The signal took some time to get through, but finally she was stopped and boarded and was found to be the *Tymeric*, homeward bound. She was sunk during the night. Next afternoon the *Gryfevale* was captured; Captain von Müller retained her as a prison ship, which his previous experience had shown to be necessary. His next capture was an Admiralty collier named *Buresk* on passage to join the China Squadron. She was of the greatest value to him as the *Markomannia* was now empty, and, naturally, he did not sink the *Buresk*, but putting a prize crew on board kept her for his own use. On September 27, two more outward bound steamers, the *Ribera* and *Foyle*, were captured; and this total Captain von Müller considered to be enough. He had captured five vessels but had missed seven others,³ though this he did not know. Keeping the *Buresk* and *Markomannia* with him he sent off the *Gryfevale* to Colombo with all the prisoners and once more disappeared.⁴

All this information the *Gryfevale* was able to give to our Intelligence Officer when she arrived at Colombo at 8 a.m. on September 29. The last position in which the *Emden* had been seen was 7.50 N., 74.45 E., at 10 p.m., September 27.⁵ The news

¹ M. 04929/14.


² Lieut. von Mücke of the *Emden*, I.D. 1014.

³ Report of I.O., Colombo, N.I.D. 3116/14.

⁴ Fikentscher's Diary mentions also the Dutch liner *Djoicja* on 27th September.

⁵ C. 61, 62.





DISPOSITION SEPT. 29. 8 A.M.

GRYFEVALE arrives at Colombo with news of EMDEN's captures off Minikoi.
Positions of H.M. Ships from their logs; of Allied Ships estimated.

brought by the *Gryfevale* found our ships disposed as in the attached plan. The *Hampshire*, after unconsciously following the *Emden* round the South of Ceylon, had put into Colombo; coaling there, she had then gone off eastward at 1 a.m. on September 27. She was now halfway towards Acheh Head. The *Chikuma* arrived at Colombo some hours after the *Gryfevale*; at first she intended to sail at once for the focal point at C. Comorin,¹ but stayed behind to coal.² The *Yarmouth*, which had been searching the Nikobars, was coaling at Penang. The *Dupleix* with her transport was halfway from Singapore to Colombo; and the *Askold* and *Empress of Asia* were in the Malacca Strait with their *Arcadia* convoy. The East Indies Squadron had just arrived at Aden with a large convoy of Indian troops and are out of the picture. The French cruiser *d'Iberville* and the three French destroyers seemed to have remained throughout in the close neighbourhood of Penang.

49. **Hunting Squadron, September 29 to October 5.**—The new intelligence did not reach Captain Grant till midnight, 29–30 September, when he immediately altered course to west for Colombo,³ and ordered the *Chikuma* to proceed for Minikoi. The Japanese cruiser left at 8.30 a.m., September 30.⁴ The *Yarmouth* got away from Penang at 4 p.m., September 29, and steamed at 15 knots on the route to Colombo. By 1 p.m. next day she was off Acheh Head, but continued westward, a few hours later overtaking the *Askold*, *Empress of Asia*, and *Arcadia* convoy. When halfway across she turned back, patrolled off Acheh Head, and went into Penang again on October 5.⁵ She was presumably carrying out Captain Grant's idea of helping to cover the convoys.

The *Hampshire* went into Colombo on October 2, and after coaling proceeded down the east side of the Laccadives, arriving in the morning of the 6th at Male, where she coaled from a collier. Here Captain Grant learned that the *Emden*, with the *Markomannia* and the *Buresk*, had been seen to the eastward of Felidu Atoll, 30 miles further southward, from the 28th of September to 1st October (inclusive), transferring coal underway, the enemy's last course observed being northward.⁶ Accordingly Captain Grant proceeded again at 5.30 p.m. on October 6 for Colombo, where he expected to find the *Empress of Asia*, now attached to him by Admiral Jerram to assist in the *Emden* hunt. She had arrived at Colombo on October 4 with the *Askold* and *Arcadia* convoy, and was then coaling.

50. **Von Spee again located.**—Regarding the other end of the station a piece of intelligence of first-rate importance was received at the Admiralty on September 30 to the effect that the

¹ C. 64, 65.


² Col. Luard's.


³ Log of *Hampshire*.

⁴ C. 65.

⁵ Log of *Yarmouth*.

⁶ Capt. Grant's Report, M. 0309/15.





on October 1, and was due at the Pelew Islands about the 10th. There had been some misapprehension as to their next destination, owing to the difficulty all Japanese find in distinguishing between the letters "r" and "l." The Japanese Naval Attaché in London gave the ultimate station of this squadron correctly as Rabaul, whereas the Japanese officer on Admiral Jerram's Staff reported it as Labuan; this the Admiral welcomed as giving him a larger force for checking the German attempts to get coal out of Manila. The Philippines were still causing him anxiety and a German ship left Cebu without clearance on October 2, having taken a cargo of provisions from the liner *Princess Alice*.¹ He at first had arranged with the authorities in Tokyo that Rear-Admiral Tsuchiyama should co-operate with him to the westward of Long. 140° E., while the First Squadron under Vice-Admiral Yamaya acted in conjunction with Admiral Patey to the eastward of that line.² Finding, however, a few days later that the Second Squadron was bound for Rabaul, not Labuan, he asked the Japanese Admiralty to reconsider its destination, which they agreed to do. Admiral Jerram's opinion was that during the absence of the *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* on convoy duty there should be on each side of the 140th meridian a squadron capable of dealing with the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* until it was quite certain that Admiral von Spee would not return westward from Tahiti.³

If intercepted wireless messages could be entirely trusted the German Admiral intended to keep away from the Western Pacific, for on October 5 Suva Station took in a signal "*Scharnhorst* on the way between Marquesas and Easter Island," to which the station at Wellington added "present position 130° W.," Easter Island being two-thirds of the way from Fiji to Valparaiso. It was probable that von Spee had some knowledge of the naval situation; the station at Thursday Island at 4.45 a.m. on October 7 had taken in another German message *en clair* "Look out; the *Australia* and all large English ships have left Rabaul going east; the Japanese squadron is all over the place; to-day the English established wireless communication with Rabaul. Look out."

52. Division of the Pacific.—That same evening the Japanese Admiralty laid before our Admiralty a proposal based on Admiral Jerram's suggestions. The proposal was that the Western Pacific should be divided into three areas:—

1. West of 140° E., in which the British China Squadron and the Second Japanese Southern Squadron should co-operate.
2. East of 140° E., in which the Australian and First Southern Squadrons should co-operate.
3. East of 160° E., chiefly Society, Marquesas and Low Islands, in which the French ships should act

¹ C 69.² C L 24.³ C L 25.

reinforced as necessary by British and Japanese ships.

4. Each squadron to be stronger than the enemy combined.¹

The chief objection to this arrangement from our point of view was that it would put the Australian squadron with all its racial feelings under Vice-Admiral Yamaya, commanding the First Southern Squadron, and the ultimate arrangement after discussion between the two Admiralties was telegraphed to Admiral Jerram as follows:—

"219. Japanese Second Squadron to cruise north of 20° S. and west of 140° E.

"Japanese First Southern Squadron to cruise north of the equator and east of 140° E.

"The Australian squadron to cruise and search south of the equator and west of 140° W. to include the French islands.

"All these squadrons should communicate whenever possible with each other and their respective Admiralties, and will by their movements assist each other's operations." (9.10.14, sent 6.20 p.m.).

he area detailed to the Second Southern Squadron thus extended from Japan to Australia and included Yap, Anguar, and the Philippines. The squadron had visited Yap on October 7, and found that the wireless had been repaired, used, and re-destroyed. This being so the Japanese Admiralty suggested that the island should be occupied by either British, Australian, or Japanese forces.²

53. **Watch on Manila.**—Admiral Jerram was maintaining a strict patrol over the Philippines with the *Himalaya* and *Empress of Russia*, reinforced on October 9 by the destroyer *Ribble* which the *Himalaya* brought with her after her coaling at Hong Kong on the 5th. Shortly afterwards they were joined by the *Empress of Japan*, who, after taking the prizes *Tannenfels* and *Rio Passig* to Hong Kong on the 8th, proceeded to the Manila patrol. These practically blockaded Manila just outside territorial waters throughout the first fortnight of October. The other squadron based on Sandakan had been increased by the *Nisshin* who was to help in a search of the Banda and Flores Seas for the two mercantile cruisers which the Admiral thought Germany was employing in those waters. Unfortunately, the Japanese cruiser grounded on a shoal outside Sandakan on October 4 and had to return to Singapore, where her damages were found to necessitate some weeks' repair. A few days later the base of the squadron was changed from Sandakan to Darvel Day, which the Senior Officer considered more suitable; and on the 10th the *Clio*, *Cadmus* and three destroyers proceeded south to search Makassar Strait in which persistent rumours had placed a German cruiser.³ There was no information as to the name of this rumoured vessel. The *Geier*, which at first had

¹ M. 02521/14.

² H.S. 45, p. 391.

³ C L 26.

certainly been in that neighbourhood, was now known to have been at Kusaie in the Carolines (163° E.) on September 4, and all the German vessels in the Dutch East Indies were being so satisfactorily looked after by the Dutch that the Admiral no longer considered it necessary to concern himself with them, concentrating his efforts rather on the Philippines. The laxity of the American regulations which seemed to permit the free use of the Philippine ports to German colliers induced him to urge the Admiralty to have representations made to the United States Government, and to make arrangements for preventing the export of Japanese and Australian coal to Manila.¹

The close watch on the Philippine ports necessitated by the attitude of the United States authorities had attracted the armed merchant cruisers originally employed by Admiral Jerram on the patrol of the Hong Kong-Singapore trade route, and he was now quite unable to give any direct protection to merchant ships making that passage. So far, there had been no appearance of the German mercantile cruisers whose advent had been anticipated in the early days of the war. Of the German vessels on our list convertible into cruisers none were unaccounted for except the *Yorck*, *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* and *Seydlitz* which were presumed to have been with the German Admiral at Romanzov Atoll in the Marshalls on the 15th of September. The *Princess Alice* was at Cebu watched by our Borneo Squadron; the *Roon* at Chilachap on the south coast of Java, which had been rumoured to be arming, was under the control of the Dutch, and the *Kleist* had remained safely at Padang since August 7.

54. **More French Transports.**—Some protection had been afforded to the China trade route between the 21st and 29th of September by the passage of the *Arcadia* convoy and its escort²; another French transport, the *Amiral Oly*, had left Hong Kong on September 27 with the *Zhemchug* and arrived at Singapore on October 8. Waiting there were two more French transports—the *Magellan* and *Polynésien*—which had come in from Saigon. The *Zhemchug* was too weak to escort them across the Indian Ocean, and, moreover, her coal endurance was not sufficient; but the Admiral arranged that she should take them as far as Penang, from where the *Yarmouth* should escort them to Bombay to join an Indian convoy, being relieved in the *Emden* hunt by the *Empress of Asia*³; the *Zhemchug's* orders after turning over her convoy were to search the Andaman, Nikobar and Mergui Islands.⁴

55. **Capture of Emden's Colliers.**—Before taking over the French convoy the *Yarmouth* (Captain H. F. Cochrane) was able to carry out an important service. After coaling at

¹ C. 60, 70, 71.

² C. 50.

³ C. 72.

⁴ C.L. 26.


Penang on October 5 she patrolled off Aceh Head till noon on the 11th, when she was ordered by Captain Grant to proceed to the West Coast of Sumatra. He had received news from the Admiralty that the Greek collier *Pontoporos*, known to have been with the *Emden* in the Bay of Bengal, was now anchored off the southern end of Simalur, and as the *Yarmouth* was the nearest of his ships to that spot he sent her there hoping that the *Emden* might possibly be found. Accordingly the *Yarmouth* proceeded on her mission, and at 6.10 a.m. on the 12th was rewarded by sighting two steamers near the expected position. Coming up close she found one of them to be the *Pontoporos* and the other the *Markomannia*, evidently waiting for the *Emden*. The *Yarmouth* sent a prize crew on board the *Pontoporos* to replace the German prize crew in the Greek ship, and, after embarking the Germans from the *Markomannia*, sank her at 1.10 p.m. by four rounds of 6-inch lyddite, two explosive charges having been fired in addition.


The positions in which the *Emden's* colliers had been captured and in which the *Markomannia* was sunk were outside territorial waters, as the Dutch men-of-war on the spot watching the process were able to note. Captain Cochrane in his report does not state why he sank the prize instead of sending her in. He had previously searched the *Markomannia*, and from logs and navigation books seized was able to plot the complete track of the ship from the time she left Tsingtau to the date of her capture.¹

Having got rid of the *Markomannia*, Captain Cochrane proceeded at 8 knots with the *Pontoporos* in company for Penang, where he was due on October 15 to relieve the *Zhemchug* of the French convoy. His place at Aceh Head was to be taken by the *Chikuma*, which had left Madras on the 10th. At 9 a.m. on the 14th, the *Yarmouth* turned the *Pontoporos* over to the *D'Iberville*, and working up to 17 knots, put in to Penang next morning for coal and to discharge her prisoners. This done, she met the *Zhemchug* outside at 7 p.m. on the 15th, took over the convoy, now consisting of the *Amiral Olry*, *Magellan*, *Polynésien*, and the British ship *Empire*, and proceeded for Colombo. The *D'Iberville* reached Singapore with the *Pontoporos* on the 19th, and departed next day for Penang. The *Zhemchug* left Penang on the 16th to make her search of the Andaman and Nikobar Islands, and thus became definitely part of the squadron hunting for the *Emden*.

The Admiralty had endeavoured to augment this force by the *Askold* which had left Colombo on October 6 with the *Arcadia* convoy increased by the *Dupleix* escorting the *El Kantara* and *Cordillère*. Three days later the Admiralty telegraphed to Admiral Jerram that as the *Dupleix* alone would

¹ *Yarmouth's* Report, H.S. 34, pp. 176 to 182. The position was a few miles north of Langeni, where the *Emden* coaled on September 4. See para. 31.





be sufficient escort as far as Suez, the *Askold* could leave the convoy at once and join Captain Grant's squadron in hunting the *Emden*.¹ The Admiral was unable to get this order through to the *Askold* in time to obviate the necessity of her coaling at Aden, and even after her arrival there with the convoy on the 15th, she required five days rest to clean her boilers, and could not leave till the 20th.²

56. **Emden Hunt, October 8-18.**—The *Emden* hunt, therefore, had to be carried on by the *Chikuma* and *Zhemchug* on the eastern side of the Bay of Bengal and the *Hampshire* and the *Empress of Asia* on the west. The last two had met at a rendezvous off Colombo on October 8, and after patrolling that focal point for a few days went in to Colombo to coal. From there Captain Grant decided to visit Diego Garcia ($8\frac{1}{2}$ S., $72\frac{1}{2}$ E.) in the Chagos Archipelago south of the Maldives. The two ships left Colombo and proceeded separately to the Chagos Islands, the *Empress of Asia* going on faster to Diego Garcia on the 15th, while the *Hampshire* remained to the northward of the group. The visit was again a week too late, for the *Emden* had been on the 9th at Diego Garcia where she was heeled to clean her bottom; she coaled from the *Buresk* and sailed next morning northward. In that remote British colony, where mails arrive only twice a year, the inhabitants were unaware of the existence of war, and an interchange of courtesies had taken place, the *Emden* being obliging enough to repair the motor boat of a British resident before departing north again.³ Hearing on the 15th that a ship like the *Emden* had been seen off the Little Basses, on the south-east coast of Ceylon, Captain Grant called up the *Empress of Asia*, and the two returned northward. The report was denied next day, and on the 18th the *Hampshire* and *Empress of Asia* went into Colombo and coaled.⁴

57. **Geier interned.**—In the interval occupied by Captain Grant's cruise the *Geier* had been located. She arrived at Honolulu at 7 a.m. on October 15 with the German collier *Locksun* and began to make extensive repairs. The *Nürnberg*, which at one time Admiral Jerram had considered might turn up in the Indian Ocean⁵, was reported from Australia to have been with the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* just before they bombarded Papieté. On the 15th the gunboat *Komet* fitted with a complete wireless installation had been captured in the Pacific, which reduced by still one more Admiral von Spee's possible channels of communication. Some anxiety had been caused by the idea that the *Roon* at Chilachap had been endeavouring to communicate by wireless with the *Geier* and *Emden*, but this was later found to be groundless.⁶ It was now known that the *Riasan*

¹ C. 73.

² C.L. 27.

³ Von Mücke, I.D. 1014. ⁴ Captain Grant's Report, M. 0309/15.

⁵ C. 74.

⁶ See Monograph: *The First Australasian Convoy*.

had been re-named *Cormoran*, and as the call signs for both *Cormoran* and *Luchs* had been heard, there was some reason to suppose that the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* had been re-named *Luchs* after the gunboat with whose guns she had presumably been armed at Tsingtau. Neither of these two merchant cruisers had as yet done anything hostile, nor was it known definitely where they were.¹

58. **Japanese Movements.**—They could not be among the northern chain of islands, for the First Japanese Squadron, after occupying Jaluit, came westward and searched Kusaie on October 5, Pcnape on the 7th, and Truk on the 11th, at the last place capturing a surveying ship of 110 tons. The Second Squadron visited Yap on October 7 and Pelew on the 8th. At Yap they sank the German surveying vessel *Planet* and learned afterwards that the guns, crew, and ammunition of the *Planet* had previously been transferred to the *Cormoran*, late *Riasan*, which had left Yap on October 1. The Second Squadron then separated. As the *Nisshin*, which it will be remembered had been ordered to assist in the escort of the Australian convoy, would be under repair till too late to join it, Admiral Jerram had requested the Japanese Admiralty to send a ship in her place. They selected the *Yahagi* for this purpose, to be due at Singapore on the 24th, and to meet the convoy at the Cocos Islands, which it would reach a few days after leaving Albany on the 27th. At Admiral Jerram's suggestion the Admiralty seized this opportunity to bring along another French transport, the *Euphrate*, which the *Yahagi* was requested to pick up off Saigon. The second light cruiser of Rear-Admiral Tsuchiyama's Squadron—the *Hirado*—left Pelew Islands on the 10th to cruise through Molucca Passage and the Banda Sea, returning to Pelew about the 21st.² She was to search Portuguese Timor, which German colliers were reported to be using, and, in view of the friendly attitude of Portugal, the Admiralty gave instructions, should any be found, that they were to be seized in territorial waters.² The Borneo Squadron, having found nothing in the Mahassar Strait, returned on October 14 to Darvel Bay, where they resumed the patrol of the Basilan Strait to intercept German supplies from Manila. That port was still closely watched by the *Empress of Russia*, *Empress of Japan*, *Himalaya*, and *Ribble*, acting under the orders of the Comodore at Hong Kong. The Japanese cruiser *Kasuga* left the Pescadores on October 13 to cruise down the east coast of the Philippines, which were thus being so well looked after¹ that it was improbable any coal could get away either to von Spee or the *Emden*, which latter seemed to thrive without supplies from shore, and had in the meanwhile been by no means inactive.

¹ C.L. 27.

² C.L. 76, 77.

CHAPTER X.

THE SECOND MINIKOI RAID.

59. **The Saint Egbert's news.**—The steamer *Saint Egbert* had left Colombo at 5 p.m. October 17, on a course set to pass 40 miles north of Minikoi, about the maximum diversion possible. There was, therefore, some consternation when at early morning of October 20 she put into Cochin on the south-west coast of India with the news that she and six other steamers had been captured by the *Emden* during October 16 to 19, all in the neighbourhood of Minikoi. The departure of ships from Colombo to the north and west was at once stopped for a day; but those from Aden to the eastward were allowed to sail as it was naturally assumed by the Intelligence Officer that by the time they arrived at Minikoi the *Emden* would have made off elsewhere.¹ On board the *Saint Egbert* were the crews of the vessels captured—the *Clan Grant*, *Ponrabbell*, *Ben Mohr*, *Exford*, *Chilkana* all outward bound from home, and the *Troilus* and *Saint Egbert* from Colombo for home. Of these, the most valuable in money was the *Troilus*, a "blue-funnel" liner with a cargo from the Far East and India valued at 700,000L., but to the *Emden* the best prize was undoubtedly the *Exford*, for she was an Admiralty collier with 6,000 tons of Welsh coal intended for Admiral Jerram.²

Just about the time that the *Saint Egbert* put in to Cochin, Captain Grant with the *Hampshire* and *Empress of Asia* had left Colombo to patrol off Dondra Head. The *Yarmouth* was a few hours off Colombo with the French convoy; she reached Colombo at 4 p.m. just as Captain Grant heard the news. He like the Intelligence Officers also assumed that the *Emden* had left the Minikoi area, and thinking it was now time for her to coal and that she must seek a lee in the Maldives in order to do it he proceeded again to Felidu Atoll in case the raider should go there once more.³ The Admiralty delayed the French convoy at Colombo in order to put the *Yarmouth* into the hunt and suggested she should be stationed on the trade routes between Ceylon and Minikoi⁴; she had to coal, and did not get away till 6 a.m. on the 22nd.

60. **Emden's Signal Log.**—Of all the documents available concerning the *Emden*, none is so authentic or so vivid as her signal log. We have only that part of it from October 16 to November 8, but from it we get many sidelights on the methods and daily life of the raider. It opens at 8.40 a.m., October 16, with a dialogue between Captain von Müller and Lieutenant Klöpper, the officer in charge of the *Buresk*. The subject of

¹ C. 78.

² For details of the ships and cargoes, see Fayle: *Seaborne Trade*, Vol. I., Chapter XV.

³ Capt. Grant's report, M. 0309/15.

⁴ C. 79.


the conversation was the *Clan Grant*, captured that morning and in process of digestion. Soap was a perennial need of the *Emden*, and the prize was being searched for it; the Sub-Lieutenant conducting the search was able to report that there was a "lot of soap" on board, and was told to bring off as much as possible. Enquiries were also made for 500 fire bricks. The *Emden* had just rejoined her tenders with the dredger *Ponrabbel*, which she had captured 18 miles north-west of Minikoi¹, and at noon, October 16, was in 8° 26' N., 72° 29' E. After sinking the *Ponrabbel* with three shots¹ the squadron cruised south and west, and that night picked up the *Ben Mohr*. From her skipper Captain von Müller learned that a convoy had been seen near Sokotra escorted by a British cruiser and a warship with five funnels². This intelligence showed him that the *Askold* was in the Indian Ocean. The noon position, October 17, was 8° 14' N., 72° 16' E.—practically that of the day before, but by the 18th the *Emden* had moved eastward to 8° 19' N., 74° 10' E.³ Soon after this, the *Troilus* was captured, and from her it was reported that "the authorities at Colombo have instructed British masters to pass Minikoi 40 miles to the northward." That night the *Saint Egbert* and *Exford* were captured. The *Saint Egbert* had newspapers on board which Captain von Müller immediately sent for. By 6.50 a.m. on the 19th he had made up his mind to send off the captured crews in the *Saint Egbert* to Cochin, and when the *Chilkana* came up her crew joined the others. Among the men from the *Troilus* were two German-speaking Chinese stokers; these were put aboard the *Exford* to help the navigating party there. On the 19th the noon position was 9° 10' N., 74° 58' E. On the 20th, at 7.30 a.m., just about the time that the *Saint Egbert* reached Cochin and Captain Grant left Colombo for Dondra Head, the position was 8° 14' N., 74° 57' E. Captain von Müller was keeping Indian time, 5h. 30m. fast on G.M.T.,⁴ presumably the same as Captain Grant who was cruising from and to Indian ports. From here the *Emden*, *Buresk* and *Exford* steamed south, and at noon were in 7° 9' N., 75° 23' E. At 6.35 p.m. they steered 110° magnetic, and at 7.35 p.m. 120° magnetic in order to pass south of Ceylon. By this time Captain Grant had turned and was coming westward from Dondra Head for Felidu Atoll. Captain von Müller had still the *Buresk* and *Exford* with him. At noon his position was 5° 33' N., 77° 57' E., and at 2 p.m., October 21, since Captain von Müller intended to send off the *Exford* to await him at a rendezvous, the squadron stopped for the last interchange of stores, having all unknowingly had a narrow and almost incredible escape from destruction.


¹ Deposition of Master of *Ponrabbel*, M. 20856/14.

² *Askold*, *Dupleix* and *Arcadia* convoy on the way to Aden.


³ Fikentscher's diary has the entry "18 Oct. in the forenoon *Fernando Po*" a Spanish vessel. There is no mention of this in the signal log of the *Emden*.

⁴ See signal 20th, 3.10 p.m. "From O.L. In 5 minutes flag will be hoisted, G.M.T. 9.45.0." N.L.D. 11618/16.





61. **Emden's Third Escape.**—Her first escape was from the *Hampshire* on September 4 near Simalur; again on September 19 close to Rangoon there had been a possibility of a meeting; and having actually been challenged by the *Chikuma* on September 23 (that is, if the evidence is considered good enough), the *Emden* had just been missed by the *Hampshire* and *Empress of Asia*. During the night they had been steaming in single line ahead for Felidu Atoll; but at 6.30 a.m. the *Empress of Asia* began to move up to take position at 20 miles on the *Hampshire's* starboard beam. In so doing she was steering almost direct for the *Emden*, and when at 8 a.m. the *Empress of Asia* turned to port, having reached her station on the *Hampshire's* starboard beam, she was only a few miles from the German cruiser and her two colliers. Rain squalls obscured the view, and the little German squadron passed unobserved only 5 miles astern of the *Empress of Asia*¹. It was the narrowest escape of the *Emden's* adventurous career.



¹ See plan. The *Emden* stopped at 2 p.m. in $5^{\circ} 25' N.$, $78^{\circ} 12' E.$, which gives a speed of 8.5 knots. Both this and the noon position may, of course, be unreliable.

Abstracts from ships' logs:—

Hampshire, Noon position by observation October 21, $5^{\circ} 8' N.$, $76^{\circ} 49' E.$ No current. Course, midnight to noon, S. 68 W. true, 11 knots. Weather, 4 a.m. overcast, passing showers; 8 a.m. overcast, raining.

Empress of Asia, noon position, October 21, $5^{\circ} 29' N.$, $76^{\circ} 42' E.$ No current. Courses, 8 a.m. to noon S. 68 W., 11 knots; 6.30 to 8 a.m. N. 67 W., 16 knots, to take station 20' on *Hampshire's* starboard beam. Weather, overcast, raining.


61 (a). **New Instructions to Intelligence Officers.**—The *Emden's* successes off Minikoi suggested to the Admiralty the issue of new general instructions to Intelligence Officers. By these it was enjoined that the instructions by Reporting or Intelligence Officers should, whenever possible, be handed to masters of vessels in writing and a copy kept; masters were to distrust colours hoisted by approaching warships, and to avoid smoke; moreover, Intelligence Officers were to take care that vessels scattered widely on both sides of their usual track rather than proceeded on a definite route parallel to the normal one.¹


The *Askold* sailed from Aden eastward on October 20, having left the *Dupleix* behind; the French ship had been put under the East Indies Admiral on the 12th to assist with the Indian convoys;² but the *Askold* could not arrive on the scene of the *Emden's* late activities for at least a week. On the east side of the Bay of Bengal the *Chikuma* and *Zhemchug* were both usefully employed in guarding the focal point at Acheh Head and searching the islands for possible colliers of the *Emden*.

62. **Japanese Squadron to participate in Emden Hunt.**—The only way in which Admiral Jerram could increase the force in search of the *Emden* was by depleting the squadron on guard over Manila, and he therefore ordered the *Empress of Russia*, then coaling at Hong Kong, down to Singapore. She could not leave till the 25th, and feeling that this was not enough, he was constrained to ask for further assistance in the only quarter likely to supply it. Pointing out that the *Emden* had become a serious menace to British and Japanese trade, he asked the Japanese Admiralty, through our naval attaché at Tokyo, whether they would be willing to send the *Hirado* at once to Singapore, to be followed as soon as possible, by one or two more cruisers if they could be spared. In reply, the Japanese Admiralty announced that they would form a new squadron in the Indian Ocean to be composed of the cruisers *Tokiwa* and *Yakumo*³ under a Vice-Admiral, to which, on arrival, would be added the *Ibuki* and *Yahagi*, when released from convoy duty, the *Nisshin* when repaired, and the *Chikuma*; they also asked that the *Hampshire*, *Minotaur* and *Yarmouth* should co-operate with the Japanese Admiral. In telegraphing this reply to the Admiralty, Admiral Jerram observed:—"This scheme presents many practical difficulties as to working, and involves employment of Japanese Vice-Admiral on East Indies station senior to C-in-C., East Indies; but I can see no alternative likely

¹ C. 83.² C. 75.

³		Tons.	Trial speed.	Guns.
<i>Tokiwa</i>	- - - -	9,700	22.7	4-8", 16-6".
<i>Yakumo</i>	- - - -	9,646	21.0	4-8", 12-6".





"to be acceptable to the Japanese, who, I am inclined to think, rather object to employment of their ships under the direct orders of British officers. If it is accepted, it should be conditional on definite spheres of action being assigned to Japanese and our forces respectively, which can be arranged by me when Japanese Admiral arrives at Singapore. I have referred this matter to Admiralty, as it largely affects East Indies station. If Japanese proposal is approved, I will communicate with Tokyo as necessary, and I might at the same time suggest a Rear-Admiral junior to C.-in-C., East Indies, would be preferable to a Vice-Admiral."¹ The Admiralty, considering the Japanese aid invaluable, invited the Japanese Admiralty direct to employ their squadron east of 90° E., the meridian which bisects the Bay of Bengal, and guard the focal points at Cape Negrais, Acheh Head, and Sunda Straits, using as bases Rangoon, Penang, and Singapore.² They also asked that the *Ibuki* might remain with the *Minotaur* till the Australian convoy had completed its voyage; this was now assembling in King George Sound, Albany, and was to proceed for Europe as soon as ready. At Cocos Island it was to be joined by the *Yahagi* with the French transports *Euphrate* and *Latouche-Treville*, which the Japanese cruiser had brought to Singapore on the 26th.³

The *Askold* arrived at Colombo from Aden on October 26, but had been ordered to take up to Bombay the French convoy, to which was now added a contingent of volunteers from Ceylon embarked in the *Worcestershire*. She left on the 27th with them and arrived at Bombay four days later, so that she took no part in hunting for the *Emden*, which had meanwhile carried out perhaps her most daring achievement.

CHAPTER XI.

PENANG RAIDED.

63. **Emden Hunt after Second Minikoi Raid.**— Captain Grant, little knowing how near he had come to finishing the *Emden's* career, carried on to Felidu Atoll. There he gained no recent news. There seemed to be nothing better to do than to patrol the focal points again, so coming up the East side of the Maldives while the *Empress of Asia* took the West, he returned to Dondra Head and put into Colombo on October 27 with three days' defects.

The Admiralty, like Captain Grant, had "formed the opinion" that the best way to deal with the *Emden* was to guard the

¹ C. 80, 81, 82.

² C. 84.

³ C.L. 28.

"focal points where the trade converges . . . rather than "guesswork searching";¹ the Eastern focal points would be looked after by the Japanese, but it did not appear from the operations of the hunting squadron that Calcutta was sufficiently in mind, and they ordered Admiral Jerram to station either the *Hampshire* or *Yarmouth* off the Hugli, the other to remain with the *Empress of Asia* between Ceylon and Minikoi.² But the *Emden* had no intention of re-appearing in that neighbourhood.

64. Movements of Emden—October 21–28.—Captain von Müller did not remain long near Ceylon. Having detached the *Exford* in 5° 25' N., 78° 12' E. at 4.30 p.m. October 21, he sent her at 7 knots to a rendezvous which is not mentioned in his Signal Log; he himself with the *Buresk* continued south-eastward out of all the tracks and then cut across them up towards the Nikobars. This route of his implies that he did not at this moment intend to trouble about merchant ships, and the deduction is strengthened when we find him ordering the *Buresk* to close in at night: "a distance of a thousand metres" on the beam is far too much."³ In the afternoon of October 23, when still 100 or more miles South of the trade route, he carried out target practice, probably in preparation for the firing to come; it could hardly be with a view to further commerce raiding that he expended some of his irreplaceable ammunition. He was making for Nankauri in the Nikobars, where he intended to coal, although he had neither charts nor sailing directions of the neighbourhood. At 6.35 p.m., October 26, the two ships anchored and coaling began.

Here there is a break in the record of signals, but we know what happened afterwards. On October 27, after coaling was done, Captain von Müller detached the *Buresk* and then made straight for Penang. This was the base of the French destroyers and their broken-down cruiser *D'Iberville*. From there also the *Chikuma* and *Zhemchug* carried out their periodical sweeps of the Andamans and Nikobars. The *Chikuma* had left Penang on October 24 to have another look at Simalur in case the *Emden* should come after her colliers, and the *Zhemchug* had just completed a round tour of the Nikobars, Andamans and the Mergui Archipelago; had she gone the other way round she might have been just in time to catch the German ships at Nankauri. Arriving at Penang on October 26 she began to clean boilers and make good defects.

Penang Harbour is a sheltered anchorage formed by the channel running North and South between the Island of Penang and the mainland of the Malay Peninsula. The Southern entrance has only 3 fathoms and was not used by men-of-war. The *Yarmouth*, when repairing at Penang, laid out a stern

¹ Admiralty to Japanese Naval Attaché, H.S. 17, p. 379.

² C. 85.

³ Signal at 5.35 p.m., October 22, N.I.D. 11618.

anchor and hauled up to it so as to lie East and West and thus command the Northern entrance with her broadside, and when the *Zhemchug* came in to clean her boilers, an operation for which her Captain demanded seven days, it was impressed upon him that he should, like the *Yarmouth*, haul up to a stern anchor. Eventually the Captain concurred and gave orders for it to be done; but nevertheless on October 28 the *Zhemchug* was not across the channel, but was lying with her stern to the northern entrance and her head to the tide, which at daybreak was flooding in from the South. Lieutenant Maund, R.N., the liaison Officer for the *Zhemchug*, knowing that a poor system of look out was maintained, had felt some doubt whether alarm signals from the shore would be seen in the Russian ship, and taking up his position at military headquarters, obtained a launch, by which means he hoped to reach her in time to give warning, if necessary. The *Zhemchug* was in the man-of-war anchorage on the North side of the harbour, with the result that a raiding cruiser could fire at her without coming in to the port at all. Further inward were the two French destroyers, *Pistolet* and *Fronde*, secured broadside to broadside at the northernmost pier. The *Pistolet* was at one hour's notice; but the *Fronde* had her fires out. Still further inward was the *D'Iberville*. She was overhauling her machinery, and in view of the danger which the man-of-war anchorages offered in the event of a surprise attack had, for the first time, taken up an inside billet among the merchant ships.¹

Penang was entirely undefended by shore works, but the third French destroyer *Mousquet* was on guard outside, and a launch, manned by natives, patrolled the entrance to give the alarm. Such then was the condition of Penang where Captain von Müller had determined to operate. The intelligence he had received was so scanty and unreliable that he had no idea the *Zhemchug* was there; it was the *Dupleix* that he expected to find.²

67. Emden at Penang.—In the mist of the tropical dawn, painted the British grey and fitted with a dummy fourth funnel, the *Emden* entered the harbour of Penang by the North Channel at 5.15 a.m. on the 28th; her appearance and an undistinguishable flag lying in folds at the fore deceived the patrol launch into the assumption that she was a British cruiser, and she was allowed to pass unchallenged into the port. When about half a mile from the *Zhemchug* the *Emden* hoisted German colours and discharged a torpedo which took effect on the port quarter of the Russian cruiser and flooded the engine-room. Then when nearly abeam, the *Emden* fired about a dozen rounds, the splinters and fragments doing a good deal of damage to the *Zhemchug*. The Russian was by this time

¹ Report from *D'Iberville*, H.S. 34, p. 120.


² Plotz's Diary, M 04520/14.

beginning to wake up, but it was not till the *Emden* had passed her that a gun was fired; the *Zhemchug* in the whole course of the action expended only 12 rounds. Steaming on past the French destroyers and the *D'Iberville*, who made no attempt to fire, Captain von Müller turned in towards them and retraced his course, still firing at the *Zhemchug*.¹ As he passed the Russian cruiser on the return journey he gave her another torpedo which exploded the foremost magazine, whereupon the *Zhemchug* sank. Captain von Müller had seen the *D'Iberville* and seems to have intended to attack her next. The people on shore observed him to slow down and put his helm over after passing the *Zhemchug* the second time; but, from the accounts of officers on board the *Emden* it appears that just then it was reported to him that a cruiser was entering the port. He, therefore, turned northward again to meet the new comer, which soon proved to be the patrol launch, exaggerated by the mirage into something more formidable.² He had opened fire on her, but ceased as soon as he found it was a boat filled with unarmed natives. He, however, did not turn back but continued his course; and being now clear of the channel steered westerly along the north coast of the island of Penang. He evidently did not fear pursuit; off the north-west corner of the island and only a dozen miles from the men-of-war in the port he stopped a steamer—the *Glenturret*—on her way in. She was carrying ammunition, and in accordance with the custom, she had the red flag at her mast-head. The *Emden* enquired what this meant and was told it signified that the *Glenturret* was carrying paraffin. Before the *Emden's* boarding party could make an investigation, the cruiser sighted a warship on the horizon, and hurriedly recalling his men, Captain von Müller made off to meet the enemy, having left with the master of the *Glenturret* a message of regret for his firing on the unarmed launch half an hour before. As the distance lessened the mirage faded, and the approaching warship was seen to be a destroyer. It was the *Mousquet*; she put up a gallant fight under her Commander Théroinne, but was overpowered and sunk in ten minutes. Meanwhile, the *Glenturret* had got into Penang. Satisfied with his hour's work, Captain von Müller, after picking up the survivors of the *Mousquet*, continued his course. By this time, the *Pistolet* was ready to leave;³ working up to 20 knots she maintained touch with the *Emden* till 10 a.m., when a hot bearing developed, and she had to slow down. The *Fronde* was coming up; but she never succeeded in reaching the cruiser and went on to Acheh Head without


¹ According to Plotz, *Emden* expended 100 rounds at Penang.

² Von Mücke.

³ In Lieut. Maund's report the time of *Pistolet* leaving is given as about 7.30 a.m.; the Captain of the *D'Iberville* in his written report says she was ready at 6.35 a.m., and his telegram of 28.10.14 says *Pistolet* and *Fronde* left at 7 a.m.



Ordnance Survey, 1921.



seeing her. Having warned the *Chikuma* and *Yahagi* of the *Emden's* probable presence, she returned to Penang. The *D'Iberville* got away at 10 a.m.; but with one engine broken down could get only as far as the north-west corner of Penang Island, where she looked for the wreck and survivors of the *Mousquet*. Of the *Zhemchug's* crew, 1 officer and 90 men were killed and 2 officers and 106 men wounded.

It is obvious from what has been said that the Russian cruiser was unprepared, and we find in Lieut. Maund's Report: "On board the *Zhemchug* only the after-gun and No. 2 star-board gun were cleared away, the latter being on the reverse side of the ship towards the island, while only 12 rounds of ammunition were provided on deck—6 to each gun cleared away. The ammunition from the starboard gun was transferred to the foremost gun, its opposite number having been put out of action at once by a boat falling across it. It also became necessary to flood the after magazine as smoke was seen to be rising from it. Fire was opened by *Zhemchug* when the *Emden* had passed her, and about 12 rounds in all were fired, two hits being obtained but unfortunately on the superstructure only."¹

From the long and eloquent report of Commander Audemard of the *D'Iberville*² the following are extracts:—

"In the morning of this same day, towards 5.30 a.m., *D'Iberville*, *Pistolet* and *Fronde* being in the anchorage off Georgetown I was awakened by a deafening detonation resembling a distant clap of thunder, followed almost immediately by several others, the character of which could only be defined as a vigorous gunfire.

When I went on deck, it was scarcely dawn, the ships at their moorings being vaguely outlined in the mist, on a calm sea.

"A mile away from us, bearing E.N.E., the Russian cruiser *Zhemchug*, to which my attention was immediately drawn, was disappearing in a cloud of yellowish smoke which enveloped her right up to her masthead.

"A few degrees on her right appeared the vague silhouette of a four-funelled man-of-war which seemed to be making for the usual anchorage to the east of Cornwallis Light.

"The firing having ceased, my first impression was that the *Zhemchug*, by some fatal error, had opened fire on one of the allied ships.

"This opinion was shared by my officers, who, like myself, saw in the smoke of the *Zhemchug* the evidence of her aggression, since the newly-arrived cruiser appeared to have been under her fire without replying.

"The sudden cessation of fire could but confirm our opinion. The allied ships had doubtless recognised each other, and without delay I ordered away the boats to render assistance to the victims of what we considered to be an inexplicable error.

"Scarcely had this order been carried into effect when a violent detonation, similar to the first one, was heard; at the same time the unknown cruiser, completing her turn towards the open sea behind

¹ The claim to these last two hits we know from the *Emden's* signal log to be mistaken.

² H.S. 34, pp. 118 to 125.

several merchant ships which had momentarily hidden her from our view, showed her four funnels, of which the foremost one was visibly a dummy.

"Simultaneously we cried: 'It is the *Emden*,' and each man proceeded to his action station, the guns were loaded and ready to fire at my order

" The opportunity for the *D'Iberville* to open fire on the hostile cruiser occurred when the latter, at a distance of at least 2,000 metres, bore about 15° from right aft, the bows obviously heading the same way as those of *D'Iberville*. The only guns able to bear in this direction were two 65 mm. and two 47 mm. The after 10 cm. gun, the only one which could have produced any effect on this occasion, would not bear.

"Under these conditions could I give the order to open fire? I did not think so. To open fire would have been for the enemy, already triumphant, but the signal for another easy victory. For us, the useless sacrifice of our 300 sailors and the final annihilation of the allied forces assembled at Penang. For all these reasons I did not hesitate in keeping silent, at the same time holding myself ready to reply vigorously to any attack by the enemy.

"On board the torpedo boats secured alongside, about 1,300 metres S.S.W. of *Zhemchug*, the situation was just as full of anxiety as that on board *D'Iberville*. There prevailed there the same indecision concerning the motives of this inconceivable aggression, and each one attempted to penetrate this mystery, which, as on board us, was elucidated only on the *Emden* leaving, the cruiser then being outside the range of their torpedoes.

"The torpedo boats immediately commenced the preparation for sea; *Pistolet* was ready at 6.35 a.m. and departed in pursuit of the *Emden*

Commander Audemard mentions no arrangements for passing alarm signals, and it seems clear that there was no efficient means of communication to the ships in the harbour. Each had to get its information from its own look-out.

A contemporary German report of the incident may be of interest. As soon as the *Emden* rejoined the *Buresk* signals began to pass, and in the *Emden's* signal log we find:—

" 7 a.m. From *Buresk*. Captain to Torpedo Lieutenant. Good morning! It is time to get up. The sun does not appear to be shining in your cabin. Congratulations on your splendid success. The torpedo weapon has, as usual, done a lot. Please send me a short report by signal

"7.45. To *Buresk*. Good morning! The torpedo lieutenant is asleep and would fly at my head if I waked him. We arrived at Penang at 4 a.m., were in harbour about 5 a.m., only recognised *Zhemchug* at 800 metres. Fired first torpedo from starboard tube at 300 metres; hit her below the after-funnel. She at once settled by the stern up to the upper port-holes. Simultaneously directed devastating fire on her deck and crews' quarters. She looked like a sieve. Went about, in passing to port fired a torpedo. Tremendous explosion. Forepart torn away. Two minutes afterwards when smoke had cleared away ship had disappeared. Fire was opened on us from *Zhemchug* and elsewhere, but we were not hit. After all, the performance of the torpedo was nothing very special. Then recognised the *D'Iberville* in harbour. On going about to fire, what appeared to be a torpedo boat came in full speed towards her, opened fire, turned and recognised as a Government steamer. Later the *Mousquet* was sighted. Fire was opened at 4,600 metres. She

replied at intervals, but at 4,000 metres after the third salvo was observed to be hit, the boiler having exploded. She was fired at until she sank. 36 of crew saved out of 78, almost all wounded; three have since died here. Sent by steamer to Sabang. *Pontoporos* has been captured."

The raid on Penang, successful though it had been in a military sense, brought about far less disturbance of commerce than the bombardment of Madras. "Its effect on the immediate movements of shipping was surprisingly small. Some alarm indeed was excited in Calcutta . . . but though the port was closed for a few hours and several steamers which had just put to sea returned to the Hooghly, the interruption of trade was too short to be appreciable."¹

66. Hunting Squadron Reinforced.—Admiral Jerram on receipt of the intelligence that the *Emden* had sunk the *Zhemchug* countermanded the departure of the French transports from Singapore and ordered the *Yahagi* to proceed at full speed up the Malacca Straits to work with and under the *Chikuma* from Acheli Head to Rangoon. The *Empress of Russia*, which arrived at Singapore at 7 a.m. on October 29, he ordered to join the *Hampshire*, after coaling, and she managed to get away at 4.30 that afternoon. The *Hugli* now seemed a long way from the scene of operations, and Admiral Jerram, considering that the ship told off by the Admiralty for that area would be more usefully employed off the S.E. coast of Ceylon, obtained the Admiralty's approval to station the *Yarmouth* there.² As she had to coal she returned from Minikoi to Colombo on October 29, and was ordered by Captain Grant, when she left at 6 a.m. on the 1st of November, to patrol south and east of Ceylon, coaling if necessary at Madras. The *Hampshire* had to spend from the 27th to the 30th of October in harbour repairing defects, and the *Empress of Asia* remained at Colombo attending to her condensers from the 26th of October till November 2, when she rejoined the *Hampshire* off Cape Comorin. The *Askold* was also delayed by defects at Bombay, and would not be ready for sea till November 4, when she was to be sent to patrol the trade routes between Madras and Calcutta.³

To increase the squadron available for dealing with the raider the Admiralty decided to bring a light cruiser from the Mediterranean, and ordered Malta to send either *Dublin* or *Gloucester* with all despatch to Aden, where further orders would be given. The *Gloucester* was selected, and she left Malta next day.

A speedier reinforcement should be, however, available from East Africa. The definite location of the *Königsberg* up the Rufiji River, East Africa, by the *Chatham* on October 30 changed the nature of the operations against the enemy from a

¹ Fayle: *Seaborne Trade*, I. 270.

² C. 86, 97.

³ C. 88.

widespread search to the blockade of the mouth of the river, and released for other duties some of the force till then employed in the search. A scheme of operations was devised to meet the new conditions and this was telegraphed to the authorities concerned, that part of the scheme immediately affecting the China command being:—

"259. *Dartmouth* and *Weymouth* to operate against *Emden*, proceeding *via* St. Pierre (Providence Island), Diego Garcia, up the Maldiv Islands to Minikoi and thence to Colombo." (Sent 31.10.1914.)

This order was not immediately obeyed. The two ships joined the *Chatham* off the Rufiji River on November 2, the *Dartmouth* returning to Mombasa next day to coal. A force was at that moment landing at Tanga in German East Africa under the protection of the *Fox*, which was, therefore, not yet able to relieve the *Dartmouth*.


To the Admiralty the dispositions made seemed to ignore the area in which the *Emden* had first appeared, and still feeling uneasy that the Hugli was open to attack they telegraphed to Admiral Jerram:—


"267. The *Gloucester* is en route to assist in *Emden* hunt. Now that *Königsberg* has been located, *Weymouth* and *Dartmouth* are also proceeding to search for *Emden*. Until *Askold* can arrive off Calcutta cannot one cruiser be sent to watch that focal point where *Emden* was so successful?" (Sent 4.11.1914.)

In accordance with this the Admiral directed the *Yarmouth*, which he had previously stationed off the south-east coast of Ceylon, to cruise between Madras and Calcutta, paying strict attention to the focal point off the latter place, until relieved by the *Askold* then on her way from Bombay which she had left on November 4. The *Empress of Russia* proceeded from Colombo for Minikoi at 7 a.m. on November 4, on learning which the Admiralty informed Captain Grant that it was not "desirable" for armed liners to cruise about without the support of a "cruiser."¹

67. **Effect of the Battle of Coronel.**—It was in the early morning of November 4 that the Admiralty learned from Valparaiso that Admiral von Spee had inflicted a signal defeat on our South American Squadron off the coast of Chile, and had now the South Atlantic open to him. As far as the Indian Ocean was concerned, no particular danger was anticipated since the German Admiral was unlikely to arrive before he could be intercepted; but among possible objectives for his next movements was an attack on the base of our expedition against German South-West Africa, and to increase the naval protection in that district the Admiralty countermanded their orders for the *Dartmouth* to join in the *Emden* hunt, sending her instead to Simon's Bay. A more powerful ship was available in the *Minotaur*, which, with the *Ibuki*, *Melbourne* and *Sydney* and the

¹ To Intelligence Officer, Colombo, 8.55 p.m., 4.11.14.





First Australian convoy, had left Australia on November 1 for Colombo. On November 6 the Admiralty ordered her also to Simon's Bay, leaving the convoy in charge of the Senior Officer, Captain Silver of the *Melbourne*. These alterations in his command were explained to Admiral Jerram in:—

"270. Owing to situation in South Atlantic *Dartmouth* has been ordered to Simon's Bay. *Weymouth* is proceeding as ordered in my 259." (Sent 5.11.14.)

and:—

"272. *Minotaur* has been ordered to leave convoy and proceed to South Africa at once, a very urgent necessity having arisen.

"*Triumph* will be your flagship and should return south when she can be conveniently withdrawn from Tsingtau, being replaced by a sloop." (Sent 6.11.14.)

To meet the possibility that the German Admiral might go north from Valparaiso the *Australia* was sent across to join the Anglo-Japanese squadron off the west coast of Mexico; and to provide protection to the Commonwealth we asked the Japanese to station one of their southern squadrons at Fiji. There remained the Eastern Archipelago, and here the Admiralty looked to the Japanese for assistance. They sent to the Japanese Admiralty:—

"With regard to the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific, it is now known that *Emden* is the only enemy ship at large. We, therefore, hope that the Japanese squadrons and vessels not involved in the eastward movement will draw westward into the vicinity of Sumatra and the Dutch East Indies in order to block every exit and deny every place of shelter up to the 90th meridian of east longitude.

"British Admiralty are combining in Indian waters in search of *Emden* the following light cruisers:—*Weymouth*, *Gloucester*, *Yarmouth*, *Melbourne*, *Sydney*, the armoured cruiser *Hampshire*, and Russian cruiser *Askold*. These ships will be ready by the middle of November. Thus by concerted action between the Allied fleets the *Emden* should be speedily run down."¹

To this the Japanese Admiralty agreed, and the net round the *Emden* seemed to be growing complete. Vice-Admiral Tochinai with the *Tokiwa* and *Yakumo* should arrive at Signapore from Hong Kong on November 8, when he would be joined by the *Chikuma* and *Yahagi*, and he would take charge of the operations in the eastern half of the Bay of Bengal. The *Nisshin*, when her repairs were complete, would join him, as would also the *Ibuki* as soon as she had been relieved of the Australian convoy. Another ship on her way to join the Japanese Admiral was the *Ikoma*,² which had left

¹ H.S 17, p. 531.

—	Date.	Tons.	Tria! Speed.	Guns.
<i>Ikoma</i> (cruiser) -	1908	13,750	21·9	4-12"; 12-6"; 12-4·7"

Shimonoseki on November 1, escorting the transport *Moumouthshire*. This vessel was bringing ammunition from Japan and was to embark some troops at Hong Kong on arrival on November 7.

Other small vessels shortly due at Singapore were the *Pyramus* and *Philomel*, which left Fremantle on November 3 and were destined for use in the Red Sea; the Borneo Division (*Clio*, *Cadmus* and destroyers) was also due in a few days as Admiral Jerram had called them to Singapore. In his opinion "the efforts of German colliers to escape from Manila appeared to have ceased and the two armed merchant cruisers and the destroyer stationed outside Manila were sufficient to deal with them."¹ They examined Tambelan Island and St. Barbe on the way as the enemy had been reported to have used those islands as a wireless station and coaling base.²

At 7 a.m. on November 7, Tsingtau capitulated. This released the *Triumph* and *Usk* for other service; but it was some time before they could get away, since Captain Fitzmaurice had to superintend the embarkation of the British troops which had participated in the assault.


68. **Geier Interned.**—Next day (November 8) the *Geier* and the German auxiliary *Locksun* were interned at Honolulu, a long-delayed consummation which now relieved Admiral Jerram of further anxiety about them.


The *Geier's* career, so far as we know it, had been uneventful. She had been at Singapore preparing to cross to East Africa when surprised by the war. She left on July 29 and seems to have wandered about among the Eastern Archipelago for some months. She met the *Emden* near Angaur on August 20,² and on September 4 achieved her only success against commerce. In the harbour of Kusaie, one of the Eastern Caroline Islands, she found a steamer, the *Southport*, disabled its engines, and then thinking it safe departed on a fortnight's cruise, probably for food and coal as these seemed to be her great need. When she came back the bird had flown; the *Southport's* crew had ingeniously put together what they could muster of the machinery and had managed to escape. The *Geier* made no more captures, and when she reappeared it was at Honolulu where her only course was to accept internment. If commerce-raiding had been her object, her net achievement was nil. The other German armed vessels about which Admiral Jerram had been from time to time disturbed were now causing him less anxiety. The *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* had been definitely located with von Spee off the Chilean Coast, and the *Cormoran* so far had not been reported anywhere.

The *Emden* had given no further signs of her presence beyond sending in to Sabang on November 1, the 34 survivors

¹ C.L. 29.

² Fikentscher's Diary; also I.D.H.S., Vol. 508, p. 153.





of the *Mousquet* which Captain von Müller had put aboard the *Newburn*—a British ship he had met 140 miles west of Sabang on October 30. It will be remembered that the officer of the watch in the *Emden* had signalled to the *Buresk* when they met that the *Pontoporos* had been captured. This last item of information may have been obtained from the French prisoners. The *D'Iberville* had taken the *Pontoporos* to Singapore before returning to Penang, and the French sailors might not know of the capture of the *Markomannia*, which is not mentioned in this signal. But there was no secret about it; the Admiralty had announced in the "Times" of October 16 that the *Yarmouth* had captured the *Markomannia* and *Pontoporos* and the fact that on October 31 the news was fresh enough to be signalled implies that Captain von Müller's sources of intelligence, even in Dutch waters, were not particularly efficient. Anyhow, the news was enough to keep him away from the rendezvous to which he had sent the *Pontoporos*, and after picking up the *Buresk*, west of Sabang, Sumatra, in lat. $1^{\circ} 33' N.$, long. $95^{\circ} 23' E.$, at dawn on October 31, Captain von Müller proceeded down the west coast of Sumatra. Two days later he took 540 tons of coal from the *Buresk*, having taken 1,875 tons in all from her cargo of 6,700 tons¹; the scene of this coaling appears to have been 7 miles east of North Pagai Island.² He then steamed across the Sunda Strait at 5 knots from south to north, till at noon on November 5 he was in $6^{\circ} 9' S.$, $105^{\circ} 7' E.$ It may be guessed that he was expecting a friendly steamer, since on November 1 he had signalled: "There may be a chance to send letters home during the next few days. Letters to be delivered to officers of divisions not later than 4 p.m., November 3." The expected meeting does not seem to have taken place, and at noon, November 5, he steamed off south-west at 10 knots for what was to be his last exploit.

CHAPTER XII.

THE EMDEN'S END.

69. **Raid on the Cable Station at Cocos Island.**—Captain von Müller's operations had been so varied that to forecast his next proceeding seemed impossible. After a raid on commerce, near Calcutta and Rangoon, he had set the oil tanks at Madras on fire. After sinking ships west of Ceylon, he had mended a motor boat at Diego Garcia, and having attracted our ships to that out-of-the-way place, had reappeared at Minikoi. Next, Penang, 1,500 miles from Minikoi, received his attention. Where

¹ Signal, November 3, 4.10 p.m.

² M. 0717/15.

would he go next? He might assume that by this time we should have taken effective measures to protect our trade route; if so, it would not be there that he would be found. Perhaps another raid might be expected.

Such a raid had been in Captain von Müller's mind since on October 21 he had detached the *Exford*; and it was now for her rendezvous (40' N. of Cocos Island)¹ that he was steaming with the *Buresk* in company. He carried out target practice again on November 7, and at dawn on November 8 picked up the *Exford*. His first inquiry from her was whether she had seen anything yet; but the reply was: "Have been here since October 30, and have seen nothing of the expected steamers."² After taking two barrels of flour and two of salt meat from her, he detached her again in charge of Lieutenant Lauterbach, and at 4.50 p.m. set his course, with the *Buresk* in company, due south for the Cocos Islands.

That the exposed position of the Cocos Islands would render it liable to attack had been foreseen by Admiral Jerram, who remarks in a despatch:—

"... The possibility of Cocos Island being seized by *Emden* had been constantly in my mind, and although I could not possibly spare a ship to be stationed there permanently I had instructed the cable station as to the precautions to adopt and the necessity of giving immediate warning in the event of a surprised attack, and furnished it with a list of the secret wireless call signs of all allied ships in these waters."³

Accordingly, when the *Emden* appeared the officers of the Eastern Telegraph Company were ready to act. The wireless operator immediately sent out "S.O.S.; S.O.S.; S.O.S.; Strange warship at entrance" *en clair* but was speedily jammed by the *Emden's* telefunken and was unable to get any further wireless signals through. The *Emden* at once lowered two boats manned by landing parties with maxims, news which the operator telegraphed by cable to all the stations he could reach. At Singapore the news caused Admiral Jerram some anxiety for the safety of the Australasian convoy, from which the *Minotaur* had parted about 24 hours before. The convoy, now under the escort of the *Melbourne*, *Sydney* and *Ibuki*, with Captain Silver of the *Melbourne* as senior officer, he knew to be near the Cocos Islands, and fearing a night attack on it he ordered the *Hampshire*, *Empress of Asia* and *Empress of Russia* to proceed at high speed to meet it and cover the remainder of its voyage to Colombo.³ His other arrangements he reported to the Admiralty in—


"258. Cocos or Keeling Island report this morning that *Emden* had arrived there and was sending two boats ashore armed with maxim guns.


"Telegraphic communication then ceased.

¹ See *Emden's* signal log, noon, November 8.

² Signal log, November 8, 7.26 a.m.

³ C.L. 30.





"*Yakumo* leaves Singapore this evening with *Colne*, *Jed*, *Welland* for Sunda Strait.

"Cable ship *Patrol* will join them there about November 13, and proceed with *Yakumo* to Cocos to repair cable, leaving destroyers to continue patrol of Sunda Strait.

"Vice-Admiral Tochinai, in *Tokima*, leaves Singapore to-morrow, November 10, for northern end of Sumatra; *Nisshin* will follow him November 16 or 17.

"I do not propose to disturb other ships from their present stations.

"*Clio* will act as wireless link between Singapore and ships in Sunda Strait."

(Received at Admiralty 8.15 a.m., 9.11.14.)

It was not till next morning that he learned that these efforts to block the eastern exit of the Indian Ocean against the *Emden* were no longer necessary.

The landing party sent by Captain von Müller "got to work" in double quick time. I¹ and the two W/T operators were the first at the W/T station, where calls for help were still being sent out. We at once destroyed the accumulator, electric machinery, motor engine, switchboard, &c. Another party did the same work in the telegraph house. Lieutenant-Commander von Mücke fished up the cable and cut it through. The W/T mast was blown up and also a house with spare cables."

70. The "**Sydney**" comes up.—By this means Cocos Island was cut off from all communication with the rest of the world. But the S.O.S. signal had been heard, and help was speedily coming. The *Melbourne* (Captain Silver) in charge of the Australasian convoy intercepted the call shortly before 7 a.m. on November 9. the convoy being then about 55 miles to the northward of Cocos. Captain Silver knew only that the enemy was a cruiser and not having been informed that the *Königsberg* was safely blockaded up the Rufiji River could not be certain whether it was the *Emden* or the *Königsberg*. The safety of the convoy was his first consideration, but there was also the fact that the *Emden* was within reach, and might possibly attack his charge after dealing with the cable station. He chose to attack her first. In his despatch he says:—

"I decided that it was in the interest of the safety of the convoy to get into touch with this cruiser, which could only be *Emden* or *Königsberg*.

"I thereupon directed *Sydney* to raise steam for full speed and proceed to Cocos. I also directed *Sydney* by W/T to rejoin convoy with despatch in case the cruiser had, in the meanwhile, departed."²

The *Minotaur*, to whom the S.O.S. signal had been made in the first instance, took it in at 6.20 a.m., and sent the following signals:—

"To *Melbourne*, 6 30 a.m. Cocos Island reports strange ship of war at entrance. Suggest you send ship to examine.

¹ Letter from Hastrich, a member of the *Emden's* crew to Engine P.O. Jagittis, N.I.D. 9663/15.

² M. 04523/14.

"To Melbourne, 7.15 a.m. If you wish me to return please inform me at once. Do not answer if not considered expedient.

"To Melbourne, 7.45 a.m. If it is *Emden* and you chase her inform me what direction she takes and endeavour to head her towards me; my position at 8 a.m. is 15° 31' S.; 94° 29' E."

The *Sydney* (Captain Glossop) had left the convoy at 7 a.m. and worked up to 20 knots. At 9.15 a.m. she sighted land ahead and almost immediately the smoke of a ship which proved to be the *Emden* coming fast towards her. The *Sydney's* wireless message announcing this was picked up by the *Minotaur*, which signalled:—

"To Melbourne and Sydney, 10.15 a.m. Am standing towards Cocos Island since 9.30 in case assistance is required.

"Inform me when action is over so that I can resume course."

But the *Minotaur's* assistance proved unnecessary, for the *Sydney* was considerably more powerful than the *Emden*, and had little difficulty in putting an end to the raider's career.¹

Owing to the destruction of the Cocos cable station it was some time before these events were known; but during the night of November 9–10 Cocos Island managed to set up an extemporised instrument and to send through the cable to Batavia, which the *Emden's* landing party had not had time to cut, a short message reported by Admiral Jerram as follows:—

"... *Emden* has been engaged by British cruiser, result not known; landing party has seized sailing schooner and left island.

"No further news and not possible to communicate reverse way.

"Later information Cocos states that *Sydney* arrived there and that *Emden* is wrecked north of Cocos Island."²

The Eastern Telegraph Company at Singapore also passed on to the Admiralty another telegram from their operator at Cocos describing the events from the shore point of view:—

"... *Emden* came up 6 a.m., 4 funnels, 1 palpably canvas, with armed launch, 2 boats under counter; 40 men, 3 officers, 4 maxims, and threw them off close to outer buoy, they landed in 15 minutes. We put out wireless call for help, received by *Minotaur* and passed to *Sydney*. After smashing instruments, wireless installation, blowing up mast and engines except condenser and refrigerator, boats put off; but *Sydney* coming up *Emden* stood to sea firing her shots at first excellent but afterwards fell off; lost two funnels and mast and took fire astern. However, *Sydney* scarcely touched, 3 killed, 15 wounded; *Emden's* first shot tearing away *Sydney's* rangefinder and latter shooting at first not good. *Emden* ashore north Keeling, burnt out; Captain of *Sydney* now returning there with our doctor and two assistants. Landing party commandeered 2 months' stores and left in *Ayesha* at 6 p.m. We were well treated and are all well except some petty pilfering, nothing private touched.

Perth cable cut quite close to jetty, only small length required. Batavia and Rodriguez all right with exception of small store. No. 2 building damaged, *Ayesha* may be at Keeling, *Sydney* gone to sea." (Recd. at Admiralty, 8.0 a.m., 10.11.14).

¹ M. 04526/14. For Capt. Glossop's Report of the action, see Appendix.

² Tel: 261 from C-in-C., China, sent 11.5 a.m., recd. by Admiralty, 5.12 a.m., 10.11.14.

71. **Ayesha Commissioned.**—This *Ayesha* was a sailing vessel of 97 tons, out of service, old and rotten, which was lying in the harbour. As soon as the *Emden* sighted the *Sydney*, Captain von Müller recalled the party which had landed to cut the cable, but had to run out to engage the *Sydney* before they could rejoin. Lieutenant von Mücke, therefore, returned to the island, hoisted the German flag, declared the island a German possession, put all the Englishmen under martial law, prohibiting any signalling or communication with other places, and made arrangements for the defence of the beach, having trenches dug and installing the four maxim guns which the landing party had brought in anticipation of armed resistance. He intended to oppose the expected landing from a British warship by force. A few hours' reflection, however, modified this bold attitude, and he then decided to abandon this new German possession and fly. This course also required some courage. The only means to escape lay in the *Ayesha*; in this leaky craft he and his men embarked, and after filling her up with such stores as he could find, or were given him, he set sail with three cheers for the Kaiser amid the clicking of all the cameras on the island. He had announced that he was making for German East Africa, 3,500 miles away, but such was not really his intention. As soon as he was out of sight he turned to the east for Padang in Sumatra, 700 miles away.¹ His crew consisted of 3 officers and 40 men,² a large number for such resources in food and water as could be carried in so small a craft.

During the contest the *Minotaur* was steaming towards the Cocos Islands, but at 11.15 a.m., November 9, she intercepted the signal "*Sydney to Melbourne*. Enemy beached to save herself from sinking. Am pursuing her merchant collier." Accordingly, Captain Kiddle altered course to west again for Mauritius, and at noon was in 15° 14' S., 94° 23' E. The *Minotaur* had been in wireless touch with the *Melbourne* and *Sydney* throughout the encounter, and as she was also in touch with Perth W/T Station she was able that evening to telegraph to the Australian Naval Board a summary of events.³

72. **Protection of the Convoy.**—Captain Silver of the *Melbourne* with the Australasian convoy had steadily pursued his course for Colombo during the battle, though he had moved the escorting ships *Melbourne* and *Ibuki* to the convoy's Southern flank, which was that nearer the Cocos Islands. The difficulty of defending so large a convoy from attack by any fast armed vessel is shown by the fact that it took the *Empress of Asia*, and would have taken the *Melbourne*, 40 minutes to pass from the head to the rear of the squadron at 19½ knots.⁴

¹ Von Mücke: Lecture in Vienna, I.D. 1014/15.

² C 90.

³ *Minotaur's* Log and W/T Log.

⁴ Log of *Empress of Asia*, 12 November 1914.

Captain Silver was somewhat anxious about the *Königsberg* and telegraphed to the *Minotaur* for the latest news, receiving in reply:—

"Last information about *Königsberg* was in telegram from Intelligence Officer, Colombo, received 30 October, stating that *Dartmouth*, *Chatham*, *Weymouth* were searching for her East Coast of Africa Do not think there is any danger of *Königsberg* being in these waters."¹

From this it is clear that the convoy's escort was not aware that the *Königsberg* was no longer at large.

Admiral Jerram's orders for the *Hampshire* and *Empresses* to proceed at high speed to cover the convoy into Colombo did not reach Captain Grant (*Hampshire*) till 1 a.m., November 10. The *Hampshire* was then cruising between Cape Comorin and Minikoi, with the *Empress of Russia* to the northward of her, while the *Empress of Asia* having left Colombo at 6 p.m. on November 9 was steering N. 68° W. to join the *Hampshire*. Captain Grant called the two *Empresses* to him and proceeded south-east in company. "At 2 p.m. received telegram to send "on one *Empress* at full speed, *Emden* having been accounted "for. ² selected *Empress of Asia*, as she had just coaled, while "the *Empress of Russia* only had a week at full speed. As "the danger is passed at present, *Königsberg* being up a "river on East Coast of Africa, according to news brought by "*Empress of Asia*, I decided to reduce to 14½ knots, we "could have joined the convoy at 18½, but were burning over "300 tons per diem, and it would be leaving very little "reserve to get back to Colombo. In case of grave risk of "the convoy it was worth it. Now I am meeting the convoy "only a few hours later, and am in W/T touch." The *Empress of Asia* was to relieve the *Sydney* at Cocos Island, remaining there till the arrival of the *Cadmus*, which was coming from Singapore to make a thorough search of the wreck of the *Emden* and guard the island against a return of the *Ayesha*. The *Sydney*, however, left Cocos Island with the *Emden's* crew and all the wounded on November 11, three days before the arrival of the *Empress of Asia*.


CHAPTER XIII.


SUMMARY OF THE EMDEN'S CAREER.

Perhaps no vessel on either side achieved such fame as the *Emden*; in both hemispheres her name was better known during the war than that of any other ship. The result of

¹ *Minotaur* to *Melbourne*, 6.30 p.m., 9 November 1914.

² Captain Grant's Report, M 0309/15.





NOV. 9. SYDNEY ENGAGES EMDEN.

SYDNEY
EMDEN

this notoriety has been the growth of certain legends which may be worth examination. Most of these stories can be traced in the first instance to remarks made by the crews of the ships she captured and kept on board, and to whom her officers told tall stories. One of these legends is that she had a most efficient system for gaining intelligence.

73. **Intelligence.**—One Saturday, in reply to a query as to what they would do if one of our cruisers suddenly appeared on the scene, the officers of the *Emden* said they were perfectly safe as they knew the *Yarmouth* was in Colombo, and that her crew were playing in a football match that afternoon. This story was swallowed by the listeners and repeated as an example of the marvellous intelligence system of the Germans,¹ but it was not true. The *Yarmouth* at the time was patrolling off Acheh Head. Again, Captain von Müller, on learning that the *Buresk* was a Government collier, closely questioned her skipper as to whether he was not carrying other Government stores. This seems a natural question in the circumstances; but the fact was that, while loading, the *Buresk* was left alone one night in the hands of the Admiralty, who had the docks guarded. This made the crew think they had some secret and important cargo on board, and Captain von Müller's questions led them to the conclusion that he knew all about it. The diary of one of *Buresk's* officers kept while in the *Emden* has the entries: "October 14, received wireless that *Hampshire* was 500 miles off, also cruisers *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Chatham*, and *Weymouth* were searching for them, but knew their positions." In point of fact, the *Hampshire* was then about 300 miles off, but the remainder of the statement shows that this was pure guess work. On October 18 the diary has an entry: "Noon, received wireless that steamers were steering 60 miles north of track." The *Emden's* signal log records no such signal, and we know that the information that steamers were to pass 40 miles north of Minikoi² was given by the crew of the *Troilus*.

On the other hand, we have plenty of evidence that Captain von Müller was not aware of much that it was important for him to know. When the *Sydney* turned up it was at first thought on board that she was the *Newcastle*,³ which was then on the west coast of America. Again, he expected to find either the *Dupleix* or *Montcalm* at Penang; and in the preceding chapters will be found several other instances of similar ignorance on his part. The only piece of information obtained by wireless other than the press news circulated by the Dutch stations, appears to have been from an Indian shore station. The *Emden* asked, "Whose call sign is Q.M.D.?" whereupon the station replied "H.M.S. *Hampshire*." With such guileless operators in

¹ M. 04929/14.

² See paragraph 60.

³ M. 54970/16.

charge ashore, it is a wonder that she did not get more information. Captain von Müller told Captain Grant that he got no news by W/T as regards shipping;¹ having been in China together the *Emden* knew the *Hampshire's* note quite well, and probably the *Yarmouth's* too. From all these considerations, we may safely conclude that the *Emden* received no wireless messages specially sent to her and relied for her intelligence on ordinary common sense, rather than on information, either from India or the Dutch East Indies.

74. Dutch Neutrality.—There seems no reason to suspect that the Dutch authorities had defended their neutrality in the East Indies otherwise than with fairness or even a slight bias in our favour. Dutch men-of-war constantly patrolled their own waters with embarrassing results to such arrangements as the German consuls had been able to make. On September 9, Dutch men-of-war had discovered three colliers—two German and one neutral; the two Germans were forced to discharge their cargo in Dutch territory, and the neutral preferred to leave Dutch waters. Again, at the end of September, the German S.S. *Hoerde* from Manila with coal was found by a Dutch cruiser in a little bay on the west coast of Sumatra; she was brought into Sabang and forced to discharge. The *Choising*, which had left Batavia suddenly in the night of September 26, was found prowling about and was brought into Padang on October 11; her subsequent escape to pick up the *Ayesha's* crew was evidently against Dutch wishes. The *Anghin* came into Sourabaya with 1,400 tons of coal on October 23, stating that she had left Manila on September 4 for Bangkok; she, however, did not leave again. Altogether, by October 31 the net result of Dutch activity was that 14,000 tons of coal intended for belligerents had been discharged in Dutch territory and 12,000 tons found at rendezvous was forced to go elsewhere. Against the abuse of wireless, the Dutch seem also to have taken all reasonable precautions, and in one case, that of the *Preussen* at Sabang, which on October 28 was found to have a clandestine installation, the master and wireless operator were both interned. After trial and an appeal, the Commander and Fourth Officer were sentenced, in March 1916, by the High Court of Batavia, to one year's imprisonment each. According to the Governor-General, this installation can have been ready only a few days before discovery.² Altogether, it is clear that such success as the *Emden* achieved was not in any way helped by the action or inactivity of the Dutch.

75. Working Time.—The *Emden* was sunk 99 days after the start of her war career. The first 30 days of this were occupied in the voyage to the Indian Ocean, during which

¹ M. 04929/14.

² M. 0717/15; N.I.D. 20169/16; N.I.D. 10053/17.

she made no organised attempt to interrupt commerce. On August 31 she was in the latitude of Sunda Strait and may be considered to have been in position. Her subsequent career may be summarised as follows:—

Date.	Number of Days.	Captures.
August 31–September 9 - - - -	10	-
September 10–September 14 - - -	5	8
" 15- " 24 - - - -	10	-
" 25- " 27 - - - -	3	6
" 28–October 15 - - - -	18	7
October 16- " 19 - - - -	4	2 ¹
" 20–November 9 - - - -	20	-

In the second blank she bombarded Madras, and in the last period she raided Penang. Counting each of these as a working day we have a total of 13 working days out of her 70 in the Indian Ocean. If also the capture of the *Riasan* be called a working day we have a grand total of 14 working days out of the 99 days since the outbreak of war with France and Russia on August 2. The remainder of her time was employed in changing station; one big blank period, that occupied in her visit to the Chagos Islands, was mainly due to faulty intelligence obtained from antiquated sailing directions.

75 (a). Total Loss caused by Emden.—The total number of ships sunk by the *Emden* was 16, and their value is estimated at 2,200,000l.² Two warships were sunk by her—the *Zhemchug* and *Mousquet*. Besides this, the damage to the oil tanks at Madras and the cable station at Cocos represent a considerable amount of money; in the case of Madras the loss to us was chiefly in the paralysis of business which followed.²

76. General Diary of Movements.³

- Aug. 2. At sea. Received news of outbreak of war with Russia.
- " 4. Captured *Riasan*.
- " 6. Coaled at Tsingtau and sailed with *Markomannia*.
- " 12. Joined von Spee in Ladrone Islands. Coaled.
- " 14. Detached with *Markomannia*.
- " 19. Coaled at Angaur.
- " 25. Coaled at N.E. point of Timor Island.
- " 28. Passed between Lombok and Bali.
- Sept. 4. Coaled at Simalur. Passed *Hampshire*.
- " 10–14. Raid on Colombo–Calcutta Trade Route.
- " 16. Coaled from *Pontoporos*.
- " 18. Off Rangoon.

¹ *Glenturret* and *Newburn*, both released.

² See *Fayle: Seaborne Trade*. ³ See Map, p. 110.

- Sept 19. Coaled from *Markomannia* in Andamans.
 „ 22. Bombarded Madras.
 „ 23. Off Pondicherri.
 „ 24. Escape from *Chikuma*.
 „ 25-28. First Minikoi Raid.
 „ 29. Coaled from *Markomannia* at Felidu Atoll.
 Oct. 5-8. Cruising West of Diego Garcia.
 „ 9. Coaled from *Buresk* at Diego Garcia.
 „ 16-19. Second Minikoi Raid.
 „ 21. Narrow escape from *Hampshire* and *Empress of Asia*.
 „ 26. Coaled from *Buresk* in Nikobars.
 „ 28. Sank *Zhemchug* and *Mousquet* at Penang.
 „ 30. Transferred survivors of *Mousquet* to *Newburn*.
 Nov. 2. Coaled from *Buresk* off Pagi Island, Sumatra.
 „ 4-5. Patrolling Straits of Sunda.
 „ 9. Raided Cable Station at Cocos. Sunk by *Sydney*.

CHAPTER XIV.

DISPERSAL OF THE CHINA SQUADRON.

77. Movements immediately after Destruction of *Emden*.—

The *Emden* now being destroyed, the *Königsberg* blockaded, and all the men-of-war under Admiral von Spee located on the Chilean Coast, our ships in the Indian Ocean could be more profitably employed elsewhere. There was still the *Ayesha* with her armed crew to be accounted for, and also the *Cormoran*, but no fact has yet transpired to give any idea of the latter's present position or movements. Admiral Jerram ordered the *Hampshire*, *Askold* and *Empress of Russia* to Colombo and the *Yarmouth* to Madras for a few days' rest before proceeding on any further service, as they had been almost continuously at sea since the war began¹, leaving any active operations against the *Ayesha* in abeyance for the time. The Admiralty, however, telegraphed :—

“Arrange for armed merchant ships to search for *Ayesha* carrying *Emden's* landing party.
Melbourne and *Sydney* are to proceed to Colombo forthwith.”²

The *Sydney* had already left Cocos Island to rejoin the convoy. The *Melbourne* during the night of November 11 received her orders to proceed to Colombo in advance of the convoy; they reached her through the *Hampshire*, which continued steaming south-eastward at 14½ knots till 8 p.m. on November 12, when she met the *Melbourne* and turned back for Colombo. The *Empress*

¹ C. 89.

² Tel. : 283 to C.-in-C., China, 5.55 p.m., 11.11.14.

of *Russia* also continued steering south-eastward to meet the *Sydney*, passing the convoy, now under the sole charge of the *Ibuki*, at 8 p.m., November 12. She met the *Sydney* at 8 a.m. November 13, and took over from her 93 German prisoners and wounded, after which, in company with the *Sydney*, she proceeded for Colombo. Arriving there at 11.10 a.m., November 13, she relieved the *Sydney* of the remainder of the *Emden's* prisoners, discharged 38 wounded to hospital and 150 to various ships of the Australasian convoy which reached Colombo, November 16.¹ It was not till November 18 that she could start for a cruise through the Maldives and Diego Garcia in search of the *Ayesha* and *Exford*.

78. **Cruisers ordered Home.**—Besides the *Melbourne* and *Sydney*, which were destined for Malta, the Admiralty on November 12 ordered home the *Hampshire* and *Yarmouth*.² This suggested to Admiral Jerram a solution of a difficulty which he telegraphed as follows :—

“With reference to escort of Australian convoy from Colombo, I submit it is undesirable *Ibuki* should be their sole protection, not so much from point of view of safety as of Australian sentiment.

Suggest *Hampshire* and *Yarmouth* should carry out this service if *Melbourne* and *Sydney* cannot be spared.

Moreover, Japanese have asked *Ibuki* may be released at Colombo as they are anxious for her to join their Second Southern Squadron without delay.”³

Although the First Lord “entirely disagreed with the C.-in-C.'s views”⁴ the *Hampshire* was ordered to take the Australasian convoy on from Colombo and the question of the release of the *Ibuki* was considered, though the *Yarmouth* was ordered on to Gibraltar without the convoy⁵.

The Japanese Naval General Staff had suggested to our Admiralty that, now the *Emden* was destroyed, their ships in the Indian Ocean would be better employed against Admiral von Spee's squadron and proposed that the *Ibuki* and *Nisshin* should join their Second Southern Squadron, the *Yahagi* and *Chikuma* to join the First Southern Squadron. The squadrons thus re-organised would comprise :—

First Squadron (headquarters, Suva).

Kurama (flag of Vice-Admiral Yamaya).

Tsukuba.

Ikoma.

Iwate.

Chikuma.

Yahagi.

¹ Log of *Empress of Russia*.

² C. 91.

³ Tel. : 275 from C.-in-C., China, 13.11.14.

⁴ See H. S. 2, p. 232.

⁵ C. 92.

Second Squadron (headquarters, Truk, Caroline Is.).

Satsuma (flag of Rear-Admiral Matsumura).

Ibuki.

Nisshin.

Hirado.

Umikaze.

Yamakaze.

Vice-Admiral Tochinai with the *Tokiwa* and *Yakumo* was to remain temporarily in the vicinity of Singapore.¹

Operations to be conducted by Admiral Jerram now resolved themselves into :—

- (1) Escort of various transports.
- (2) The watch on Manila.
- (3) Search for the *Ayesha*.

His squadron was shrinking daily. On November 16 the *Philomel* left Singapore with the French transports *Euphrate*, *Chili* and *Latouche-Treville*, which had been waiting at Singapore for escort ever since the *Emden's* raid on Penang; she arrived with them at Colombo on November 23.

On November 17 the *Hampshire* sailed from Colombo with the Australasian convoy. The *Ibuki* was also acting as escort, since no orders about her return had then been received by Admiral Tochinai.² They arrived at Aden, November 25, the *Hampshire* continuing the voyage to Gibraltar, and the *Ibuki* returning East to join the Japanese Second Southern Squadron.

On November 17 also, Admiral Jerram received orders to send all his river-class destroyers to Egypt.³ In accordance with this order the *Colne*, *Jed*, *Chelmer* and *Welland* were docked at Singapore. The *Kennet*, after refitting, arrived from Hong-Kong, and they left for Penang and Colombo on November 30. The *Ribble* was repairing defects at Hong Kong; in the same yard was the *Usk*, which on November 23 arrived from Wei-hai-wei with the *Delta*, a hospital ship to be converted at Hong Kong into a transport for conveying the 2nd Battalion of the South Wales Borderers home from there. The *Usk* and *Ribble* were to leave Hong Kong for Egypt about December 1, the *Delta* to proceed earlier without escort. The two destroyers, however, were late, and were not able to leave Singapore till December 17.

On November 18, the *Yarmouth* left Colombo for Aden; the *Chikuma* and *Yahagi* left Singapore for Fiji,⁴ and Admiral Jerram reported :—

" . . . The sea-going force now under my orders consists of four armed merchant cruisers, two sloops, *Askold* and *Triumph* when her refit is complete about end of December.

¹ C.L. 30

² C. 93.

³ C. 94.

⁴ C. 95.

"I consider two armed merchant cruisers and one sloop should continue to watch Manila until the enemy's squadron has been destroyed or has left the Pacific Ocean, leaving *Askold*, two armed merchant cruisers, and one sloop for general escort and patrol work."¹

But the Admiralty wanted his ships elsewhere, and replied :—

"Arrange, if possible, for *Askold* to proceed to Egypt to operate against Turks on Syrian coast and in Dardanelles. . . .

Every available ship is required from the East for Egypt, the Dardanelles, and the Syrian coast to operate against the Turks.

Askold should be sent to Egypt, as already telegraphed.

Armed *Empress* liners are required to work the Red Sea convoys in conjunction with Indian Marine ships.

Requirements of China station should be met by Japanese."²

In accordance with this, the *Askold* left Colombo for Port Said on November 24. Admiral Jerram's arrangements for the armed merchant liners were :—

"*Empress of Japan* and *Himalaya*. These two vessels and also *Chelmer*, until I ordered her to Singapore, have been employed in watching Manila to prevent the sailing of German colliers.

"As I consider that this watch should continue as long as there are any German cruisers in the Pacific, I have arranged that it shall be undertaken by Japanese ships, and *Chigoda* should arrive off Manila to-day for the purpose.

"The two armed merchant cruisers will then proceed direct to Singapore and on to Aden as soon as possible.

"*Empress of Asia* left Singapore November 27 for Aden, calling at Colombo.

"*Empress of Russia*. As it seemed probable that the schooner *Ayesha* might proceed to the westward, I sent *Empress of Russia* to Diego Garcia, leaving Colombo on November 18; she searched that vicinity from November 20-23, without result; and I think it is just possible that the *Ayesha* may never be heard of again as it is now 18 days since she left Cocos Island. I am informed that she makes 4 feet of water a day when sailing and that both the pumps are out of order.

"I have requested H.M. Consuls' General at Manila and Batavia that if *Exford* or *Ayesha* should arrive in American or Dutch waters the local authorities may be pressed to have them interned.

"Whilst returning from Diego Garcia to Colombo *Empress of Russia* was diverted to Aden by wireless. Due at Aden, November 29."³

This left Admiral Jerram nothing except the battleship *Triumph* and the sloop *Cadmus*, whose retention for general purposes the Admiralty approved; she was at the Cocos Island examining the wreck of the *Emden*.

The *Clio* left Singapore for Suez on November 22 with the transport *Monmouthshire* which had been brought, originally as an ammunition ship, from Shimonoseki by the *Ikoma*. The *Monmouthshire*, on arrival with the *Ikoma* at Hong Kong, had been fitted as a transport, and embarking 250 R.G.A. details left there on November 14 for Singapore⁴ with the *Ikoma*.

¹ Tel. 290 from China, 18.11.14.

² Tel. 298, 299 to C.-in-C., China, 18.11.14.

³ C.L. 31.

⁴ H.S. 34, p. 156.

Vice-Admiral Tochinai sailed from Singapore for Fiji on November 24 with the *Tokiwa*, *Yakumo* and *Ikoma*, thus terminating the cordial relations which had been established between himself and Admiral Jerram.

79. Search for Ayesha.—The convoys having left and the watch on Manila being in the hands of the Japanese, Admiral Jerram's main pre-occupation was the search for the *Ayesha*. It was not till December 2 that he heard any news of her, which, with his arrangements to meet it, he telegraphed to the Admiralty in:—

"308. Intercepted telegram from Sabang to Lloyds, London, states S.S. *Sahara* reports having seen several wrecks 50 miles to the West of Sabang, presumably yesterday morning, Tuesday.

"Consul General, Batavia, telegraphs newspapers to-night report schooner *Ayesha* entered Padang some days ago and left again flying German colours. It seems possible that crew of *Ayesha* may have joined *Exford* and be on trade route.

"*Cadmus* returned from Cocos (Keeling) Island to-day and reports small guns and mountings were not on board *Emden*, so possibly they may be mounted in *Exford*. Five destroyers left Penang, 7 p.m., 1st of December, for Colombo, and I am endeavouring to inform them by W/T.

"*Empress of Japan*, *Himalaya*, leave Singapore to-morrow morning, 3rd December, and I am ordering them call at Penang for orders; subject to Admiralty approval I propose to employ them searching for *Exford* until question of alleged wrecks is cleared up.

"*Cadmus* will be ready for sea Friday morning, *Pyramus*, Monday and I could use them also.

"*Empress of Asia* is at Colombo, and if not urgently required in Red Sea could cruise between Ceylon and Minikoi Island. No Japanese ships are available in vicinity.

"Submit I may be informed if these arrangements are approved."¹

His arrangements were approved; but were not carried out, since:—

"Further enquiry elicited following facts that wreckage reported consisted of only one large pulling boat and a spar.

"Small guns of *Emden* were removed long time ago; none can be mounted, therefore, in *Exford*.

"*Ayesha* arrived at Padang, 28th November, and sailed 29th November.

"Even if *Ayesha* joins *Exford* they have very little machine gun ammunition.

"All ports and ships have been warned already. Under these circumstances I have not detained *Empress of Asia*, but am sending *Empress of Japan* and *Himalaya* down West Coast of Sumatra, former to complete circuit of island, latter to part company off Padang and search Northward again to Acheh, then proceed to Colombo.

"*Cadmus* has lost greater part of both bilge keels and cannot be ready for six days.

"*Pyramus* will proceed as ordered by C.-in-C., East Indies, unless anything else occurs."²

The trade route between Acheh Head and Colombo had been covered by the five destroyers which had left Singapore on

November 30. They steamed spread to 15 miles apart, but on arrival at Colombo on December 6 had to report having seen nothing.

Admiral Jerram noted the removal of all British ships from the Far East with some apprehension in view of the fact that Admiral von Spee's squadron was still at large. This he expressed in telegram:—

"316. After considering present disposition of ships on China and East Indies Stations I should like to make quite sure that Admiralty realise there is now no ship of allied nations to the east Suez which is capable of dealing with a German cruiser except *Chatham* already fully occupied.

"In view of temporary success of *Emden* it seems not improbable German Admiral may send another light cruiser across Pacific or round Cape of Good Hope to replace her.

"The nearest suitable Japanese ship belongs to Second Southern Squadron in the Caroline Islands, and as the Japanese are reluctant to break up their squadron and have been deliberate in moving their ships it would certainly be a fortnight, and probably three weeks, before any force sent by them could be assembled where most probably required.

"Vice-Admiral Tochinai was despatched Singapore with *Tokiwa* and *Yakumo* for express purpose of operating against *Emden* and was recalled to Japan when *Emden* had been captured. I think that Japanese consider question of expense a good deal."³

80. Effect of Battle of the Falklands.—All apprehensions on this matter were, however, set at rest by the victory won at the Falkland Islands on December 9, in which the *Gneisenau*, *Scharnhorst*, *Leipzig* and *Nürnberg* were sunk, and the *Dresden*, sole German survivor of the fight, was driven to hide among the islands of the Cape Horn Archipelago; but on December 12, when the *Ibuki* was ordered to return to Japan from Singapore, Admiral Jerram suggested that the Japanese, if they were considering the redistribution of their ships, might think fit to keep two at Singapore in case any future attack on trade should be made.²

81. Capture of Exford.—The *Pyramus*, having had her defects made good, left Singapore on December 8 for Colombo to join the East Indies command; she took no part in the chase of the *Ayesha* and *Exford* which thus devolved on the *Empress of Japan* and the *Himalaya*. "On December 11, *Empress of Japan* recaptured *Exford* about 25 miles south-west from Padang and took out of her the German prize crew, viz., 1 lieutenant, R.N.R., 2 warrant officers, and 14 men belonging to *Emden*, who have been landed as prisoners of war at Singapore.

"*Exford*, manned by a prize crew from *Empress of Japan*, had been brought to Singapore, where she will discharge her cargo, of which only a small amount has been used for her own steaming; she will then be discharged from Admiralty service.

¹ C.L. 31; but telegram quoted as C. 95 says he left November 15.

² Tel.: 308 from C.-in-C., China, 2.12.14.

³ Tel.: 316 from C.-in-C., China, 7.12.14.

¹ Tel.: 316 from C.-in-C., China, 7.12.14.

² C. 96.

"During this search nothing was seen of *Ayesha*, so *Empress of Japan* returned to Singapore on December 15, whilst *Himalaya* proceeded direct to Colombo; after coaling there she will proceed to Diego Garcia, and after searching the Maldive Islands northwards as far as Minikoi, will proceed to Aden in accordance with her original orders."¹

82. **Cormoran Interned.**—In the meantime, another German ship which had been on Admiral Jerram's mind was disposed of. This was the *Cormoran*, late *Riasan*, which, though never definitely located, had been considered a danger to the Pacific and Indian trade routes. On December 14 she arrived at Guam, an island north of the Philippines owned by the United States. She was within striking distance of the trade routes meeting at Singapore, and Admiral Jerram obtained the Admiralty's permission to keep the *Empress of Japan* and *Himalaya* instead of sending them on to Aden.²

The *Cormoran* was, however, interned on December 15, and Admiral Jerram, therefore, ordered the *Himalaya* to proceed to Aden after searching the Maldives, keeping only the *Cadmus* and *Empress of Japan*.³

83. **Career of the Cormoran II.**—The *Cormoran*, late *Riasan*, fitted out at Tsingtau with the armament⁴ and the crew of the gunboat *Cormoran*, joined Admiral von Spee at Majuro in the Marshall Islands, and was detached by him to work with the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* as a commerce-destroyer in Australian waters. Proceeding westward, the *Cormoran* called at Kawieng on September 6, and carried on to the Molucca Passage, which she reached on September 11. She cruised there for a few days, called at Ceram on the 13th, and passing between New Guinea and Gillolo on September 14 made northward for Yap, probably for coal and provisions. It was just about this time that our Sandakan Squadron captured the two colliers *Tannenfels* and *Rio Passig*⁵ in this neighbourhood; indeed, the *Rio Passig* had been to Ceram. The colliers were reported to be waiting for von Spee, but it is possible they might have been met by the *Cormoran* if Admiral Jerram's watch on the exits from the Philippines had been less strict. The raider appears to have stayed at Yap from September 17 to 19, and obtained some coal and provisions. From there she came south again to New Guinea to rendezvous with the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*. The spot chosen was Alexis Bay, a few miles North of Friedrich Wilhelms Hafen, in 5° S., 145° 50' E., where was the seat of the German Government in New Guinea, and there the *Cormoran* arrived late on September 23. But her visit was ill-timed. Early next morning Admiral Patey with the Australian Squadron arrived off Friedrich Wilhelms Hafen, and the *Cormoran* was forced to run up a narrow creek and hide among the mangroves. It is

¹ C.L. 32.

² C. 97, 98.

³ C. 99.

⁴ 8—4·1"; 5—1-pr.; 2 Maxims.

⁵ See paragraph 37.

certainly remarkable that a ship of that size could escape notice at all; but the Australian Squadron stayed no time at Friedrich Wilhelms Hafen, and made no search of the neighbouring harbours, but having received the formal surrender of the place departed at sunset for New Britain. Breathing again after her narrow escape the *Cormoran* crept out from her hiding place and made for Yap once more. About this time she met the *Prinz Eitel Friedrich*; according to the captain of the latter the meeting took place at Alexis Bay on September 28,¹ but a track chart of the *Cormoran's* movements, compiled by various members of the crew,² show the *Cormoran* as leaving Alexis Bay during the night of September 24–25, and as arriving at Yap on September 28. Here she embarked the remainder of the coal in store and taking on board a party from the surveying vessel *Planet*, with 3 pom-poms, 3 maxims and some rifles, left early on October 1, steering again, strangely enough, for Alexis Bay. A possible explanation of this move may be that she was expecting supplies at that rendezvous. She did not go in to the Bay but cruised about off-shore from the 4th to the 6th and came back to Yap.

Once more she had a nasty surprise for she had timed her arrival to synchronise with that of the Japanese Second Southern Squadron who took possession of the island on October 7. But once more she escaped, and finding the larger German islands too risky a theatre she moved off eastward. On October 12 she arrived at Lamotrek in 7° 30' N., 146° 20' E., a desolate reef in the Central Carolines, where a handful of savages support existence on fish and cocoanuts. Here she stayed two months. One day three officers went off in a cutter to search for coal—a hopeless quest; and at last starving and depressed, the *Cormoran* weighed anchor and steamed with her remaining coal to Guam, the nearest neutral port. There she arrived on December 14 and was promptly interned.³

84. **Search for Ayesha Continued.**—The internment of the *Cormoran* and the capture of the *Exford* left only the *Ayesha* unaccounted for. On December 16 a British steamer arriving at Colombo reported having sighted a three-masted schooner resembling the *Ayesha* at 6 a.m., December 9, in 3° 24' S., 99° 38' E., steering east.⁴ In his despatch Admiral Jerram remarks: "It is highly probable that this is *Ayesha*, and I think her being within 170 miles of Padang, 10 days after leaving there, may be due to her having attempted to go westward and been driven back by westerly winds. As she is now steering East she may be making for Sunda Strait in the hope of capturing a British steamer through some ruse, or she may have arranged for a German steamer to go out to her. In any case, she is a menace to trade

¹ N.I.D. 6721/15; 6816/15.

² N.I.D. 5101/16 and 5223/16 in I.D.H.S. 508.

³ The authorities for this paragraph, in addition to those already quoted, are N.I.D. 20789/15, 12102/16, M. 42026/15.

⁴ C. 99.

"until captured, and I have sent *Cadmus* to Singapore to search between Sunda Strait and the position reported. *Empress of Japan* will sail from Singapore December 19, also to search for *Ayesha*."¹ The *D'Iberville*, which had been refitting at Saigon, arrived at Singapore from there on December 20 and left next day for the Java Sea and British North Borneo, more particularly to protect the coal depôt and wireless stations there. The two French destroyers, *Fronde* and *Pistolet*, left Penang on December 19 for Saigon to refit in preparation for any further service. Sunda Strait and the West Coast of Sumatra was searched by the *Cadmus*, which returned on December 28 to Singapore, where she was to remain. The North Coast of Java and South Coast of Borneo was searched by the *Empress of Japan* between December 19 and 27, when Admiral Jerram ordered her to Christmas Island and Cocos; a suspicious steamer had been seen lurking about the latter place on December 23-24, and the Admiral thought she was possibly searching for the *Ayesha* in German interests.²

At the other end of the Bay of Bengal the *Himalaya*, which had gone in to Colombo, left there again on December 19 and searched Diego Garcia and Maldives for 10 days before proceeding to Aden. This district was suspected since Lieut.-Commander von Mücke, in command of the *Ayesha*'s party, had told the people at Cocos that he would make for East Africa, though it was realised that his announcement was most likely untrue, especially as the prevailing wind was westerly and violent.

85. **End of the Ayesha.**—All these searches revealed nothing. In point of fact, by this time the *Ayesha* was non-existent and her crew had embarked, as Admiral Jerram foresaw, in another ship. After leaving Padang "for nearly three weeks we drifted about, often suffering from bad weather We waited at a given point at sea in the hope of a German steamer turning up. How we had got into communication with German steamers I, of course, cannot disclose At last, on December 14, we met the *Choising*, a 1,700 ton coasting steamer of the North-German Lloyd. We sought a point under shelter of the land, and on the 16th transhipped all standing to the *Choising* At 4.58 p.m. the *Ayesha* disappeared in the blue waters of the Indian Ocean, accompanied by three cheers ³ The *Choising* proceeded to Hodeidah, where Lieut.-Commander von Mücke expected to find the terminus of the Hedjaz Railway; there the party landed on the 8th of January 1915, and after five months of adventures by sea and land managed to reach El Ulah (Lat. 26° 30' N.) on the Hedjaz Railway. From there the party proceeded in comparative safety and comfort to Germany, where they were received as heroes, an honour to which they were justly entitled.

¹ C.L. 32.² C.L. 33.³ Von Mücke's Lecture. I.D. 1014/15.

APPENDIX C.

TELEGRAMS.

(TO AND FROM CHINA.)

All telegrams are in the year 1914.

- C. 1. From Admiralty. July 21st.
To C.-in-C., East Indies.
78. German *Geier* visits Singapore 26th July to 3rd August.
- C. 2. From Admiralty. July 27th.
To C.-in-C., China.
87. European political situation makes war between Triple Alliance and Triple Entente Powers by no means impossible. This is not the warning telegram, but be prepared to shadow hostile men-of-war and consider dispositions of H.M. Ships from this point of view. Measure is purely precautionary. The utmost secrecy is to be observed and no unnecessary person is to be informed.
- C. 3. From Admiralty. July 28th.
To C.-in-C., China, 90. Sent 9.30 p.m.
Commodore, Hong Kong, 139.
139. Be prepared to take up four vessels to be armed with the four sets of 4.7 guns now in stock at Hong Kong.
- C. 4. From Admiralty. July 29th.
To C.-in-C., China.
91. Act on secret war standing orders, Articles 2 to 4 inclusive, in view of possibility of war with certain Powers. Put into force war position table from 2.0 a.m., 30th July.
- C. 5. From Admiralty. July 31st.
To C.-in-C., East Indies.
87. Order one of the three sloops to Colombo ready to move to Singapore if crew are wanted for *Triumph*.
- C. 6. From Intelligence Officer, Singapore. August 1st.
To Admiralty.
Following telegram received from Melbourne: *Comet* reported at Samoa, 27th July last night. *Comet* was within easy working range of Wireless Station, Port Moresby. Yap, Caroline Islands, is using utmost exertions to communicate with *Scharnhorst*, Commonwealth Board of Administration. Telegram ends. C.-in-C., China, has been informed.
- C. 7. From Singapore. August 2nd.
To Admiralty.
Following telegram received from Melbourne, begins: Berlin is addressing *Planet* through Port Moresby Wireless Station, Commonwealth Naval Board of Administration ends. C.-in-C., China, C.-in-C., East Indies, have been informed.
- C. 8. From Admiralty. August 2nd.
To C.-in-C., China.
101. Naval Reserves mobilised.

- C. 9. *From Singapore.* August 3rd.
To Admiralty. Received 5.0 a.m.
German collier *Tannenfels*, six thousand tons Australian coal, left yesterday, 6 a.m., without clearance papers, destination unknown. C.-in-C., China, C.-in-C., East Indies, have been informed.
- C. 10. *From Singapore.* August 3rd.
To Admiralty. Received 5 a.m.
Following telegram received from Melbourne begins: Am informed two German colliers left Newcastle, New South Wales, under sealed orders having dropped pilot, others prepared to leave. Commonwealth Naval Board of Administration—ends. C.-in-C. China, C.-in-C., East Indies, have been informed.
- C. 11. *From Admiralty,* August 3rd.
To C.-in-C., China. Sent 1.15 p.m.
106. You are authorised to take up a total of four ships to arm as armed cruisers (*sic*).
- C. 12. *From Commonwealth, Naval Board.* August 3rd.
To Admiralty. Received 9.53 p.m.
Australia will be ready to leave Sydney evening 4th August. Wireless signals heard by Northern Australian station for several days strongly indicate that *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, and other German men-of-war are in vicinity of New Guinea. . . .
- C. 13. *From Singapore.* August 4th.
To Admiralty. Received 6.32 a.m.
Melbourne telegram begins: Night of 2nd/3rd August Thursday Island heard that *Scharnhorst* signalled Yap and *Scharnhorst* signalled *Nürnberg*. Cooktown heard *Naura* and *Scharnhorst* exchanged signals. Port Moresby heard *Scharnhorst* and *Planet* exchanged signals. Broome heard steamship *Bocham* signalled *Geier* and *Geier* to steamship *Frieberg*. Commonwealth Board of Administration. Telegram ends. C.-in-C., China, and C.-in-C., East Indies, have been informed.
- C. 14. *From Commodore, Hong Kong.* August 4th.
To Admiralty.
175. Four following vessels engaged as armed mercantile cruisers: *Empress of Asia* from 31st July, complete 13th August; *Empress of Japan* and *Empress of Russia* due Hong Kong, 13th and 21st August respectively, P. & O. Steamer *Himalaya* due 13th August. . . .
- C. 15. *From C.-in-C., China.* August 4th.
To Admiralty. Received 4.57 p.m.
116. . . . Have I discretion to leave Hong Kong before declaration of war if strategical situations appears to me to require it?
Reply:—186. Use your discretion about leaving Hong Kong (sent 8 p.m., 4th August).
- C. 16. *From Admiralty, General telegram,* August 4th, 11 p.m.
Commence hostilities at once against Germany.
- C. 17. *From C.-in-C., China.* August 5th.
To Admiralty.
117. Orders to commence hostilities with Germany received. I assume this includes Austria unless I hear to the contrary.
Reply:—119. Your 117. No, we are at peace with Austria.

- C. 18. *From Foreign Office.* August 9th
To Tokio. 10 a.m.
43. . . . I am therefore anxious at present to limit operations of war on China Station to protection of commerce at sea. . . .
- C. 18(a) *From Admiralty.* August 9th,
To C.-in-C., China, and R.A., Australia. 3 p.m.
122. (To China.) Military expedition in two transports leaves New Zealand about 11th instant for Apia, Samoa. S.N.O., New Zealand, has been ordered to arrange escort of at least one cruiser. You will be informed of actual departure of expedition. Guard against interference by enemy.
- C. 19. *From Commodore, Hong Kong,* August 10th.
To Admiralty. Received 5 a.m.
189. Fast mercantile cruiser *Empress of Asia* sailed on 9th August. One Officer, 20 men Royal Garrison Artillery and 25 men 40th Pathans on board to make up crew.
- C. 20. *From Intelligence Officer, Hong Kong.* August 10th.
To Admiralty. Received 5.45 a.m.
Following telegram received from Consul, Vladivostok, 10th August, 1.30 a.m.: Russian Admiral requested me to inform C.-in-C. he holds at the latter's disposition following men-of-war:—*Askold*, *Zhemchug*, 4 torpedo boats and 4 armed volunteer Fleet Mail Steamers. C.-in-C., China, has been informed.
- C. 21. *From Admiralty.* August 10th.
To C.-in-C., China, C.-in-C., East Indies, and Sent 11.30 a.m.
S.N.O., New Zealand.
Control of Australian Navy has been transferred to Admiralty, and you should co-operate in same way as neighbouring stations of Royal Navy.
- C. 22. *From Foreign Office.* August 10th.
To Tokyo. 12.40 p.m.
40. I have given following aide-mémoire to Japanese Ambassador. . . . "To avoid internal trouble and disturbance of trade in China, we are anxious to limit acts of war to operations at sea and more particularly protection of British merchant vessels". . . .
- C. 23. *From Ambassador, Tokyo.* August 10th.
To Foreign Office. Received 7.45 a.m., 11th.
71. . . . the only course which the Imperial Government can take is to proceed on lines as already decided upon and declare war forthwith against Germany. . . .
- C. 24. *From French Naval Attaché,* August 12th.
To Ministry of Marine, Paris. Sent 8.55 p.m.
British Admiralty requests you to telegraph *Montcalm* at Suva where is at present orders to coal there and wait there for the arrival of a military expedition coming from New Zealand about August 20th to capture Samoa. . . . After the capture of Samoa *Montcalm* will act in concert with C.-in-C., China.

- C. 25. From C.-in-C., China. August 12th.
To Admiralty. Received 10.16 a.m.
Under certain conditions I wish to declare a blockade of Kiaochau. Authority is requested to do so at my discretion.
Reply:—130. Authority is given for you to use your discretion as to the declaration of the blockade (sent 4.45 p.m., August 12th).
- C. 26. From Admiralty. August 12th.
To C.-in-C., China. Sent 12.20 p.m.
129. Our trade on the Pacific Coast is being threatened. Directly Japan declares war *Hampshire* in addition to light cruiser is to be sent to Esquimalt. Arrange for coal on passage.
- C. 27. From Admiralty. August 13th.
To C.-in-C., China.
131. Commence hostilities at once against Austria.
- C. 28. From C.-in-C., China. August 16th.
To Admiralty.
120. Russians desire to co-operate with me. May I do so?
Reply:—137. Your 120. Yes.
- C. 29. From C.-in-C., China. August 21st.
To Admiralty.
129. Following telegram received to-day from R.A.C., Australian Squadron, strengthening my opinion regarding intentions of German Squadron. Begins: There appears to be no doubt Germans are collecting large supplies of coal and concentrating somewhere N.E. of New Britain. I believe that main body will make across Pacific Ocean either East or South-east, possibly visit Samoa and Tahiti. Probably auxiliary cruisers will be left to work from base in Pacific on China, Pacific and Australian trade. Expect to arrive at Samoa, 20th August, and may be able to form better opinion. Ends.
- C. 30. From I.O., Singapore. August 27th.
To Admiralty. Received 3.30 a.m.
Last night *Geier* (German) reported definitely S.E. of Madura Island, Java Sea. *Gneisenau* heard from W/T Station at Cocos or Keeling Island, Indian Ocean, (and) N. and W. Coast Australia.
- C. 31. From Melbourne. August 27th.
To Admiralty. Received 8.34 a.m.
19. Following is estimation of German position judging from Wireless signals. *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau* have disappeared to North-eastward. *Geier* now off North-West end of New Guinea. (? *Jaguar*) off South-West of Java.
Staff Note:—This may mean objective is Australian Expedition to New Guinea.
- C. 32. From I.O., Singapore. August 29th.
To Admiralty. Received 7 p.m.
German Ship *Goldenfels* arrived Sabang night of 28th August with part of crew of British Ship *City of Winchester* remaining on board German transport *Ziethen* which is accompanied by *Königsberg*; latter sank *City of Winchester* in Indian Ocean.
Goldenfels escorted almost into port by *Königsberg*.
C.-in-C., China, C.-in-C., East Indies, Admiralty informed.

- C. 33. From R.A.C., Australian Squadron. September 1st.
To Admiralty. Received 7.39 a.m.
48. With reference to escort of Australian troops to Aden it is suggested for your consideration this could not be done simultaneously occupation of Angaur, Yap, Nauru, owing to lack of ships.
Would suggest that China Fleet might join up and carry out a combined sweep through Caroline Island and Marshall Islands, in which, if acceptable, ships might be spared for escort of troops to Aden. (1240.)
- C. 34. From Ambassador, Tokyo. September 9th.
To F.O.
137. Cruises about to start. 1. A circular tour of three ships and 2 destroyers of Third Division round Marianne and Caroline Islands to last about 4 weeks. . . . 2. The despatch of some cruisers to watch and follow up ships leaving Manila and neighbourhood, which are stated to have been carrying supplies to German Squadron for some time past. . . .
- C. 35. From Admiralty. September 13th.
To C.-in-C., Singapore.
171. . . . Proposal to establish your Headquarters at Hong Kong is approved. *Minotaur's* subsequent movements can be decided later. *Hampshire* is to join *Australia* at Fremantle by October 7 to convoy troops and remain for present under orders of R.A. French Admiral in *Montcalm* has been told he is free to return to Saigon. You should arrange for further employment of French ships.
- C. 36. From Reporting Officer, Manila. September 14th.
To Admiralty. Received 6.13 a.m.
German ships *Bochum* and *Elmshorn* loading coal about 5,000 tons each; former nearly ready to sail. Please inform Foreign Office.
- C. 37. From C.-in-C., China. September 14th.
To Admiralty. Received 6.45 a.m.
141. With reference to your telegram 171, I shall proceed to Hong Kong in *Empress of Japan*, when arrangements at Singapore are complete.
I propose that *Minotaur*, *Ibuki* (Japanese), *Chikuma* (Japanese), under orders of Captain of *Minotaur* should proceed to New Britain Is. and act from there.
This will cover Australia during absence of Australian cruisers, and would be best position from which to meet any attempt of the German cruisers to remain Pacific Islands or to return in the direction of New Guinea and Australia.
Arrangements will be made with French men-of-war and Russian Senior Officer for patrolling waters South of Singapore.
On receipt of Admiralty approval arrangements will be made immediately with Japanese.
- C. 38. From Admiralty. September 14th.
To C.-in-C., China. Sent 2.16 p.m.
172. Your 141. Action approved.
- C. 39. From Marine, Bordeaux. September 14th.
To Naval Attaché.
20. Consul at Manila signals that three German steamers are embarking a large quantity of coal
Consul at Hong Kong signals that the *Emden* is at Celebes and the *Geier* at Makassar.

- C. 40. From Navy, Melbourne. September 14th.
To Admiralty. Received 8.58 p.m.

38. Urgent. Following signal from *Luchs* (German) to *Tannenfels* in cypher heard by Darwin and Wyndham night 13th September. First group is incorrectly decoded as "widow" message begins:—

At once go to the rendezvous 0 degrees 140 degrees E. Long: Give your report fully of progress made. Be brave. *Luchs*. (ends).

Tannenfels left Batavia 1st September for Manila. Was later sighted making towards Sunda Strait. Had 6,000 tons Australian coal. R.A., Commanding Squadron, and C.-in-C., China, informed.

[Darwin and Wyndham are Wireless Stations North Coast of Australia.]

- C. 41. From Admiralty. September 15th.
To C.-in-C., China. Sent 2.20 p.m.

173. Send *Hampshire* at once to search for *Emden* in accordance with information received from Intelligence Officer at Colombo which you now have.

- C. 42. From C.-in-C., China. September 15th.
To Admiralty. Received 2.32 p.m.

142. Intelligence Officer, Hong Kong, has had personal interview with English stoker who had left German collier *Bochum* at Manila and who reports either *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau* met *Emden* and *Geier* about August 24 at a rendezvous somewhere in Malacca, passage east of Gillolo. *Bochum* and two other colliers were there also. They afterwards separated two former each with a collier in attendance.

R.A., Commanding Australian Squadron, has been informed.

- C. 43. From Intelligence Officer, Colombo. September 15th.
To Admiralty. Received 5.14 p.m.

20 *Kabinga* released by *Emden*.

Crew report *Emden* left position about 16 miles S.E. of False Point (Bay of Bengal) half past eleven p.m., September 14.

C.-in-C., East Indies, and Intelligence Officer, Singapore, have been informed.

Priority.

- C. 44. From Admiralty. September 15th.
To S.N.O., Singapore. Sent 8.15 p.m.

Urgent. *Yarmouth* is to proceed at once to capture *Emden* and work in conjunction with *Hampshire*. Inform C.-in-C., China. Transports must wait.

- C. 45. From Admiralty. September 16th.
To C.-in-C., China. Sent 12.30 p.m.

175. *Askold* and *Zhemchug* are to continue convoy from Singapore on to Calcutta; this relieves *Yarmouth* and *Hampshire* to search and sink *Emden*. Acknowledge.

- C. 46. From C.-in-C., China. September 17th.
To Admiralty. Received 7.2 a.m.

147. With reference to your telegram 175. Engines of *Zhemchug* (Russian) are in a bad state and it seems improbable that she can steam from Singapore to Calcutta without coaling.

Under these circumstances I propose to send British transport to Calcutta under escort of *Askold* only.

Zhemchug is detailed to convoy French troops from Hong Kong to Singapore, coaling if necessary at Saigon.

Dupleix will escort French troops and *Cordillere* from Singapore to Colombo and possibly Aden, due to leave Singapore about 2nd October.

Meanwhile *Dupleix* (French) will remain to protect trade with Western entrance to Straits of Malacca against *Emden* should she avoid cruisers sent to deal with her.

- C. 47. From C.-in-C., China. September 18th.
To Admiralty. Received 12.20 p.m.

150. Following Japanese ships left Yokosuka September 14 to cruise Mariana Islands and Caroline Islands (North Pacific):—*Kurama*, *Tsukaba*, *Asama* and *Umikaze*. This Squadron is officially known as the Nankenshitai or Southern Squadron.

- C. 48. From C.-in-C., China. September 19th.
To Admiralty. Received 11.52 a.m.

153. United States S.S. *Rio Passig* was seized in Latitude 6° 25' N., Longitude 122° 28' E., on 15th September and taken to Sandakan where she is now detained.

Facts of case are as follows:—She left Manila on 5th August with 4,000 tons of coal, and she was at Yap Island from 24th to 27th August; *Angaur* 28th August; Ceram Island from 1st to 12th September, and states that Netherlands man-of-war *Tromp* then ordered her to Amboanga. Original cargo of coal is still on board and her papers do not show any destination for it.

In these circumstances I consider cargo is intended for men-of-war.

United States Consul at Sandakan protested and stated he was informing Washington.

Request instructions as to whether vessel should be sent to Prize Court for adjudication or release. (Ends.)

- C. 49. From C.-in-C., China. September 20th.
To Admiralty. Received 7.4 a.m.

154 Until *Emden* is accounted for or located outside Bay of Bengal trade routes therein cannot be considered entirely safe, but if reopened noon, to-morrow, Monday, they would be reasonably safe.

Reply:—

183 Your 154. Concur as to reopening trade routes noon, Monday, as reasonably safe.

- C. 50. From Hong Kong. September 20th.
To Admiralty. Received 5.46 a.m.

Askold, *Empress of Asia* sailed 6.45 this morning for Singapore escorting *Nile*, *Arcadia*, *Carnarvonshire*, and *Cordillere*.

- C. 51. From C.-in-C., China. September 21st.
To Admiralty. Received 6.45 a.m.

156. My 147. Commodore, Hong Kong, informs me that 2nd Batt. Duke of Cornwall's in transport *Nile* are ordered to go to Bombay instead of Calcutta. I do not see my way to provide separate escort for *Nile* or for escorting her from Colombo to Bombay if she accompanies French transport and *Cordillere* as far as Colombo.

Under these circumstances should *Nile* accompany the other British transports to Calcutta, and the troops be sent by train from there?

Reply:—190. Your 156. Yes; but if situation is favourable *Askold* should escort all four transports to Bombay instead of Calcutta.

- C. 52. From Admiralty. September 21st.
To C.-in-C., China. Sent 4.45 p.m.

186. It is understood that *Nisshin* is being sent to you. This enables the Australian convoy to consist of *Minotaur*, *Sydney*, *Ibuki*, and *Nisshin*.

- C. 53. From C.-in-C., China. September 22nd.
To Admiralty. Received 7.45 a.m.

158. Your telegram No. 180. On account of bad atmospheric disturbances I have been unable to communicate by W/T with *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* (Japan) during last few days, but shall probably be able to do so to-night or to-morrow through Cocos or Keeling Island.

May I consider it settled that they are to be at Fremantle by 4th October, as in that case they will shortly have to start south?

Your telegram 186. It is unlikely *Nisshin* can reach Fremantle in time, and I submit *Minotaur*, *Melbourne*, and *Ibuki* should be sufficient for escort and that *Nisshin* can be more usefully employed under my direct orders.

(Admiralty telegram 180 stated that *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* should remain in wireless touch with Singapore for the present.)

- C. 54. From I.O., Colombo. September 22nd.
To Admiralty. Received 9.46 a.m.

Chikuma left 9 a.m. escorting colliers from Point de Galle to Madras.

- C. 55. From Admiralty. September 22nd.
To C.-in-C., China.

189. Your 158. Yes, it is settled. *Minotaur* and *Ibuki* are to be at Fremantle by 4th October. *Nisshin* should join convoy as soon as practicable on their line of advance from Fremantle.

- C. 56. From I.O., Colombo. September 23rd.
To Admiralty. Received 9.5 a.m.

From information received from C.-in-C., East Indies, I.O., Singapore, Melbourne, Cape Town, I am satisfied that trade routes are reasonably safe and advise accordingly. Masters of ships personally advised to keep well off usual tracks and not to send wireless message

- C. 57. From Admiralty. September 24th.
To C.-in-C., China. Sent 2.50 p.m.

195. Navy Office, Melbourne, reports that 15 German merchant vessels loaded with coal at Manila between September 7th and 14th; can you take any steps to watch these vessels?

Reply:—166. Your 195. On September 13th there were 19 German vessels at Manila, of which 5 have been reported loading with coal. *Empress of Asia* and *Empress of Russia* are relieving each other on patrol outside Eastern Channel to Philippine Islands, *Cadmus*, *Clio*, and 5 destroyers are based on Sandakan, Borneo, watching Southern Channel as far as radii of action permit. Japanese Second Squadron will shortly be in neighbourhood. No other ships are available.

- C. 58. From C.-in-C., China. September 26th.
To Admiralty. Received 4.27 p.m.

174. Unless anything unforeseen occurs transport *Nile*, *Carnarvonshire* and *Arcadia* will sail from Singapore, Monday morning, 28th September, for Colombo and Bombay escorted by *Askold* and *Empress of Asia*.

French ship *Cordillere* with 50,000 rifles from Japan accompanying them as far as Colombo, and will be escorted thence to Aden by *Dupleix* as the rifles are urgently required.

Dupleix sails from Penang to-night as she has defects to make good at Colombo.

Nothing heard of *Emden* since 23rd September; *Hampshire*, *Yarmouth* and *Chikuma* are still searching for her.

- C. 59. From I.O., Colombo. September 27th.
To Admiralty. Received 8.14 p.m.

Trade route Colombo to Singapore being declared reasonably safe from 8 a.m., September 28th. S.N.O., Bay of Bengal, concurs.

- C. 60. From C.-in-C., China. September 28th.
To Admiralty. Received 8.17 a.m.

175. My telegram, No. 171, convoy sailed this morning, War Office telegram received just before they sailed, the three regiments are to proceed direct to England. Submit they may proceed to Bombay as directed in your telegram, No. 190, and join next convoy from there as a special escort cannot be spared for a longer period.

German collier with 6,000 tons of coal left Manila, night, 26th September but returned 28th September; this may indicate frustrated attempt to convey coal to one or more German armed ships.

German mercantile auxiliary *Prinz Eitel Friedrich* is certainly armed and possibly also the captured Russian Volunteer Fleet Ship *Riasan*. They have not made their presence felt yet, but their whereabouts are unknown as is also that of *Geier* reported active in early part of war (ends).

- C. 61. From I.O., Colombo. September 29th.
To Admiralty. Received 6.20 a.m.

8. *Emden* (German) has sunk four British merchant ships near Ras Sora (British Somaliland) crews of ships returned to Colombo. Trade routes west closed. C.-in-C., East Indies, I.O., Singapore, D.R.I.M., *Chikuma* (Japanese), *Yarmouth*, *Hampshire* have been informed.

- C. 62. From Intelligence Officer, Colombo. September 29th.
To Admiralty. Received 6.29 a.m.

11. During 26th and 27th September *Emden* sank steamships *Tymeric*, *King Lud*, *Riberya*, *Foyle* and captured Admiralty collier *Buresk*.

Crews transferred to *Gryfevale* captured, which arrived at Colombo, 8 o'clock a.m., 29th September.

Emden, 10 o'clock p.m., 27th September, 7° 50' N., 74° 45' E C.-in-C., East Indies, *Chikuma*, *Hampshire*, *Yarmouth*, Intelligence Officer, Singapore, Director Royal Indian Marine, *Dupleix* Aden have been informed.

- C. 63. To C.-in-C., China. September 29th.
From Admiralty. Sent 2.0 p.m.

203. Your 171. Is there any objection to *Dupleix* escorting *Nile*, *Carnarvonshire*, *Arcadia* and *Cordillere* direct to Aden from Colombo, instead of the three ships going out of their way to Bombay?

- C. 64. From I.O., Colombo, September 29th.
To Admiralty. Received 6.10 p.m.
Chikuma arrived Colombo 2 p.m. and sailed 11 p.m. to patrol neighbourhood of Comorin.
- C. 65. From I.O., Colombo, September 30th.
To Admiralty. Received 8.52 a.m.
Chikuma delayed sailing on night of 29th September. Has left 8.30 a.m. 30th September in direction of Minikoi Island by order of *Hampshire*.
- C. 66. From C.-in-C., China, September 30th.
To Admiralty. Received 3.52 a.m.
179. Your telegram 203. No objection except on grounds of insufficiency of force for such valuable convoy. Our regiments have wives and children with them. Messageries Maritimes steamer *Elkantara* with eight batteries of field artillery and ammunition is also with *Dupleix* and will somewhat delay convoy as she can only steam 10 knots. I will detail *Empress of Asia* to accompany *Dupleix* as additional protection.
- C. 67. From Admiralty, September 30th.
To C.-in-C., China. Sent 2.30 p.m.
Your 179. If no objection it is considered both *Dupleix* and *Askold* escort the 5 transports to Aden.

OCTOBER.

- C. 68. From C.-in-C., China, October 1st.
To Admiralty. Received 6.20 p.m.
184. Following telegram received from Tokyo (begins):—
Japanese Admiralty have received following report from First Southern Squadron. Arrived at Jahuit 29th September. No enemy coal, wireless telegraphy, military works or garrison found there. British steam vessel *Induna* detained there has been released (ends).
- C. 69. From Manila, October 2nd.
To Admiralty. Received 3.47 p.m.
German ship *Weigand* left Cebu this afternoon by northern passage without clearance of customs with provisions from German ship *Princess Alice* for Damguar. [? Angaur.]
- C. 70. From C.-in-C., China, October 5th.
To Admiralty. Received 10.55 a.m.
188. Submit for consideration whether any measures can be taken to prevent German ships obtaining coal supplies from Manila.
Only small amount arrived there in British ships mostly consigned to United States Navy, but so far as I know, there is no restriction on imports from Australia or Japan and nothing to prevent such coal eventually reaching enemy.
British Consul-General suggests coal should be sent there only under guarantee (that) it will not be sold to Germans, but I doubt whether this can be made effective. Procedure observed in Dutch East Indies is to prohibit German ships shipping coal except for their own bunkers, and this would be effective if applied to Manila also. I believe Japanese Government is considering whole question, and possibly joint representation to United States Government might produce result as it is understood local Government is anxious about possibility of shortness of supply for local requirements.

- C. 71. From C.-in-C., China, October 7th.
To Admiralty. Received 10.40 a.m.
191. My telegram No. 188. Can representations be made at the same time to prevent systematic use of Manila as a base for German colliers, especially as regards those colliers and their cargoes which takes refuge there as a means of avoiding capture. As an example, German collier *Elmsborn* with 5,000 tons of coal sailed from Manila ostensibly for Bangkok 26th September and returned 27th September in consequence of sighting our armed mercantile cruiser outside. Apparently this ship is at liberty to make a fresh attempt. Owing to U.S. of America interpreting their neutrality in such a manner to permit this, I am obliged to maintain permanently close and continuous watch on Manila and approaches, employing force of three armed mercantile cruisers, two sloops and six destroyers for this service only.
- C. 72. From C.-in-C., China, October 9th.
To Admiralty. Received 10.30 a.m.
193. Three French transports with 2,000 troops have arrived Singapore, but no escort is available except *Zhemchug* (Russia) which is not strong enough and has not sufficient coal capacity.
Yarmouth is nearest available ship, and with reference to your telegram No. 176¹ I propose withdraw her temporarily from search for *Emden* leaving *Hampshire*, *Chikuma* (Jap.) and *Empress of Asia* to continue it.
Yarmouth could then escort transport to Bombay in time to join convoy sailing there November 1st.
Your telegram No. 189² in case *Nisshin* (Jap.) should not be now required to go Fremantle I should be glad of early information as am very short of ships.
- C. 73. From Admiralty, October 9th.
To C.-in-C., China. Sent 2.5 p.m.
218. Your 193. Approved for *Yarmouth* to escort French transports to Bombay, calling at Colombo for Ceylon contingent. Next convoy due to leave Bombay October 26th not November 1st as conjectured by you.
Nisshin is required at Fremantle as arranged as convoy is a very large one.
Dupleix should continue escort of *Cordillere* and transports to Suez and then return to your station; *Askold* to search for *Emden* under *Hampshire*'s directions and may quite convoy as soon as orders can reach her by wireless from Aden.
Give necessary instructions and inform C.-in-C., East Indies, and Intelligence Officer, Colombo. Acknowledge.
- C. 74. From C.-in-C., China, October 12th.
To Admiralty. Received 5.45 a.m.
199. My telegram 198. *Nisshin* could not be made seaworthy under 14 days and complete repairs will take 35 days.
Japanese Admiralty is being asked if they have any ship which could take her place, but it is only barely possible for one to arrive at Albany in time.
I am very unwilling to send *Chikuma* as with *Yarmouth*, *Askold*, and *Dupleix* all on escort duties, I should be left with only *Hampshire* to deal with *Emden*, and there is always a possibility of *Nürnberg* or enemy's armed mercantile cruisers turning up.
Attempted and reported movements of colliers indicate probable further operations on Trade Routes in these parts.

¹ See page 39.² C. 55.

- C. 75. From Admiralty. October 20th.
To C.-in-C., China. Sent 8.30 p.m.
224. *Dupleix* instead of returning to China is to be employed on escort duties with Indian convoys under C.-in-C., East Indies, for the present. Inform *Dupleix*.
C.-in-C., East Indies, has been informed.

- C. 76. From C.-in-C., China. October 20th.
To Admiralty. Received 4.50 p.m.
211. One or two German colliers are now using territorial waters of Portuguese Timor Island as base, probably owing to stringency of Dutch regulations.
It seems improbable that Portuguese can prevent this misuse of their waters, but apparently I cannot seize them while there.

- C. 77. From Admiralty. October 20th.
To C.-in-C., China. Sent 4.50 p.m.
234. Your 211. Secret. In view of our present relations with Portugal, any colliers or enemy vessels are to be seized if taking shelter in isolated parts of Portuguese territorial waters.

- C. 78. From I.O., Colombo. October 20th.
To Admiralty. Received 7.40 p.m.
22. *Emden* sank 5 steamers and captured Admiralty collier *Exford*, 15th to 19th October. Position about 60 miles to the west of Minikoi Island to 100 miles to the east of Minikoi Island.

Crews brought to Cochin by steamer *Saint Egbert* early next morning, 20th October.

I have delayed ships sailing for Aden and Bombay from Colombo, but not from Aden.

Propose to re-open 21st or 22nd October.

- C. 79. From Admiralty. October 21st.
To C.-in-C., China. Sent 12.30 p.m.
235. Your 213. French convoy must remain at Colombo for the present.
Yarmouth to be used for operation against *Emden*.
One ship, preferably *Yarmouth*, should be stationed on the trade route between Ceylon and Minikoi.
What is your news of *Askold*?

- C. 80. From C.-in-C., China. October 21st.
To Admiralty. Received 1.12 p.m.
214. Have sent following by telegraph to Naval Attaché, Tokyo, to day:—

Between October 15th and 19th *Emden* has captured or sunk 6 merchant ships near Minikoi Island, Laccadives. She has become serious menace to British and Japanese trade, and as I have so many demands for ships for escort duty I am much in want of more ships. Would Japanese be willing to send *Hirado* to Singapore at once and if they can be spared one or two more cruisers as soon as possible. Matter presses and I should be glad of early answer. Probably arrangements can be made for Japanese ships working together.

- C. 81. From C.-in-C., China. October 24th.
To Admiralty. Received 8.46 a.m.
221. My telegram 214. Following reply received from Tokyo:—

With the object of clearing the Indian Ocean and securing the safety of navigation, Imperial Japanese Admiralty intends

to form a new Squadron in these waters. Will be composed of *Tokiwa*, *Yakumo* under a V.A. and will be joined by *Ibuki*, *Chikuma*, *Yahagi*, *Nisshin*; *Ibuki*, *Yahagi* when released from convoy duty, *Nisshin* when repaired. *Tokiwa*, *Yakumo*, *Yahagi* will return from present Station when their objective has been accomplished. Concurrence of C.-in-C., China, asked as to co-operation of *Hampshire*, *Minotaur*, *Yarmouth*, with the Japanese Admiral after his arrival South. Further hoped that Royal Navy will arrange supplies such as coal and water as no supply ships or colliers will accompany squadron (ends).

This scheme presents many practical difficulties as to working and involves employment of Japanese Vice-Admiral on East Indies Station senior to C.-in-C., East Indies, but I can see no alternative likely to be acceptable to Japanese who I am inclined to think rather object to employment of their ships under the direct orders of British Officers.

If it is accepted it should be conditional on definite spheres of action being assigned to Japanese and our forces respectively, which can be arranged by me when Japanese Admiral arrives at Singapore.

I have referred this matter to Admiralty as it so largely affects East Indies Station. If Japanese proposal is approved I will communicate with Tokyo as necessary, and I might at the same time suggest a Rear-Admiral junior to C.-in-C., East Indies, would be preferable to a Vice-Admiral.

- C. 82. From C.-in-C., China. October 26th.
To Admiralty. Received 1.49 p.m.

223. My telegram, No. 221, following telegram received from Naval Attaché at Tokyo this afternoon, telegram begins:—

Following from Japanese Admiralty, Vice-Admiral Tochinai with *Tokiwa* and *Yakumo* has been ordered to operate against *Emden*. He has been instructed to keep a good understanding with you and co-operate with C.-in-C., East Indies, also to arrange supply of this third squadron with you. I understand Squadron leaving shortly (telegram ends). I have sent reply expressing my thanks.

- C. 83. From Admiralty. October 26th.
To Intelligence Officers abroad. Received 4.55 p.m.

It is undesirable that vessels on passage should be directed to converge on focal points such as Colombo or Singapore merely for orders and unless absolutely necessary.

Shipping must be more scattered off the routes and where a choice of passage exists this should be taken full advantage of.

As enemy is evidently aware of present scattering limits, substitute general order that vessels must scatter widely both sides of usual track, so that distribution of shipping shall be as effective as possible.

Instructions by Reporting or Intelligence Officers should, whenever possible, be handed to the Masters in writing and a record of such instructions should be kept. Masters must be warned to destroy these instructions if in danger of capture.

Colours are no identification of nationality until the vessel opens fire. It must, therefore, be impressed on all Masters that measures should be taken to avoid vessels directly they or their smoke are sighted.

All lights, except Navigational Lights, should be hidden, and Navigation Lights should not exceed brilliancy laid down in rules for Prevention of Collisions at Sea.

The second masthead light is unnecessary.

- C. 84. From Admiralty. October 27th.
To C.-in-C., China. Sent 4.35 p.m.
249. Your 221 and 223. Japanese aid is invaluable and difficulties must be overcome.

Admiralty are replying in following sense to direct communication on this subject from Japanese Admiralty. Japanese are invited to employ their Squadron E. of Long. 90° E., with special attention to guarding the following focal points:—

1. The vicinity of Cape Negrais,
2. " " " Acheh Head,
3. " " " Straits of Sunda,

using Rangoon, Penang, and Singapore as bases.

It has also been suggested that *Ibuki* should remain on convoy duty.

C.-in-C., East Indies, informed.

- C. 85. From Admiralty. October 27th.
To C.-in-C., China. Sent 6.45 p.m.
250. In continuation of my 235. Now that *Askold* is going from Colombo to Bombay it is very necessary to station a cruiser in the vicinity of the mouth of the Hooghly. Report which ship you can best spare. It appears desirable that either *Hampshire* or *Yarmouth* should be sent. The other one remaining with *Empress of Asia* between Ceylon and Minikoi.

- C. 86. From C.-in-C., China. October 28th.
To Admiralty. Received 9.44 a.m.
228. Your telegram 250, in view of knowing position of *Emden* this morning, Wednesday, I have directed *Hampshire* to recall *Yarmouth* to Colombo at once complete with coal and oil fuel and wait for orders.

Empress of Asia is at Colombo and cannot be ready for sea before November 2nd; condensers require repair.

Hampshire arrived at Colombo yesterday and is making some necessary repairs, ready to proceed 30th October; *Empress of Russia* arriving at Singapore October 29th will leave to join *Hampshire*.

Yahagi left here to-day full speed to work in conjunction with and under *Chikuma* from Acheh to Rangoon with discretion to vary limit on receipt of special instructions.

Departure of French transports from Singapore is necessarily postponed indefinitely.

Askold will require several days in harbour on return to clean boilers and rest crew.

Several cases of heat stroke have been reported.

As force at my disposal is so limited I think *Yarmouth* will be more usefully employed off South-east Coast of Ceylon than at the entrance to Hugli River, and, subject to orders to the contrary, propose to send her there.

- C. 87. From Admiralty. October 28th.
To C.-in-C., China. Sent 2.7 p.m.
254. Your 228. Concur in your dispositions.

NOVEMBER.

- C. 88. From C.-in-C., China, Singapore. November 1st.
To Admiralty. Received 8.31 a.m.
242. Your telegram 261¹ *Askold* cannot leave Bombay till 4th November owing to defective machinery. Propose to establish her (then) on trade route between Madras and Calcutta.
Reply:—Your 242. *Askold* approved.

¹ 261. What do you propose to do with *Askold* now she has arrived with her convoy at Bombay?

- C. 89. From C.-in-C., China. November 10th.
To Admiralty. Received 8.18 a.m.

I have ordered *Hampshire*, *Askold*, and one *Empress* steamer to Colombo and *Yarmouth* to Madras.

I consider it necessary they should have a few days' rest before proceeding on any further service, as they have been almost constantly at sea since the war began.

The other *Empresses* are proceeding to Cocos Is. to render medical assistance and take charge of prisoners. Casualties, *Sydney*—3 killed, 15 wounded; those of *Emden* very heavy.

- C. 90. From I.O., Colombo. November 11th.
To Admiralty. Received 8.26 a.m.

10. Following telegram received from Sydney. Cocos Island received Colombo, 11th November (begins):—

Following for Admiralty: C.-in-C., China, Commonwealth Naval Board of Administration—Schooner 3 masts, called *Ayesha*, escaped from Direction Island last night at 6 p.m. with 3 German officers and 40 men, four Maxim guns, each two belts; 3 boats of *Emden* with it containing the destruction parties landed for cable (ends).

C.-in-C., East Indies, C.-in-C., China, and *Hampshire* have been informed.

- C. 91. From Admiralty. November 12th.
To C.-in-C., China. Sent 9.20 p.m.

287. *Hampshire* and *Yarmouth* to proceed to Gibraltar.

- C. 92. From Admiralty. November 13th.
To C.-in-C., China. Sent 5.55 p.m.

289. Your 275. *Hampshire* is to take Australian convoy on from Colombo.

Question of release of *Ibuki* is being considered.
Yarmouth is to proceed to Gibraltar.

- C. 93. From C.-in-C., China. November 17th.
To Admiralty. Received 7.9, a.m.

284. I am sending *Askold* from Colombo to Hong Kong to meet stores and ammunition demanded from Vladivostock, and propose to keep her in that neighbourhood for the present ready to escort ship with Russian mines if necessary.

Your telegram 289. No further orders having been received about *Ibuki*, Japanese Admiral Tochinai has directed her to proceed with the Australian convoy as far as Aden leaving Colombo to-day.

- C. 94. From Admiralty. November 17th.
To C.-in-C., China. Sent 4.25 p.m.

Send all your River class destroyers to Egypt. Arrange, if necessary, for colliers to accompany them or for them to be towed. Acknowledge.

DECEMBER.

- C. 95. From C.-in-C., China. December 4th.
To Admiralty. Received 12.51 p.m.

311. Vice-Admiral Tochinai with *Tokiwa* and *Yakumo* left Singapore 15th November for Truk (Hogulu) Island. *Yahagi* and *Chikuma* left Singapore 18th November and *Ikoma* left Singapore

24th November, all for Fiji Islands, calling at Townsville for coal.

Japanese two Southern Squadrons are being reconstituted as follows:—

First.—*Kurama*, flagship, *Tsukuba*, *Ikoma*, *Yahagi*, *Chikuma*, *Umikaze*, *Yamakaze*, base Fiji Islands.

Second.—*Iwate*, Flagship, *Nisshin*, *Ibuki*, *Hirato*, Base Truk (Hogolu) Island.

C. 96. From C.-in-C., China
To Admiralty.

December 12th.
Received 1.20 p.m.

326. *Ibuki* is ordered to return to Japan from Singapore. With reference to my telegram No. 316,¹ I have suggested through the Naval Attaché at Tokio that if Japanese are considering redistribution of their ships, perhaps they may think fit to keep two at Singapore in case any future attack on trade should be made.

C. 97. From C.-in-C., China.
To Admiralty.

December 14th
Received 6.56 p.m.

332. Japanese Admiralty inform me that German armed mercantile cruiser *Cormoran*, formerly Russian Volunteer Fleet Ship *Riasan*, entered Guam this morning, 14th December, and is coaling and provisioning. *Himalaya* arrives Colombo, 16th December. Propose that she should search Diego and Maldive Islands for *Ayesha* and then return to Colombo. *Empress of Japan* arrives at Singapore 15th December. Submit I may keep both ships for protection of trade routes instead of sending them to Aden, although it is doubtful whether they are fast enough to catch *Cormoran*.

Japanese Admiralty have ordered *Ibuki* (Jap.) now at Singapore to wait for further orders, but I have not yet heard what other steps they intend to take.

Iwate (Jap.) is at Truk Island (Carolines). *Hirato* (Jap.) Pelew, *Nisshin* (Jap.) Pleasant Island.

C. 98. From Admiralty.
To C.-in-C., China, Singapore.

December 15th.
1.5 p.m.

Your 332. Proposal to retain *Himalaya* and *Empress of Japan* approved.

C. 99. From C.-in-C., China.
To Admiralty.

December 16th.
Received 5.12 a.m.

335. My telegram, No. 332. Japanese Admiralty inform me *Cormoran* (German) has been disarmed at Guam yesterday, December 15th. *Himalaya* will proceed direct to Aden after searching Diego Garcia and Maldive Islands.

British steamship reports having sighted schooner resembling *Ayesha*, 6 a.m. December 9th, S. Lat. 3° 24' E., Long. 95° 13' (?); 99° 38' (?); 95° 20' (?). Course East.

I have asked C.-in-C., East Indies, whether he requires *Empress of Japan* urgently; if not, I will employ her and probably *Cadmus* also in further search for schooner.

¹ Re Eastern situation generally, see p 85.

APPENDIX D.

CHINA STATION WAR ORDERS.¹

GENERAL ARRANGEMENTS.

1. In the case of war with any country except Japan, the object of the China Squadron will be to localise the hostile men-of-war and bring them to action before reinforcements can reach them.

2. As the Japanese Alliance has recently been renewed, war with that country is improbable under present conditions. No definite offensive operations could be undertaken against Japan with the squadron at its present strength.

3. The strategic conditions will vary so considerably according to the country with which we are at war, and will depend so much on circumstances that will arise at the time hostilities are imminent, that it is impossible to lay down definite instructions beforehand.

4. Generally speaking, the fighting strength of the squadron will rendezvous immediately at Hong Kong; but if the ships are dispersed, the action to be taken must be determined by circumstances at the time.

No direct steps will be taken to protect commerce until the enemy's ships, including armed merchant vessels, have been brought to action or contained.

5. In the event of war with Germany, unless Japan is ready to act instantly as our ally, the whole of the fighting strength of the China squadron will be required to deal with the German ships in Chinese waters.

6. The disposal of the *Triumph* will depend upon whether Holland remains neutral or not.

If she is hostile, *Triumph* will be sent south to join the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, in engaging the Dutch squadron stationed in Java.

Under favourable circumstances it is anticipated that *Triumph* will be ready to leave Hong Kong 10 days after the receipt of the warning telegram.

7. If the Commonwealth of Australia places its ships under the control of the British Admiralty, the China Squadron may be reinforced by the battle-cruiser *Australia*, and later, by one of the light cruisers *Sydney* or *Melbourne*.

In the event of the *Australia* being ordered to China, she would probably be able to reach Hong Kong in 8 to 12 days, according to her position when the warning telegram is received.

Her ammunition and spare stores would be sent to Hong Kong by specially chartered steamer, by a route decided upon by the Australian Government after consultation by cable with the Commodore.

8. The Intelligence Officers at Hong Kong and Shanghai will, as far as possible, be informed from time to time of the areas which merchant ships should avoid, and these officers will distribute the information to the British Port and Consular authorities for communication to British merchant ships.

[The remainder of the War Orders, 20 printed foolscap pages, concerning details of organisation &c., consisted of:—

Warning telegram.

War Orders for Commodore Hong Kong (Enclosures A and B) &c., as per covering sheet.]

¹ M. 9055 of 12.1.14.

WAR WITH GERMANY.

GENERAL PLAN OF OPERATIONS.

My plan of operations is framed on the following suppositions of the initial policy of the enemy, bearing in mind the possibility of the Dutch joining them.

2. The enemy may either—

- (a) steam south at once and effect a junction with the Dutch forces, or,
- (b) commence a vigorous offensive against British trade off the Yangtse and endeavour to capture any sloops and gunboats leaving the river.

3. The British forces available at once can be taken as

<i>Minotaur,</i>	<i>Newcastle,</i>
<i>Hampshire,</i>	7 Destroyers, and
<i>Yarmouth,</i>	3 submarines.

4. If Germany is acting alone, *Triumph*, and possibly *Australia*, should be able to join my flag off the Yangtse about 12 days after receipt of the Warning Telegram. Two French cruisers may also be available, but probably not for some days after the receipt of the Warning Telegram.

5. Neglecting submarines, which, owing to the long distance from port and their lack of speed, cannot be counted on in a day action, the British squadron at the commencement of hostilities, as at present constituted, is slightly inferior to that of Germany. Germany has no hope of further reinforcements, and it is most probable, therefore, that if the policy at (a) is not adopted, she will carry out a vigorous offensive on the lines set forth at (b).

In either case I consider it essential that I should endeavour to bring the enemy to action as soon as possible, and although I hope for a successful issue to such an action, I feel that it is my duty to point out that a crushing blow would be dealt both to our trade and to our position and prestige in the Far East in the event of a defeat.

6. My plan of operations is as follows:—

DURING THE PERIOD OF STRAINED RELATIONS.

If time will allow, concentrate all fighting ships at Hong Kong to complete with coal, stores, &c., and if the situation will admit of it, send all smaller ships to Hong Kong in anticipation of commissioning the *Triumph*.

ON THE RECEIPT OF THE WARNING TELEGRAM.

Proceed to sea with my available squadron as soon as possible and move up to a position in the vicinity of the Saddle Islands: the submarines, colliers, and fleet auxiliaries following as soon as ready, *Alacrity* anchorage being used as a base.

My object in doing this is:—

- (a) to protect the major portion of our trade,
- (b) to be in a good strategical position should the German Fleet put to sea for any purpose,
- (c) to be within a reasonable distance of Tsingtau, so that there would be a chance of cutting off any German ships attempting to harry our trade,
- (d) to capture enemy's ships,
- (e) if the German Fleet decided to effect a junction with the Dutch ships at once (probably to the eastward of the Philippines), there would be a good chance of engaging them well to the north of their rendezvous, if our fleet left Hong Kong as soon as possible and searched the area to the north-eastward of Formosa on the way up.

7. I would modify these plans if any unit of a German fleet were known to be separated from their main fleet at the time of the receipt of the warning telegram.

8. After these initial stages, I should be guided by the development of events.

If Germany is acting by herself, my squadron will be joined by *Triumph* and possibly by the *Australia* and two French cruisers, in which case more aggressive action can be taken.

If the Dutch join Germany, *Australia* and the two French ships may be available, but the Dutch have some new destroyers and three minelayers, and the possibility of *Triumph* or *Swiftsure* being put out of action must be taken into account, in which case reinforcements would be required in the south.

9. The submarines would act more or less independently of the squadron, and I propose to use them for a watch on Tsingtau; they can take care of themselves to a certain extent; and Wei-hai-wei would probably be used as their base.

10. When more aggressive action can be taken I propose to move the squadron nearer Tsingtau.

A close blockade is of a doubtful utility; destroyers and submarines cannot approach the harbour very closely on account of mines, and if the enemy wished to get clear there should be no great difficulty in doing so on a suitable night, more especially as the sea is practically clear outside the harbour.

The difficulties of a close blockade would be great on account of having no suitable base in the vicinity, in addition to which, our forces are not very greatly superior, and the absence of one or two ships, coaling, &c., might weaken the fleet at a critical time; also the blockade could not be made very effective.

11. No great harm could be done to British trade by German ships north of Shanghai and it may be taken that trade routes in the vicinity, or to the south and east of that port, will be their objective, both for harassing our trade and protecting their own.

12. For these reasons I propose to cruise to the south and east of Tsingtau, using the destroyers and light cruisers as look-outs, the fleet retiring to the Saddle Islands or some Korean or Japanese harbour from time to time for replenishing coal, stores, &c., and overhauling machinery.

In Admiralty letter M. 030, of 20 February 1912, the last paragraph implies that there is a reasonable chance of the Japanese allowing the British forces to use a base of this description. I desire to point out that such permission is very desirable, as the Chinese Government might protest against the use of Alacrity Anchorage for this purpose, and might even resort to reprisals to the extent of attacking Hong Kong or seizing Wei-hai-wei.

As soon as the minelayer became available, she would be escorted by the fleet to drop mines off Tsingtau from time to time under cover of darkness.

13. It is most important that accurate information should be obtained as to what ships were in Tsingtau from time to time. I have made some suggestions on this point in my covering letter.¹

14. If events in Europe showed that the war was likely to be of long duration, preparations for an attempt of the capture of Tsingtau would be made.

¹ Suggestions that Chinese Clerks might be utilised, &c.

APPENDIX E.

SYDNEY'S LETTER OF PROCEEDINGS.¹

H.M.A.S. *Sydney* at Colombo,
15th November 1914.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to report that whilst on escort duty with the convoy under the charge of Captain Silver, H.M.A.S. *Melbourne*, at 6.30 a.m., on Monday, November 9, a wireless message from Cocos was heard: "Strange warship at entrance." I was ordered to raise steam for full speed at 7.0 a.m. and proceeded thither. I then worked up to 20 knots, and at 9.15 a.m. sighted land ahead and almost immediately the smoke of a ship which proved to be H.I.G.M.S. *Emden* coming out towards me at a great rate. At 9.40 a.m. fire was opened, she firing the first shot, I kept my distance as much as possible to obtain the advantage of my guns. Her fire was very accurate and rapid to begin with, but seemed to slacken very quickly, all casualties occurring in this ship almost immediately. My foremost Finder in centre of main control position being dismounted quite early and the after control being put out at about the third salvo. First the foremost funnel of her went, secondly the foremast, and she was badly on fire aft, then the second funnel went, and lastly the third funnel, and I saw she was making for the beach on North Keeling Island, where she was grounded at 11.20 a.m. I gave her two more broadsides and left her to pursue a merchant ship which had come up during the action.

2. Although I had guns on this merchant ship at odd times during the action I had not fired and as she was making off fast I pursued and overtook her at 12.10, firing a gun across her bows and hoisting International Code Signal to stop, which she did. I sent an armed boat and found her to be the S.S. *Buresk*, a captured British collier, with 18 Chinese crew, 1 English Steward, 1 Norwegian cook, and a German Prize Crew of 3 officers, 1 warrant officer and 12 men. The ship unfortunately was sinking, the *Kingston* knocked out and damaged to prevent repairing, so I took all on board, fired 4 shells into her, and returned to *Emden*, passing men swimming in the water, for whom I left 2 boats I was towing from *Buresk*.

3. On arriving again off *Emden* she still had her colours up at mainmast head, I enquired by signal, International Code, "Will you surrender?" and received a reply in Morse, "What signal, no signal books?" I then made in Morse, "Do you surrender?" and subsequently, "Have you received my signal?" to neither of which did I get an answer; the German Officers on board gave me to understand that the captain would never surrender, and therefore, though very reluctantly, I again fired at her at 4.30 p.m., ceasing at 4.35 p.m. as she showed white flags and hauled down her Ensign by sending a man aloft. I have given these details very exactly as subsequently I heard they were indignant, saying I fired on a white flag.

4. I then left *Emden* and returned and picked up the *Buresk*'s two boats, rescuing two sailors (5.0 p.m.) who had been in the water all day. I returned and sent in one boat to *Emden* manned by her own prize crew from *Buresk*, and one officer, stating I would return to their assistance next morning. This I had to do as it was desirable to find out the condition of cables and Wireless Station at Direction Island. On the passage over I was again delayed by rescuing another sailor (6.30 p.m.) and by the time I was again ready and approaching Direction Island it was too late for the night. A high Telefunken Note being also heard on Wireless Instruments.

5. I lay on and off all night and communicated with Direction Island at 8.0 a.m., November 10, to find that the *Emden*'s party consisting of 3 officers and 40 men, 1 launch and 2 cutters had seized and provisioned a 70-ton

schooner (the *Ayesha*), having 4 Maxims, with 2 belts to each. They left the previous night at 6 o'clock. The Wireless Station was entirely destroyed, 1 cable cut, 1 damaged and 1 intact. I borrowed a doctor and two assistants and proceeded as fast as possible to *Emden*'s assistance.

6. I sent an officer on board to see the captain, and in view of the large number of prisoners and wounded and lack of accommodation, &c., in this ship and the absolute impossibility of leaving them where they were, he agreed that if I received his officers and men and all wounded, "then as for such time as they remained in *Sydney*, they would cause no interference with ship or fittings, and would be amenable to the ship's discipline." I, therefore, set to work at once to tranship them—a most difficult operation, the ship being on weather side of Island and the send alongside very heavy. The conditions in the *Emden* are indescribable. I received the last from her at 5.0 p.m., then had to go round to the lee side to pick up 20 more men, who had managed to get ashore from the ship.

7. Dark came on before this could be accomplished, and the ship again stood off and on all night, resuming operations at 5.0 a.m. on November 11, a cutter's crew having to land with stretchers to bring wounded round to embarking point. A German Officer, a doctor, died ashore on the previous day. The ship, in the meantime, ran over to Direction Island to return their doctor and assistants, send cables, and was back again at 10.0 a.m., embarked the remainder of wounded and proceeded for Colombo by 10.35 a.m., Wednesday, November 11.

8. Total casualties in *Sydney*:—Killed, 3; severely wounded (since dead) 1; severely wounded, 4; wounded, 4; slightly wounded, 4. In the *Emden* I can only approximately state the killed at 7 Officers and 108 men from Captain's statement. I had on board 11 officers, 9 warrant officers and 191 men, of whom 3 officers and 53 men were wounded, and of this number 1 Officer and 3 men have since died of wounds.

9. The damage to *Sydney*'s hull and fittings was surprisingly small, in all about 10 hits seem to have been made, though in the case of the after control there may have been two or three hits. The engine and boiler rooms and funnels escaped entirely. Both control positions were hit.

10. With such a crowd of prisoners and wounded on board it was impossible to do more than barely look after them, the wounded were in a terrible state and had to lay about on the upper deck and passages under what temporary shelter could be rigged, in close tropical weather, with heavy rain, and as a consequence the ship will require most careful and thorough disinfecting and cleaning at Colombo.

11. I communicated with *Empress of Asia* by signal at midnight on Thursday, November 12, and was more than thankful to be able to stop and tranship to *Empress of Russia*, 18 Chinese (ex *Buresk*) and 5 officers, 4 warrant officers and 66 men belonging to *Emden*, most of whom were wounded, including 12 cot cases, but notwithstanding, I retained 9 of their worst cases as I did not like the transhipment; indeed, if we had not been most fortunately in smooth water, I could not have shifted the men.

12. I have noted down here a few interesting facts:—

(a) Principal casualties occurred in the disengaged side, and in after control position, which was put out.

(b) Total mileage by revolutions steamed from 9.0 a.m. to noon, 68 miles.

Action lasted from 9.40 a.m. to 11.20 a.m., during which time engines varied from 13 knots to an estimated 27 knots, i.e.:—

22 minutes at 13 knots.

43 " " 20 "

1 hour 55 " " 25-27 knots.

(c) Enemy's shell appeared to fail to burst often, his steering gear was disabled very early in proceedings, and loss of speed occurred in consequence.

¹ Original is in M. 04526/14.

- (d) *Sydney* fired one torpedo, but owing to an immediate large alteration of course, nothing was known of its behaviour.
- (e) *Sydney* expended 670 rounds of ammunition, nearly all of which were lyddite, the effect of which was appalling, and could I have known it, I might have left her after the first half hour.


13. I have great pleasure in stating that the behaviour of the ship's company was excellent in every way, and with such a large proportion of young hands and people under training it is all the more gratifying. The engines worked magnificently and higher results than trials were obtained, and I cannot speak too highly of the Medical Staff and arrangements on subsequent trip, the ship being nothing but a Hospital of a most painful description.

14. I passed the convoy between the hours of 4 and 5 a.m. on the 15th and arrived at Colombo at 10.0 a.m.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient Servant,
(Signed) JOHN L. T. GLOSSOP,
Captain.

To the Secretary of the
Admiralty.

EMDEN CHART II.



MOVEMENTS OF "EMDEN"


1st AUGUST to 9th NOVEMBER, 1914,

AND

POSITIONS OF CHINA SQUADRON

To 13th SEPTEMBER.

Track of "Emden" taken from I.D. 1165, Oct. 1917, "German Raiders," plotted on Admiralty Chart 2483.

Positions of H.M. Ships from Ships Logs.
(Noon positions unless otherwise stated).

CONFIDENTIAL.

Attention is drawn to the Penalties attaching to any infraction
of the Official Secrets Act.

C.B. 929.

005471

**THE
EAST INDIES SQUADRON,
1914.**

(Short Title :--"EAST INDIES.")

Historical Monograph No. 17.

NAVAL STAFF,
TRAINING AND STAFF DUTIES DIVISION,
May, 1921.

THE EAST INDIES SQUADRON, 1914.

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THE EAST INDIES SQUADRON, 1914.

Introduction.

The chief interest of the subject of this monograph lies in the unexpected nature of the calls upon the East Indies Squadron and its diversion from its primary function. It will be seen that though it was placed in the Indian Ocean to fulfil certain duties, no sooner did war break out than it was detailed for entirely different duties, and the work it had been specially got ready to perform was taken over by another squadron, originally disposed elsewhere for other work. In fact, the situation which war did in actual fact bring about proved to be quite different from what had been anticipated, and was met by the complete abandonment of the carefully considered procedure laid down in the war plans.

Note on Sources.

The telegrams to and from the East Indies Station are in H.S. Vols. 12 and 32. The docketed papers have not yet been bound. They consist chiefly of telegrams and letters from the War Office and India Office, and will be referred to by their numbers in the Admiralty register.

The transport arrangements are in a volume titled T. 7634/14, at present in the custody of the Ministry of Shipping.

No references are given for movements of H.M. ships; these have been taken from their logs.

THE EAST INDIES SQUADRON, 1914.

(Short Title : "EAST INDIES, 1914.")

CHAPTER I.

THE STATION AND ITS SQUADRON.

1. **The East Indies Station.**—The Indian Ocean is exceptional in that its coasts are largely British. The northern shores include India and Burmah; to the westward are British East Africa and South Africa; on the east side are the Malay States and Australia; while its southern boundary, if it can be considered to have one, is the open sea extending for nearly 5,000 miles between Africa and Australia along the parallel of 35° S.

This large extent of British coast line permitted us to set up a series of protected harbours; of these, Bombay, the strongest, was a second class naval base, while Singapore, fortified against a powerful squadron of armoured cruisers and a raiding force of not more than 2,000 men, was the most formidable of the defended commercial ports. The others in alphabetical order were: Aden, Calcutta, Colombo, Durban, Fremantle, Karachi, Mauritius, and Rangoon (Admiralty Manual of War Organisation, 1914, Appendix).

Germany's only colony and base in these waters was German East Africa with its ports Dar-es-Salaam and Tanga, neither of which was fortified.

The Indian Ocean being so large an area was under the care of three British squadrons; of these, the East Indian Squadron (one battleship, two light cruisers, and three sloops) took the main portion from Java to Aden; the Australian Squadron (one battle cruiser, four light cruisers, and two submarines) under the control of the Commonwealth Government guarded Australian waters, and the Cape Squadron (three light cruisers) was responsible for the south-western portion as far north as the Equator and the Seychelles, thus including German East Africa. One effect of this arrangement was that the base which would presumably be used by enemy cruisers operating against our trade routes in the Indian Ocean was outside the jurisdiction of the force guarding those routes.

Before the Russo-Japanese War we had maintained in Far Eastern waters a powerful squadron, including six battleships, to counteract the Russian force in those seas, and the general idea was that our first move when war was imminent would be

to concentrate at Singapore the China, East Indies, and Australian Squadrons under the supreme command of the C.-in-C., China, who would always be the senior of the three Admirals. But with the destruction of the Russian fleet and the renewal of our alliance with Japan, coupled with the concentration of the main force of the British Navy in Home Waters to meet the menace of growing German power, the three squadrons were all much reduced; and in 1913 Singapore itself was transferred with Sumatra, Java, and the Malay Peninsula from the China Station to the East Indies which up to then had extended only as far as the northern entrance of the Straits of Malacca.¹ By this extension the East Indies Station now took in the whole of the very important trade route between the two focal points Aden and Singapore, the latter being the junction of the trade routes from China and the Eastern Archipelago.

2. **Trade Routes.**—Practically all the trade to and from the Far East, India and East Africa and a large proportion of the Australian trade passes through the Gulf of Aden. At the island of Sokotra the main trunk of the trade route goes on to Colombo, throwing off branches to Karachi, Bombay, Mauritius and the African coast. Off Ceylon further important branches run to Calcutta, Rangoon, Sunda Strait and Fremantle, but the trunk itself continues to Singapore and up the coast of China. The value of this trade in hulls and cargoes is very great,² both from the money it is worth, and the indispensable nature of the goods; consequently, it might be judged to present an attractive target to an enterprising enemy. Yet Germany had within immediate striking distance only one light cruiser, and thus our Squadron told off for the patrol of the Indian Ocean was a small one.

3. **The East Indies Squadron.**—The East Indies Squadron, under the command of Rear-Admiral Sir Richard H. Peirse, K.C.B., M.V.O., consisted of the following vessels:—

—	Class.	Completed.	Tons.	Guns.	Trial Speed.
<i>Swiftsure</i> .	Battleship	1904	11,800	4—10-in. 14—7·5-in.	19·9
<i>Dartmouth</i> .	Light Cruiser	1911	5,250	8—6-in.	25·8
<i>Fox</i> .	"	1895	4,360	2—6-in. 8—4·7-in.	19·9
<i>Espiegle</i> .	Sloop	1902	1,070	6—4-in.	13·5
<i>Odin</i> .	"	1902	1,070	4—4-in.	13·6
<i>Alert</i> .	"	1895	960	4—4-in.	13·4

¹ M. 12159 of April 14, 1913.

² See Fayle: *Seaborne Commerce*, Chapter VII., for details of the route and the value of its trade.

A reinforcement would be provided by the largest vessels of the Royal Indian Marine; these were to be armed on the outbreak of war and could be used either as transports or merchant cruisers. Arrangements had been made with the Australian Government that one of their light cruisers should be sent to Fremantle to be under the orders of the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.¹

4. **War Orders.**—The War Orders of the East Indies Station were based on the assumption that the China Squadron would prevent the enemy cruiser squadron in the Pacific from entering the Indian Ocean, and that the principal danger to be feared was from merchant vessels which Germany might arm as cruisers; these might slip away from the southern ports of China, and pass unobserved through one or other of the numerous straits between Australia and the Malay Peninsula. The points at which they would probably strike would be those where the trade routes converged and merchant vessels would be most thickly collected; such would be (a) the Gulf of Aden, (b) the neighbourhood of Minikoi in the Maldive Islands, (c) off Colombo, (d) the Straits of Malacca, and (e) the Straits of Sunda. The disposition of the East Indies Squadron at the outbreak of war would be ruled by these considerations, and the best allocation would, therefore, be:—two sloops in the Gulf of Aden; the *Fox* and an Australian cruiser for the Colombo-Fremantle trade route; the *Swiftsure*, *Dartmouth* and two auxiliary cruisers for the Straits of Malacca and Sunda, to be reinforced by the *Triumph* from Hong Kong in certain circumstances, such as the entry of Holland into the war on the side of Germany. The Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, was to make Singapore his Headquarters.¹

5. **Enemy Forces.**—On 27 July 1914, the date of the despatch of the Precautionary telegram warning all Senior Officers abroad that war between the Triple Alliance and Triple Entente was by no means impossible, the German men-of-war in the Indian Ocean were:—

—	Class.	Completed.	Trial Speed.	Guns.
<i>Königsberg</i> - -	Light cruiser	1907	24½	10—4.1-in. 1—7-pr.
<i>Geier</i> - - -	Gunboat	1905	16 (designed).	8—4.1-in. 5—1-pr.
<i>Möwe</i> - - -	Surveying vessel	—	—	3—1-pr. 2 Maxims.

The *Königsberg* and *Möwe* were at or near Dar-es-Salaam, and the *Geier* was at Singapore.

¹ See Appendix G.

Besides these, there were in the Indian Ocean several German vessels considered by us as convertible into cruisers. Of these, the *Tabora* (8,022 tons, 15 knots) was approaching Dar-es-Salaam; the *Kleist* (8,959 tons, 14½ knots), nearing Penang; the *Derfflinger* (9,144 tons, 14½ knots) in the Red Sea homeward bound; the *Zieten* (8,021 tons, 14½ knots) from Sydney to Bremen, nearing Colombo; and, largest of all, the *Princess Alice* (10,981 tons, 15½ knots) had left Suez for Yokohama.

In the Pacific Ocean was the German East Asiatic Squadron consisting of the two fast armoured cruisers *Scharnhorst* (Flag of Admiral Graf von Spee) and *Gneisenau* and the light cruisers *Emden*, *Nürnberg*, and *Leipzig*. The positions of none of these was known, except of the last, which was on the coast of Mexico. The *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* were last reported to have been at Truk Island (Lat. 7½° N., Long. 150° E.) on July 7. The *Nürnberg* had left San Francisco on July 21, and the *Emden* was thought to be at Tsingtau.

At this juncture the disposition of the East Indies Squadron was:—

Swiftsure at Colombo.

Dartmouth in dock at Bombay.

Fox, *Alert*, and *Odin* in the Persian Gulf.

Espègle at Colombo.

The more important ships of the Australian Squadron were cruising off the Queensland Coast; the China Squadron was mostly at Wei-hai-Wei except for the gunboats in the Yangtse and West Rivers, and the *Triumph* in dockyard hands at Hong Kong; while the Cape Squadron was on passage from Mauritius to Zanzibar.

CHAPTER II.

THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

6. **Arrangements for shadowing Königsberg.**—The situation which had led to the despatch of the warning of July 27 speedily became more threatening, and next day the Admiralty instructed the Cape and East Indies Admirals that the *Dartmouth* must be prepared to shadow the *Königsberg* until the *Nottingham* could get out to the Cape Station.¹ The *Nottingham* was to leave England at the end of August to relieve the *Pegasus*, and the *Falmouth* to relieve the *Fox*.² In actual fact, these two light cruisers remained at home.

¹ Appendix F. 1.

² M Letter Book Miscellaneous 272, pp. 62, 276.

On July 29 the "warning" telegram was sent out by the Admiralty, followed soon after by orders to act on the War Standing Orders, and at 11.30 a.m. on the 30th the Admiralty, having heard nothing from Admiral Peirse, sent direct to the *Dartmouth* instructions to proceed from Bombay to Zanzibar. In point of fact, Admiral Peirse had by that time reported his dispositions, but owing to the congestion of business at Whitehall his telegram was not seen by any principal member of the War Staff till August 1. He had ordered the *Dartmouth* to undock at Bombay with the greatest despatch and proceed to Zanzibar to shadow the *Königsberg*, had recalled the *Fox* from Muskat to join him at Colombo, and had ordered the *Espiègle* to Aden, the *Alert* to Bombay, and the *Odin* to remain in the Persian Gulf. Any hope he might have of getting touch with the *Königsberg* was faint since the *Dartmouth* could not leave Bombay till the 8th, and, in fact, the *Königsberg* came out of Dar-es-Salaam on July 31, and though sighted by the *Hyacinth* of the Cape Squadron, disappeared in a short time and was not heard of again for some weeks. Admiral King Hall, C.-in-C. of the Cape Squadron, confidently believed that she would remain on the African coast.¹

Although arrangements had been made for the automatic transfer of the Royal Indian Marine ships *Dufferin* and *Hardinge* to the Navy with the issue of the War telegram, Admiral Peirse considered it desirable to arm them and to prepare them in advance; this was approved and the necessary authorisation sent out. In view of the fact that the *Triumph* at Hong Kong was short of a crew, Admiral Peirse was told that one of his sloops must remain at Colombo ready to move to Singapore should her crew be wanted for the *Triumph*, and he consequently cancelled his orders for the *Espiègle* to go to Aden.²

The Admiral proposed to go himself to Singapore in the *Swiftsure*, but this the Admiralty did not approve, as the Eastern Telegraph Company at Zanzibar had sent a warning that in addition to the *Königsberg* there were four large German armed steamers in the neighbourhood³ which might get on to trade routes. Until his reinforcements from the Royal Indian Marine should be ready he had only his original squadron to deal with this menace. The *Dufferin* and *Hardinge* were to be ready by the 12th and 15th of August respectively, and three more vessels of the Indian Marine (*Northbrook*, *Minto* and *Dalhousie*) were, on the 5th, put under Admiral Peirse to be armed at once in anticipation of formal consent from the Government of India,⁴ and to provide ratings for them he ordered

¹ F. 2, 3, and 8.

² F. 5, 6, and 7.

³ F. 9, 10, and 11. This was quite untrue, and is an example of the numerous scare telegrams which were accepted as true and much hampered operations at the outbreak of war.

⁴ M. 01294/14.

the *Alert* to pay off at Bombay. The *Fox* joined him at Colombo that evening.

7. Protection of the Aden-Colombo Trade Route.—Until August 6, Admiral Peirse had been unable to take any steps to find the *Königsberg* or to protect the Colombo-Aden trade route; the *Dartmouth*, which had been definitely detailed by the Admiralty for this purpose was still in dock at Bombay, but that morning the Admiral left Colombo in the *Swiftsure* to patrol the threatened route, detaching the *Espiègle* as the most powerful of his available ships to patrol the other route from Colombo to Singapore, to be joined by the *Fox* as soon as she had finished her coaling at Colombo. The German gunboat *Geier* had left Singapore on July 29, and was thought to have been at Rhio, opposite Singapore, on August 3; the *Emden* was reported to have left Tsingtau on August 3 with four colliers; the *Nürnberg* left Honolulu on July 27; the *Scharnhorst* was considered from the wireless messages heard in Australia to have been in Lat. 8° S., Long. 162° E., steering South-East at noon on the 5th; the *Leipzig* left Mazatlan, Mexico, on the 6th; and the *Gneisenau* was considered to be with the *Scharnhorst*.¹ Thus there seemed to be no immediate danger on the trade route across the Bay of Bengal except from the *Königsberg* and armed liners, only one of which, the *Tabora* (arrived Dar-es-Salaam August 2), had been located. The route west from Colombo seemed the more threatened, and the Admiralty, learning on the 7th that the *Dartmouth*, which had finished her preparations a day earlier than was anticipated, had proceeded from Bombay for Zanzibar, ordered her to join Admiral Peirse to assist the *Swiftsure* in patrolling the western routes; this order reinforced instructions to her from Admiral King Hall (who appeared to think she was under his command) that she was to proceed quickly to Aden, looking out for the *Königsberg* at the mouth of the Red Sea, and from Aden, if there were no news of the enemy, to go on to Zanzibar.² His intention was that she should relieve the *Pegasus* there and remain with the *Astræa* for operations on the East coast of Africa. Next morning, the 8th, Dar-es-Salaam wireless station was destroyed by the *Astræa* and the Germans closed the harbour by sinking their floating dock in the channel, thereby blocking in the *Tabora* and preventing any possibility of the *Königsberg* taking refuge there.

8. The East Indies Squadron changes its Function.—So far the East Indies Squadron had carried out the war plans devised by Admiral Peirse for the protection of trade; and though it was too early yet to be certain that no losses had occurred, at any rate none had been reported. But meanwhile decisions had been reached at home which were to make a complete

¹ See Monograph: *China and Emden*.

² F. 14, 15.

change in the place to be filled by the East Indies Squadron in the general scheme of strategy. Shortly after he had left Bombay for the Gulf of Aden Admiral Peirse received the following urgent order :—

113. *Swiftsure* and *Dartmouth* are to return to Bombay forthwith at highest possible speed and complete with coal. Report expected date of arrival. Prepare to convoy troops to Aden. Order all armed Indian Marine ships to assemble at Bombay.¹

From this moment the original war plans of Admiral Peirse can be considered as abandoned. In framing them he had not contemplated the transference of troops in large numbers from and to India, and yet it was the escort of transports and not the destruction of the enemy's forces which became the principal duty of the East Indies Squadron so long as those forces were within reach. This alteration in the function of a squadron in waters so remote from Europe was one of the far-reaching effects of the German Army's operations in France.

CHAPTER III.

THE FIRST INDIAN CONVOYS.

9. **Arrangements for Escort.**—As early as August 5 the Cabinet had given a decision to carry out a pre-war plan of reinforcing our army in Egypt by one Indian Division. Two days later they greatly increased the force, and on August 8 the Government selected for despatch to Egypt the 3rd (Lahore) and 7th (Meerut) Divisions and the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade. The Admiralty, learning that advanced details would be ready to leave by August 15, at once ordered Admiral Peirse back to Bombay, and informed the India Office that "subject to any unexpected change in the naval situation, the Expedition should be able to leave on August 15 as proposed."² The return of the *Swiftsure* and *Dartmouth* to Bombay would leave the trade route entirely unprotected; yet, safeguarding transports was considered a more urgent claim on naval forces than the protection of trade, and the risk had to be taken. Something, however, could be done, and on August 10, even while the *Goeben* and *Breslau* were still unlocated, the *Black Prince* and *Duke of Edinburgh* were detached from the Mediterranean Squadron to go to Aden searching the Red Sea for hostile merchant cruisers, some of which were expected to be at Massowah, the port of Italian Somaliland. The light cruiser *Chatham* also was ordered from the Dardanelles to Suez,

¹ Sent to C.-in-C., East Indies, and to *Dartmouth* 12.55 p.m., 9.8.14.

² M. 01346/14.

and there was some intention of sending her on to hunt for the *Königsberg*.¹

On August 12 the Admiralty gave the War Office a definite assurance that they would undertake the escort of the Indian troops from the 15th, provided all the transports sailed altogether.² As we have seen, orders dealing with the situation had already been issued; in pursuance of them the *Swiftsure* returned to Bombay on the 12th and found the *Dufferin* and *Hardinge* preparing for war; she was joined later in the day by the *Minto* which then commenced arming. These three Royal Indian Marine ships were expected to be ready by the 15th. At Aden the *Dalhousie* was arming, with instructions to proceed to Bombay as soon as possible.³

The necessity of providing escort had not entirely prevented trade protection in the Indian Ocean, for Admiral Peirse had stationed his only available ships, the *Fox* and *Espiègle*, at the focal point off Colombo, on which port they were based; and the junction of the streams from China and Australia at Singapore was guarded, to some extent, by the French torpedo vessel *D'Iberville* and three French destroyers, searching that district for the *Geier* and *Kleist*.⁴ In point of fact, the *Kleist* had arrived at Padang, in Sumatra, on August 7, but we had no consul there, and the intelligence officer of that area did not know that she was in port.

The *Dartmouth* had steamed on towards Aden in pursuance of her instructions, and did not receive her orders till she got wireless touch with that port; she replied to them that she would reach Bombay by the 17th. This would make her too late to accompany the convoy from its port of departure, and the Admiralty's intention was for the *Swiftsure* and the Indian Marine ships to bring it from India, being joined by the *Dartmouth* at some rendezvous midway; accordingly, they telegraphed to Admiral Peirse :—

117. Report whether entire first division can be ready to sail under your escort 15th instant. How many transports? Are armed Indian Marine ships used as transports?

Dartmouth to coal immediately and to meet on your advance earliest moment. *Black Prince* and *Duke of Edinburgh* have been ordered to Aden searching Red Sea en route. (Sent 2.10 p.m., 12.8.14.)

10. **Delay in Departure of First Contingent.**—In point of fact, the need for escort was not then so pressing as the Admiralty thought, for this telegram crossed with one from Admiral Peirse, in which he reported that the first transport was not expected to be ready till the 20th.

The delay gave an opportunity which the Admiralty utilised by sending the *Dartmouth* to search the Gulf of Aden and the Aden end of the trade route from Bombay for the *Königsberg*

¹ F. 18, 21.

² H.S. 12, p. 115.

³ F. 19, 23.

⁴ F. 19.

before meeting the convoy at some rendezvous on the route.¹ The trade route from Colombo is much the more important, but they are practically identical in the Gulf of Aden.

11. East African Expeditionary Force.—But not only had the large convoy for Egypt to be provided with escort; our slender force in East Africa seemed in need of reinforcement, and, in addition to that, a campaign for the subjugation of German East Africa was on foot.² The intelligence received from there led the India Office to the conclusion that so many as seven battalions of Indian troops with a mountain battery and howitzers would be required.³ Such a large force would require a considerable escort, which could not then be provided, and its despatch was, therefore, postponed, only the battalions to defend British East Africa being considered urgently necessary. Owing to the small number of men-of-war in the Indian Ocean the Admiralty came to the conclusion that these troops for British East Africa must sail with the larger convoy for Egypt and have the same escort as far as Sokotra, though this arrangement might entail some delay in departure from Bombay.⁴ From Sokotra to its point of disembarkation the convoy for Egypt was to be escorted by the *Black Prince* and *Duke of Edinburgh*.⁵

By August 13 it was learned that the first convoy of troops for Egypt would not be ready till about the 20th, and would consist of 20 transports, their escorts being the *Swiftsure*, *Dufferin*, *Hardinge*, and *Minto*, the three R.I.M. ships being armed and to be used as cruisers, not transports.⁶ The *Dartmouth*, which put into Aden on August 13, had found no trace of the *Königsberg*; indeed, the enemy had been reported near Inhambane, on the African coast abreast of the southern end of Madagascar. All the cruisers of the Cape Squadron except the *Pegasus* were concentrating at Cape Town to be used for escorting the South African garrisons as far north as the Equator, and the *Astræa* was ordered from Zanzibar to the Cape to join her own admiral there, looking out for the *Königsberg* on the way.³

12. Further Delay.—However, it was impossible for the troops either for Egypt or East Africa to start on the appointed date, and a postponement till the 28th took place. This delay of a fortnight enabled the Admiralty to send the *Dartmouth* right back to Bombay, so that she could complete with coal there and await orders from the C.-in-C. as to escorting the transports;⁷ thus no vessel was left to hunt for the *Königsberg* in the Gulf of Aden. Nothing more had been heard of the *Geier*; while of the liners supposed to be convertible into cruisers, the *Derfflinger* was immobilised at Port Said, the *Princess Alice* had arrived at Manila, and the *Kleist* at Padang in Sumatra; but the *Zieten*

was unlocated. The *Möwe* (surveying vessel), known to be at Dar-es-Salaam on the outbreak of war, was thought by the Admiralty to be somewhere at large. To deal with her they countermanded the paying off of the *Alert*, which they knew Admiral Peirse had ordered for the purpose of providing crews for the R.I.M. vessels, and ordered him to send her to the Gulf of Aden to search for and destroy the *Möwe*.

The *Alert* was really unavailable, as she had been paid off and her crew and armament distributed among the various auxiliary cruisers; moreover, she could not steam more than 5 knots against the monsoon then prevailing, and could not carry enough coal to take her to Aden. Accordingly Admiral Peirse asked that his arrangements might be allowed to stand; this was approved, except that the Admiralty wished to send the *Odin* from the Persian Gulf on this mission. As it happened the *Möwe* had been sunk by the Germans inside Dar-es-Salaam harbour, though it was not reported to the Admiralty till the night of the 14th.¹ This released the *Odin* from the dangerous necessity of searching the Gulf of Aden, in the course of which she might have met the *Königsberg*.

13. Departure of the first Troops for East Africa.—The Government of India was sending, as an advance battalion of the expeditionary force against East Africa, the 29th Punjabis on August 19 from Karachi to Zanzibar in a transport called the *Nairung*. Admiral Peirse had concurred in this, and did not intend to supply an escort since the large convoy was to start a week later and would take all his available ships. The Admiralty, however, ordered him to employ the *Fox*, and he accordingly removed her from the Colombo focal point, where she and the *Espiègle* had captured several German ships,² and directed her to meet the *Nairung* at a rendezvous north of the Seychelles, thence escorting the transport on to Zanzibar.³ This left 4,000 miles of one of the richest trade routes in the world under the protection of one sloop, all the other ships in the Indian Ocean lying at anchor till such time as the troops should be ready to start or disembark.

14. Expedition "A" to Egypt takes precedence.—As the attitude of Turkey since the arrival at Constantinople of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* had been increasingly hostile the Home authorities felt that the greatest necessity was to show the loyal Indian Army taking the place of the British Garrison in Egypt; and of the three Expeditionary Forces from India—"A" to Egypt, "B" to Dar-es-Salaam, and "C" to British East Africa,⁴

¹ F. 25, 26, 27, and 28.

² *Rappenfels*, *Fürth*, *Australia*, and *Moltkefels*.

³ F. 29, 34, and 36.

⁴ This expedition was now called "C" to distinguish it from the larger force for Dar-es-Salaam.

¹ F. 22. ² See Monograph: *East Africa*, § 13. ³ H.S. 12, p. 118.

⁴ H.S. 12, p. 129. ⁵ H.S. 10, p. 63. ⁶ F. 23. ⁷ F. 24.

the first now took precedence and the other two were delayed indefinitely. Lord Kitchener¹ wished that the first echelon of Force "A" should sail on the 20th, and this was reported from India to be possible. The Admiralty, without consulting Admiral Peirse, informed the War Office that naval escort would be ready by that date for the Egypt and East Africa forces, but the Admiral and other authorities on the spot came to a final arrangement that the whole of the first division should sail in two sections—one from Bombay on the 24th, and the other from Karachi on the 25th, the two portions to meet at a rendezvous to be fixed by the Admiral. The *Dartmouth* was due to join the *Swiftsure* at Bombay on the 20th and the *Dalhousie* from Aden on the 22nd, while the *Northbrook* was to be ready by the 23rd. The *Dufferin* and *Minto* were sent by the Admiral on the 18th to Karachi to take charge of the convoy from that port.²

The *Nairung* with the 29th Punjabis for Zanzibar left Karachi on the 19th as arranged for the rendezvous north of Seychelles where she was to be met by the *Fox*. As far as the rendezvous she was without escort, but that there was danger seemed to be indicated by the fact that both cables to the Seychelles were reported cut on the 19th³ and the Germans in East Africa were becoming active on the Rovuma River, which might mean that they were organising an expedition to seize the islands.⁴

15. Convoys versus Trade Protection.—In the middle of the anxiety caused by the unprotected state of the Indian Ocean came information that the Indian Government had been asked to send one Indian battalion to Singapore and one to Mauritius. The feelings of the Admiralty on receipt of this news are reflected in a note dated August 21:—

"Our trade in these waters has been unprotected since about the 10th of August, due to ships being sent to Bombay to escort transports due to leave August 15. These ships are still waiting at Bombay for the transports.

"In the meantime, *Königsberg* is free to attack our trade, and no doubt losses will be heard of.

"Both cables to Seychelles we know have been cut.

"The Government are responsible financially for all losses of ships, and if escorts for troops are to be continually made, H. M. Government should be informed that the cruisers cannot be held responsible if they are continually deflected from their own war duties [which are] to search for and destroy the enemy's ships."

When the question of escorting the battalion for Mauritius came up the Admiralty replied: "The double demand on "H.M. Ships for the convoys already arranged and the protection of British trade in the Indian Ocean can scarcely be

¹ Secretary of State for War. ² F. 32, 33, 35, 37, and 39; M. 03564/15.

³ F. 38.

⁴ Cape 130 IN, recd. 12.37 p.m., 20.8.14.

"reconciled even now, and further demands are for the present "inadmissible."¹

16. Königsberg in the Gulf of Aden.—The Admiralty's fears for the safety of trade soon received a justification. Though at 12.10 p.m. on the 21st they informed the French Ministry of Marine that the latest news of the *Königsberg* was that she had been reported off Inhambane on the 11th, there had come into the Admiralty that morning a telegram from the C.-in-C., Cape Squadron, announcing that the German steamer *Zieten* had brought in to Mozambique the crew of the Hall liner *City of Winchester*, taken over from the *Königsberg* off Cape Guardafui on 9th.² The *Zieten*, after visiting Colombo on July 29, had continued her voyage and had apparently been called up by the *Königsberg*. The *City of Winchester* had been captured by the German cruiser on August 6 in the mouth of the Gulf of Aden; she had left Colombo on July 30 before any instructions had been issued to merchant vessels, and being without wireless had not heard of the war till 3 hours before she was captured. The *Königsberg* took her to Makalla on the Arabian coast, and on the 10th to Khorya Morya Bay where most of her crew were transferred to the *Zieten* which had now joined the *Königsberg*.³ Two days later the Germans having removed so much as they wanted of the cargo of the *City of Winchester* sank her in the Bay.

This information showed that if the *Espiègle* and *Swiftsure* had been allowed to proceed along the trade route to Aden as originally proposed by Admiral Peirse, reinforced later by the *Dartmouth*, they would have had some chance of harrying the German cruiser and her consorts, even if they did not catch her. It will be remembered that his orders to the *Espiègle* were countermanded because her crew was thought to be necessary for the *Triumph*, and that the *Swiftsure* and *Dartmouth* were recalled on the 6th to escort a convoy which was even then (21st) not ready.⁴

The Gulf of Aden, however, was now powerfully protected by the presence of the *Duke of Edinburgh* and *Black Prince*, which arrived at Aden on the 20th and 21st respectively. The latter had been delayed a day by having to return with two prizes—the *Istria* and *Südmark*⁵—which she had captured in the Gulf of Suez. In the Red Sea they had sighted no hostile merchant cruisers, finding instead that the German and Austrian

¹ H.S. 12, pp. 221, 282.

² F. 40.

³ Deposition of Master of *City of Winchester*. M. 17304/14.

⁴ The responsibility for the delay is difficult to fix. The Viceroy, on August 18, said the Karachi force would be ready by the 21st, but on the 20th stated: "Naval C.-in-C. reports that no date earlier than 24th will suit naval arrangements." (F. 35, 39.) Again: "No delay has so far occurred as regards escorts." (Viceroy to I.O., 726 and 749, M. 01751/14.)

⁵ The *Südmark* had been in communication with the *Königsberg*, and her captain knew that the *City of Winchester* had been sunk. (F. 42.)

merchant ships in those waters had all taken refuge at Massowa.¹

The Admiralty had sent orders on the 16th that the two cruisers were to coal at Aden, the first ship completed to go on to Bombay and assist in escorting the transports; the other cruiser to remain at Aden and take the convoy on from there up the Red Sea to Suez.² They had for the time abandoned the idea of bringing the *Chatham* down the Red Sea to hunt for the *Königsberg* and had instead retained her at Suez to deal with any situation that might arise.

17. Orders for the First Convoy.—The convoy of troops for Egypt was at last ready to start from India on August 24. The greatest danger it had to face was a possible attack from the *Königsberg* and any auxiliaries which might have been armed. Of these, the *Derfflinger* had been interned at Port Said, the *Tabora* was blocked in at Dar-es-Salaam, while the *Zieten* was at Mozambique; the only one presumably within striking distance was the *Seydlitz*, which had left Sydney on August 3. From the Pacific there was now little to be feared, since two cruisers (thought to be the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*) had been sighted at Samoa on the 20th; the *Nürnberg* and *Leipzig* had recently been reported as leaving the vicinity of San Francisco, and only the *Emden's* movements were unknown beyond the fact that she had left Tsingtau on August 3. The *Königsberg* was the Admiralty's chief anxiety in East Indian waters, and they informed the French C.-in-C. in the Mediterranean that they wished to employ the *Dublin* and *Weymouth* in the Indian Ocean "to hunt out *Königsberg*, which was now a threat to the transport of our troops across that ocean. . . ."³

On his return to India Admiral Peirse had drawn up his convoy orders, and these he issued on August 17. The first echelon to be moved was to consist of the whole of the 3rd Indian Division, with several British regiments and Indian batteries, besides some additional native regiments. He hoped to get them all away between August 24 and 26. The transports were divided into four groups, and two embarkation ports, Karachi and Bombay, were used. The general idea was that the sailing of a group from Bombay should take place the day before another group left Karachi, which was a day nearer home; at a convenient rendezvous the two groups would join, and part of the escort could then return to pick up the next group. The rendezvous selected was Ghubbet-ar-rahib Bay in the Khorya Morya Islands.⁴ Group A from Bombay was to be escorted by the *Swiftsure* and *Hardinge*, and Group B from Karachi by the *Dufferin* and *Minto*. From the rendezvous on to Aden the *Duke of Edinburgh* was to join the escorting force, and her

¹ F. 41.

² F. 31.

³ F. 44.

⁴ The Convoy Orders in 180 paragraphs are in M. 03564/15.

arrival would relieve the *Dufferin* and *Minto* to go back for the remainder of the transports; she left Aden on the 24th in the morning, for the rendezvous. In the meantime the Admiralty had ordered the *Chatham* down from Suez with two more transports, the *Dongola* and *Somali*, bringing officers and officials back to India from home leave.¹ She would thus probably be available to help in the escort up the Red Sea, though perhaps not of the first convoy, which was due at Aden on September 2. She left Suez on August 24.

18. The Convoy starts.—On August 24 Group A left Bombay under the escort of the *Swiftsure* and *Hardinge*, and next day Group B left Karachi with the *Dufferin* and *Minto*. The Karachi group could make only 6 knots in the teeth of a south-westerly monsoon blowing with strength 5.² A report was current that the *Königsberg* was 500 miles south of Bombay exchanging wireless messages with the *Zieten*.³

Soon after the convoy started the C.-in-C., China, telegraphed that charts and mail bags found in a prize indicated that the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Nürnberg*, *Emden*, and *Luchs* might be on the southern side of Sumatra; to meet the situation he intended to sail for Singapore with the *Minotaur* and *Hampshire*, to be followed by the *Dupleix* and *Yarmouth*. His appreciation received some confirmation on the 28th, when a German ship, the *Goldenfels*, arrived at Sabang (Pulo Wey) with the rest of the crew of the *City of Winchester*, and stated that she had been escorted almost into port by the *Königsberg*.⁴

19. The Second Convoy.—The German cruiser had made no attempt to interfere with the transports. The third group of the convoy⁵ left Karachi on August 28 under the escort of the *Northbrook*, which had commissioned at Bombay on the 26th and immediately proceeded for the northern port. The group to have sailed from Bombay with the *Dartmouth* as escort was not yet ready, and the *Dartmouth* remained at anchor in Bombay Harbour from August 20 till September 3. There were thus three groups of transports in the Arabian Sea at the end of August:—

- (a) A large convoy of 15 ships on the way from the Khorya Morya group to Aden under the escort of the *Swiftsure* and *Duke of Edinburgh*.

¹ F. 43, 45.

² *Dufferin's* log. Group A consisted of nine ships—*Assaye*, *Nurani*, *Baroda*, *Sumatra*, *Taiyabi*, *Bharata*, *Barpeta*, *Bangala*, *Purnea*. Group B was of six ships—*Ambala*, *Upada*, *Itola*, *Kirkfield*, *City of Glasgow*, *Ellenga*. The regiments in them are given in T. 7636/14.

³ Staff diary of Lahore Division.

⁴ See Monograph: *China and Emden*

⁵ Seven ships, *Castalia*, *Sangola*, *Teesta*, *Takada*, *Akbar*, *Edavana*, *Itaura*. (T. 7636/14.)

- (b) A separate convoy of seven ships proceeding from Karachi to Aden escorted by the *Northbrook*.
 (c) The *Nairung*, proceeding from Bombay to British East Africa, escorted by the *Fox*.

This last had been diverted on the 25th to Mombasa as port of disembarkation without calling at Zanzibar, in accordance with a decision of the India and Colonial Offices.¹ She was due about September 2, and the *Fox*, after turning her over to the *Pegasus*, which was to come out to meet her, was to visit the Seychelles, where both cables had been interrupted since August 19. On August 27, however, communication between Zanzibar and the Seychelles was restored and all was reported quiet there,² in view of which the *Fox's* orders to visit the islands were countermanded. The rumour of the German expedition gathering in the Rovuma river had been disproved; it was evident that the Seychelles had not been raided and the *Königsberg* was thought by the Admiralty to have gone to the Dutch East Indies. So strong was this belief that we informed the French, who wished to send a liner full of reservists from Madagascar to Suez, that their route would be reasonably safe.³ This view was strengthened by the report spread by the *Goldenfels* at Sabang; and even on the 30th, when the French Governor of Madagascar reported that a three-funnelled cruiser, considered to be the *Königsberg*, under the German flag, had that morning paid a flying visit to Majunga at the northern end of his island;⁴ the report was not at first believed. But an intercepted cable from Zanzibar to the Eastern Telegraph Office in London stating that a preconcerted simultaneous attack by the *Königsberg* and a small gunboat (*Kaiser Wilhelm*) was expected in the absence of the *Pegasus* (which had gone to meet the *Fox* at Mombasa), and a telegram from Malta (519) to the effect that call signs of a German cruiser had been heard off Sokotra on the 28th,⁵ may have given rise to some anxiety at the Admiralty about our convoys. Actually, the Gulf of Aden was at that time being patrolled by the *Black Prince*; after embarking 20 men and 2 field guns at Aden, she landed them at Perim on the 25th, and coming eastward as far as Sokotra, patrolled between there and Somaliland across the trade routes during the 29th and 30th.⁶ She then went back to Aden to coal preparatory to taking the *Swiftsure's* convoy on from Aden to Suez.

At any rate the *Nairung* arrived safely at Mombasa on September 1, being escorted the last 70 miles by the *Pegasus* and *Fox*. She had met the *Fox* at the rendezvous in 0° 20' S., 58° E., at 5.0 a.m. on August 27, and had continued at first for Zanzibar, the change of destination to Mombasa not reaching the *Fox* till 4.0 a.m. on the 30th. The latter coaled and was

ordered back to Bombay on completion. Her Captain proposed that he should visit Zanzibar and the Seychelles in connection with the reports of the proximity of the *Königsberg*, but the Admiralty replied: "In view of *Königsberg's* superior speed this visit was useless. Proceed as ordered to Bombay for "convoy duties. *Pegasus* can be sent to Zanzibar if desirable,"¹ from which it was evident that no attack on Zanzibar was then expected. The *Fox*, however, went there in the early morning of the 3rd of September instead of returning direct from Mombasa to Bombay.²

The large convoy escorted by the *Swiftsure*, *Hardinge*, and *Dufferin* arrived on August 30 at Ghubbet-ar-rahib Bay in the Khorya Morya Group. From there the two Indian Marine ships returned to India on relief by the *Duke of Edinburgh*, which, after searching the Arabian coast, had been waiting at the rendezvous since the 27th; she took station astern of the convoy, the *Swiftsure* leading; on September 1 the *Duke of Edinburgh* went into Aden to coal and replenish in preparation for continuing the voyage to Suez. On September 3 she and the *Black Prince* picked up the convoy off Aden, and took it on to Suez, arriving six days later. The *Swiftsure* having safely disposed of the first convoy went in to Aden.

20. **The Third Convoy.**—On September 3 the first instalment of the 7th (Meerut) Division and of the 9th (Secunderabad) Cavalry Brigade left Bombay; the convoy consisted of seven ships³ and was escorted by the *Dartmouth*, which had been lying there for a fortnight. The route followed was that of the Commander-in-Chief earlier. This concluded the despatch of the four groups allowed for in Admiral Peirse's Convoy Orders of August 17. But there were still more to come. The military situation in France was so desperate that we abandoned our military lines of communication across the Channel, and the French Government withdrew from Paris, which the victorious Germans might succeed in reaching at any moment. In the circumstances every soldier procurable was wanted in France, and the Cabinet decided to bring home the bulk of the British Regular troops abroad, replacing them where possible by India: Territorial battalions; the British regiments in North China, Hong Kong, and Singapore were to come to India to replace the white troops there; and as many Indian battalions as could be spared were to go to Egypt and even to the front in France. These moves entailed a great deal of escort work and had effects in varying degrees on all our squadrons in foreign waters. As far as the East Indies was concerned the programme for the future was a heavy one. The remainder of the 7th Division and 9th Cavalry Brigade and two British regiments, in

¹ M. 01577/14.

² F. 46.

³ F. 47.

⁴ F. 49.

⁵ F. 50.

⁶ Log of *Black Prince*.

¹ F. 51, 52.

² Log of *Fox*.

³ *Barala*, *Mongara*, *Elysia*, *Ula*, *Urlana*, *Fultala* with the Indian troops; *Thongwa* carrying the Sherwood Foresters.

24 ships, would be ready by September 10; in the course of the next fortnight 49 transports with troops were expected to leave; and at the end of the month the Indian troops intended to garrison Egypt, and Expeditionary Force "C" for East Africa, a further 16 ship loads, would have their preparations complete.¹ With the small force at his disposal the escort of these huge convoys was a difficult problem for Admiral Peirse.

CHAPTER IV.

NEW ESCORT ORDERS.

21. New Orders.—At Aden the Admiral had been joined by the *Chatham*. The Admiralty had told him to arrange escorts for the next convoys with the Government of India,² and he reported the following programme:—

Northbrook's convoy to be taken by *Chatham* from Aden to Suez.

Dartmouth's convoy due at Aden on September 12 to be taken to Suez by the *Northbrook*.

Dufferin to bring about 12 ships from Bombay on the 9th and the *Hardinge* to escort remainder (about 12 ships) from Karachi on the 10th, these to be met halfway by the *Swiftsure*.

Echelon leaving India on the 15th under escort of *Fox* or *Dalhousie* and *Minto*.

Dartmouth to accompany whichever group of Force "C" most likely to fall in with *Königsberg*.

He also asked that the *Black Prince*, *Duke of Edinburgh*, and *Chatham* might be placed temporarily under his orders for work between Aden and Suez. This request was granted,³ and may be considered to have had the effect of extending the East Indies Station so as to include the Red Sea. But as regards his escort proposals the Admiralty strongly disapproved, thinking them too weak, and they replied with telegram:—

153. Proposed escort insufficient. The minimum escort is two ships, one of which must be superior to *Königsberg*. Armed transports are not to be counted as warships, but as additional precaution. For a large convoy one more regular ship of war is to be added. You will probably find it best to organise fortnightly sailings, using the six ships at your disposal.

You must remember your responsibility for the safety of the troops.

(Sent 11 p.m. September 4.)

¹ M. 01751/14.

² F. 53.

³ F. 54, 55.

These new orders compelled Admiral Peirse to alter his programme, but only at the cost of some delay. The *Northbrook's* convoy of seven ships had been met by the *Chatham*, whom the admiral had intended to carry on alone with them to Suez, sending the *Northbrook* in to Aden to coal¹; he had now to call the whole convoy into Aden to wait five days for the arrival of the *Dartmouth's* group, the combined convoy of 14 ships then to go on up the Red Sea escorted by the *Chatham* and *Northbrook* till met by the *Duke of Edinburgh* and *Black Prince*, which would return with them to Suez. The *Swiftsure* and *Dartmouth* would return to Bombay; and with the *Fox*, *Dufferin*, and *Hardinge* would leave India with the Meerut Division about the 18th. He explained that his previous arrangements had been made under the impression that the departure of the troops was urgent, remarking also that the *Königsberg's* movements were being closely watched.²

22. The Königsberg and Von Spee.—Of the *Königsberg's* movements nothing certain was known at the Admiralty beyond the fact that she had been at the Khorya Moraya Islands on August 12, nearly a month ago, since it may be taken that the simultaneous reports placing her at Majunga and near Sabang on August 30 cancelled one another in probability. She had not reappeared off East Africa, where the report of a threatened attack sent by the Eastern Telegraph Company was denied by the Resident at Zanzibar on September 9. Still, there were signs of activity inland. A small action at Tsavo had resulted in the repulse of the German attacking force by the 29th Punjabis, but there was every possibility of other raids, and the Viceroy was instructed that the remainder of Force "C" must leave on the 16th for Mombasa as arranged.³ The *Pegasus* returned on the 5th to Zanzibar. No further news of the German Pacific Squadron had transpired; it was thought to be in the Dutch East Indies by the C.-in-C., China, and until his search had been carried out the Admiralty prohibited the *Espiegle* from going east of Colombo.⁴

23. Modification of New Escort Orders.—When the seven transports, escorted by the *Chatham* and *Northbrook*, arrived at Aden on the 6th, Admiral Peirse, considering unnecessary the seven days' wait caused by the Admiralty orders, pointed out that as the Red Sea was safe his original arrangement for *Chatham* alone to take them on should be sufficient, and the *Northbrook* after coaling could then take over the *Dartmouth's* convoy on the 12th; these proposals were approved, since the regulations as to strength of escort were intended to refer only to the passage of the Arabian Sea.⁵ The Admiralty made a further suggestion that, as the *Dartmouth* could not reach

¹ *Chatham's* Sailing Orders, M. 03564/15.

³ F. 62.

⁴ F. 59.

² F. 56.

⁵ H.S. 12, p. 400.

Bombay till September 18, instead of bringing the large convoy all the way she should join it half way, relieving the *Fox* to take the East African force on to Mombasa.¹

Admiral Peirse replied that to comply with this suggestion would be against the orders in telegram 153 as to minimum escort, and proposed the *Dartmouth* for the East Africa convoy, which he considered more likely to meet the *Königsberg*; it had now been ascertained that the *Goldenfels* had not been accompanied by any armed vessel whatever, and wireless indications implied that the *Königsberg* was near Zanzibar. In any case the restriction would have the effect of keeping back till the 18th the group of 24 ships which was to have sailed on the 9th and 10th with the remainder of the 9th Cavalry Brigade and 7th Division of Infantry. Realising this, the Viceroy put forward the suggestion that as later sailings would be proportionately delayed the Admiralty might increase the East Indies Squadron by more ships.² This the Admiralty were not then prepared to do, but they modified the restricting orders to meet the number of available vessels by telegram

158. It has been decided in view of the urgency of hastening the transport of troops from Egypt that the previous orders as to the numbers of warships attached to convoys can be modified to meet the number of vessels available for this duty unless a change for the worse occurs in the Naval situation in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea.

Black Prince, *Duke of Edinburgh*, and one armed troopship should suffice for Red Sea.

Swiftsure, *Dartmouth*, *Chatham*, and armed troopship for Indian Ocean. *Fox* and armed troopship for East African convoy.

Could not fortnightly sailings be arranged if convoy changes escorts in Long. 47° E., the escorts to coal at Suez and India, not calling at Aden.

Fox could start with the first large convoy till *Chatham* joins and then proceed to East Africa.

Unless objection seen arrange for this and report.

(Sent 6.50 p.m. September 9.)

In accordance with this the *Dartmouth's* convoy was taken over by the *Northbrook*³ off Aden on the 11th and the *Dartmouth* herself went in to the port, leaving next day for Karachi, 1,500 miles distant. Admiral Peirse himself in the *Swiftsure* reached Bombay on the 12th in readiness for the next convoy. He pointed out that the Admiralty's latest order did nothing to expedite the departure of the first large convoy which must await the arrival of the *Dartmouth* at Karachi; and a further suggestion at the end of the same order that the escorting ships should not call at Aden he considered impracticable, since in the state of the monsoon ships must coal there, the bad coaling facilities at Bombay completely nullifying any saving of time

¹ F. 57, 58.

² F. 61, 63, 64, 66.

³ The *Black Prince* was ordered from Suez to meet her and picked up the convoy on the 14th about 700 miles from Suez. The convoy reached Suez on the 17th.

gained by omitting the call at Aden.¹ The arrival of Force "B" for offensive operations in German East Africa was considered urgent and the Viceroy was ordered to prepare it for instant despatch, but replied that although the force would be ready very soon there were no ships in India available to transport it and no escort possible till October 5.² This would be on the return of the squadron to India after completing the escort of the large convoy due to leave on September 18.

24. Arrangements for the Fourth Convoy.—Admiral Peirse was at Bombay with the *Swiftsure*, *Fox*, and *Dufferin* ready for his convoy of 31 ships,³ and the *Hardinge* and *Minto* at Karachi were waiting for their convoy of 12 ships;⁴ the *Dartmouth* had left Aden on the 12th and was due on the 15th; but there was no hope of the convoy being ready till September 18. The route was to be the same as before and the *Chatham*, then at Suez, was to meet them in long. 55° E. just west of the Khorya Morya Group, when the *Dartmouth* and *Hardinge* would be detached with the two transports for Mombasa.⁵

25. Emden appears.—This was the situation when at 10.26 p.m. on September 14 a telegram from the Intelligence Officer, Colombo, reached the Admiralty reporting a new danger in the Indian Ocean. The *Emden* had been sighted the previous day with four prizes about half-way between Calcutta and Madras. Up to this time she had not been definitely reported anywhere and all that was known was that the Japanese had informed Admiral Jerram (China) that she was not at Tsingtau. In spite of the search he had been carrying out in the East Indies she had slipped past his cruisers, and had now appeared in the Bay of Bengal. Her position implied that her object was commerce raiding and not interference with the transports, and in the area she had chosen, traversed by important trade routes in every direction, she had a rich field for her operations.⁶ The whole attention of Admiral Peirse's squadron was occupied with the large convoy that was soon to start. The only ships he had at sea were the *Dartmouth*, due at Karachi on the 15th, and the *Northbrook* and *Black Prince* due at Suez on the 17th. In the circumstances he had nothing he could send to the Bay of Bengal, and the effect of the *Emden's* raid was to sever that important half of his station from him and turn it over to the China Station. Admiral Jerram had in the first days of the

¹ F. 67.

² The telegrams, 892 to Viceroy; H. 845 from Viceroy, dated September 12 and 14, are in T. 6683/1914.

³ Group E, containing further portions of the Lahore and Meerut Divisions and Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade, and Group F, i.e.:—the *Bandra* and *Begum* for British East Africa.

⁴ Group G, containing some Indian and British regiments.

⁵ F. 68.

⁶ See Monograph: *China and Emden*.

war wished to concentrate his force off the Yangtse, but had been ordered to Hong Kong. When Japan entered the war on August 23 and took over the whole of the northern part of the China Station he moved further south to Singapore, which the War Orders had designated as the headquarters of the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies, and the operations against the *Emden* were carried out entirely by the vessels of the China Squadron though they took place in the Bay of Bengal which the War Orders had recognised as the more important half of the East Indies Command.

The *Emden* soon made another appearance and was sighted at 6.30 p.m. on the 18th off Rangoon, into which port she sent the Norwegian ship *Dovre* with the crew of the *Clan Matheson*, which she had sunk off False Point four days previously. This second appearance showed still more strongly that commerce-raiding was her object and that the convoys in the Arabian Sea ran for the moment little danger of molestation from her.

The difficulties of escorting the Indian troops had now compelled the Admiralty to decide on increasing the force at the disposal of the East Indies Admiral. The old battleships of the *Canopus* class, which had at first been part of the Channel Command, had at the end of August been distributed among the various Atlantic cruiser forces as supports, or defences for advanced bases. The nearest was the *Ocean* at Gibraltar. On September 11 she had been attached to Cruiser Force I, and had arrived at Gibraltar on the 18th. Next day the Admiralty ordered her to Port Said and ready for convoy duties in the East Indies.¹

26. Departure of the Fourth Convoy.—The departure of the remainder of Lahore and Meerut Divisions and the Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade was further delayed by excessive rain and did not take place till the 20th from Bombay and the 21st from Karachi. The *Swiftsure*, *Fox*, and *Dufferin* took the Bombay convoy of about 29 ships,² and the *Dartmouth* and *Hardinge* the Karachi group of 11 ships.³ In the interval the route had been changed, and a new rendezvous in 18.45 N., 61.20 E., was fixed by the Admiral.⁴ Just as they left there came in some serious news; the *Pegasus*, lying at anchor and

repairing boilers at Zanzibar, had been bombarded and sunk by the *Königsberg* from the offing without being able to make any effective reply to the German cruiser's guns.¹

27. Dealing with the Königsberg.—This news made no difference to the Admiralty's determination to bring the Indian troops to France without delay. To Admiral Peirse they telegraphed:—

"175. The *Königsberg* was in action at Zanzibar this morning (September 20), afterwards steaming south. *Emden* is also located. Neither of these two ships can reach convoy before Aden.² *Dartmouth* and *Fox* are to convoy East African Expedition at best speed of transports to Mombasa.

"Order *Chatham* to proceed to Zanzibar at once. *Dartmouth*, after arrival of convoy, is to hunt *Königsberg* in concert with *Chatham*. Most urgent this ship should be destroyed.

"*Fox* to return for convoy duties.

"A further signal will inform you what extra ships are being sent you."

(Sent 12.30 p.m., 20.9.14.)

Now that the *Königsberg* was located the Admiralty could take definite steps to deal with her, and they ordered the *Weymouth* from the Mediterranean to join the *Chatham* and *Dartmouth* in hunting for her.³ So far there had been no light cruisers available for that work, but the *Ocean*, half-way from Gibraltar to Malta, and the *Goliath* off Finisterre, were on their way to replace the *Chatham* and *Dartmouth* on escort duty and free them for active operations against the *Königsberg*.⁴ As regards the *Chatham*, she could have been at Aden much earlier if she had been relieved half-way up the Red Sea by the *Duke of Edinburgh*; but the latter lay at anchor off Suez from the 9th to the 19th September, and the *Chatham* brought her convoy right on to Suez and did not leave there till the 17th. She reached Aden on the 21st, and left that night for Mombasa to begin operations against the *Königsberg*, being the first ship charged with that special mission.

28. Voyage of the Fourth Convoy.—Naval operations in the Indian Ocean at this point fell naturally into three groups:—

- (a) Convoy work in the Arabian Sea.
- (b) Operations against the *Königsberg* near German East Africa.
- (c) Operations against the *Emden* in the Bay of Bengal.

With the first Admiral Peirse was mainly concerned; Captain Drury-Lowe, of the *Chatham* later was given charge

¹ F. 69.

² *Bankura*, *Bamora*, *Havildar*, *Thistura*, *Subadar*, *Knight Companion*, *Taraba*, with Lahore Division; *Torilla*, *Ancora*, *Arankola*, *Manora*, *Euryalus*, *City of Sparta*, *Sofala*, *Chakrata*, with Meerut Division; *City of Exeter*, *Risaldar*, *Egra*, *Ellora*, *Ranee*, *Rajah*, *Tactician*, *City of Birmingham*, with Secunderabad Cavalry Brigade; *Somali* with Rifle Brigade and *Dongola* with Royal Berkshire Regiment; *Hedjaz* with supplies; *Bandra*, *Begum*, *Umfuli*, with Force "C" for Mombasa.

³ *Ekna*, *City of Lahore*, *Erinpura*, *Elephanta*, *City of Poona*, *Cocoonada*, *Pundua*, *Aronda*, *Devanha*, with Indian troops; *Dilwara* with Lancashire Fusiliers for Aden; *Braunfels* (a German prize) with supplies.

⁴ The *Minto* had gone on ahead to this rendezvous.

¹ For details, see Monograph: *East Africa*.

² This statement was probably made under the impression that the convoy had left Bombay on the 18th. As it was, the *Königsberg* and the convoy were both 1,500 miles from Makalla on the 20th; and the *Königsberg*, having much the greater speed, could have reached even the rendezvous before the two convoys met.

³ F. 73.

⁴ F. 75, 76.

of the second; while measures taken to deal with the *Emden* were directed entirely by Admiral Jerram.¹ The raider made another appearance on September 22 and bombarded Madras for a short time. Next morning she was seen off Cuddalore steaming south.

The large convoy which Admiral Peirse had under his charge met the Karachi Group under the care of the *Dartmouth* and *Hardinge* at noon on the 23rd near the rendezvous he had given (18.45 N., 61.20 E.), whereupon Admiral Peirse absorbed the latter into his own convoy and detached the three transports for Mombasa under the escort of the *Dartmouth* and *Fox*. They steamed off S 12° W for their journey of 1,900 miles, while the remaining 37 ships proceeded westward for Aden with the *Swiftsure* and the two Indian Marine vessels *Hardinge* and *Dufferin*. The *Black Prince* and *Duke of Edinburgh* reached Aden on the morning of the 24th, having taken five days to come through the Red Sea. The *Duke of Edinburgh* appears to have waited at Suez till her consort had completed escorting the *Northbrook's* convoy; indeed, the Indian Marine ship reached Aden a day ahead of them. From that port the *Swiftsure's* convoy was to be taken to Suez by the *Black Prince* and *Northbrook*, and the Admiralty intended, if the Red Sea were safe, to send the *Duke of Edinburgh* with Admiral Peirse to Bombay for the next convoy. The two big cruisers were not to remain long on escort duty, since they were wanted for service with the Grand Fleet;² the *Black Prince* was to be relieved at Suez by the *Minerva*, and the *Duke of Edinburgh* was to be replaced in the Indian Ocean by the *Vengeance* as soon as she could be spared from the Channel Fleet. The other two battleships, *Ocean* and *Goliath*, were delayed by defects and could not reach Suez for 10 days, so that the next convoy would have to be escorted by the *Swiftsure* and *Dufferin* from Bombay and the *Duke of Edinburgh* and *Hardinge* from Karachi.³

On September 27, seven days after leaving Bombay, the convoy of 35 ships arrived off Aden and was taken over from the *Swiftsure* by the *Black Prince* and *Northbrook*, and thus the second large force of Indian troops was carried safely across the Arabian Sea. The *Swiftsure*, *Dufferin*, and *Hardinge* went in to Aden to coal and left next day with the *Duke of Edinburgh* for India. The *Minto* had been placed at the disposal of the Resident, Aden, and was no longer available for naval duties.⁴

¹ For a description of operations in East Africa, see Monograph: "East Africa." For operations against *Emden*, see Monograph: "China."

² H.S. 12, p. 574.

³ F. 76, 77, 78.

⁴ F. 78.

CHAPTER V.

THE OCTOBER CONVOYS.

29. **East Africa Attached to East Indies Command.**—We have seen that the necessity for escorting the Indian troops across the Arabian Sea had had the effect of transferring the control of operations in the Bay of Bengal to the Commander-in-Chief, China, who had been relieved on his original station by the Japanese. In the same way, the claims of the Union Expedition to German South West Africa,¹ and the transport of the Cape Garrison homewards having proved all that the Commander-in-Chief at the Cape could manage with his small force, on October 1 the Admiralty transferred from the Cape Station to the East Indies the whole of the African coast north of Delagoa Bay.² By this change the new East Indies Station can be considered to have consisted of the trade routes from Colombo and India as far as Suez, and to include German East Africa, the principal base for hostile attack on them: this was perhaps a better strategic arrangement than that existing at the outbreak of war. It is to be remarked that the alteration was brought about not by any considerations of trade protection, but primarily by the double demand of the concentration of Imperial troops to meet Germany in the field, and of the attack on German overseas possessions, neither of which had seriously dominated the ideas on which the pre-war disposition of the Fleet had been based. By the inclusion of East Africa, Admiral Peirse's sphere of responsibility was considerably increased; but his squadron had been reinforced to a certain extent. The *Chatham*, *Dartmouth* and *Fox* were already on the East African coast and on October 1 the *Weymouth* arrived at Aden. There the Admiralty sent her orders that she was to cruise within 200 miles of Sokotra to deal with the *Emden* or *Königsberg* should they come to that important focal point; the order did not reach her, and she went on to Mombasa³ to join in the hunt for the *Königsberg*. Nothing more had been heard of that ship; but the *Emden* was known to have been near Minikoi on September 27, and her presence was having an indirect influence on the passage of the Indian convoys, for three empty transports necessary for the next group were held up at Calcutta by the Government of India till the Admiralty gave an assurance that it was safe for these to sail, provided they left at night independently, and kept wide of the recognised track.⁴

¹ This was an expedition being prepared by the Government of the Union of South Africa for the seizure of the coast of German South West Africa.

² F. 82.

³ F. 81, 96.

⁴ M. 02349/14.

30. **Arrangements for the Fifth Convoy.**—In the organization of the Indian Army, each infantry brigade included one British battalion of the Regular Army, and it was now decided to bring these battalions home, replacing them in the Indian Army by Territorial battalions. Thus the arrangements thenceforth had to be made with a view to the escort of convoys outwards as well as homewards from India, and on October 1 a programme was issued by the Admiralty to cover the movement of troops to and from India up to the end of January 1915.¹ According to it the next convoy should leave Bombay on October 10, subsequent groups leaving at intervals of 16 days; the first outward bound group would leave Port Said on October 24, followed by other groups at 16 day intervals. No intermediate escorts would be arranged, so that transports which failed to leave with their proper group would have to wait 16 days for the next one. As, however, the transports held up by the *Emden* would be a few days late in reaching Bombay, two days extra were allowed, and, accordingly, October 12 was the date fixed for the departure of the next convoy.

The ships available for its escort were to be increased by the *Ocean* and *Goliath*,² which it was hoped would either arrive in time to start with it, or, at any rate, could meet it in the course of its voyage; the *Ocean* arrived at Port Said on October 2, but as the *Goliath* was not able to leave Malta till 6.45 that afternoon, the *Minerva*, then at Suez, was ordered to the East Indies to come under Admiral Peirse for escort duty. He proposed to use her, in conjunction with the *Duke of Edinburgh* and *Northbrook*, to take convoys up the Red Sea,³ but drew the Admiralty's attention to his lack of fast ships by telegram

"194. I wish to point out by gradual withdrawal of all fast fast cruisers from escort duties I shall be left with no ships approximating to speed of German cruisers.

"*Minerva* inadequate for escort if *Königsberg* or *Emden* slip into Red Sea, and as long as they are at large I submit that *Duke of Edinburgh* at least should be left under my orders."
(Sent 4.10.14, received 7.28 a.m.)

The *Duke of Edinburgh* had arrived at Karachi at 1.25 p.m. on the third, and was to wait there about 10 days till the next convoy was ready. His arrangements for its escort were that the Karachi group should be taken by the *Duke of Edinburgh* and *Hardinge*, and the Bombay group by the *Swiftsure* and *Dufferin*, to be joined at a rendezvous by the *Ocean* and *Goliath*, one or both of the two battleships and the *Hardinge* going on with the Mombasa and Mauritius detachments. These general arrangements were approved, but he was told that one of the battleships would be sufficient for the East Africa contingent.⁴

31. **Search for *Königsberg*.**—Beyond a wireless message intercepted from Nauen, which seemed to imply that she was

still in East African waters,¹ there was no definite news of the *Königsberg*, though a search for her was being carried out independently by the *Dartmouth* and *Chatham*. Naval assistance was also required for the operations against German East Africa, and the *Fox* was ordered to co-operate with the Officer Commanding Expedition "B," both in the disembarkation and in subsequent operations on the coast.² She had arrived at Mombasa on the 3rd with the transport *Umfuli*, and remained there throughout October except for two short cruises. On the 5th Admiral Peirse ordered Captain Caulfeild of the *Fox* to take the *Chatham*, *Dartmouth*, and *Weymouth* under his orders and conduct the search for the *Königsberg*, so long as the operations remained conveniently near Mombasa, the *Chatham* to reassume command if the enemy were reported at a distance.³

32. **Emden in the Arabian Sea.**—The Admiral arrived with the *Swiftsure* and *Dufferin* at Bombay in the early morning of the 5th to prepare for the next convoy. In the course of his voyage from Aden he had inspected the Laccadive Islands in accordance with a suggestion from the Admiralty, but had found nothing there. In fact the *Emden* was well to the southward. The *Hampshire* of the China Squadron had gleaned some news of her. According to this the enemy was reported to have left Felidu Atoll in the Maldives (3½° N., 74° E.) on October 1, steering northward, after a three days' stay in that neighbourhood.⁴

The receipt of this news on October 6 found our ships in the Indian Ocean disposed as follows:—

Swiftsure and *Dufferin* at Bombay.

Duke of Edinburgh and *Hardinge* at Karachi.

Odin, *Éspiegle*, and *Dalhousie* in the Persian Gulf.

Goliath, *Minerva*, and *Northbrook* outward bound in the Red Sea.

Fox, *Chatham*, *Dartmouth*, and *Weymouth* at Mombasa or Zanzibar.

Dupleix and *Askold* just left Colombo westward with a convoy for Aden.

Chikuma leaving Colombo for Madras.⁵

Hampshire at Colombo.

As the information was already several days old it did not affect any of the principal work in hand, but the fact that the *Emden* was now in the Arabian Sea suggested the possibility of her making an attempt on our weak little squadron in the Persian Gulf, for which place a small force (Expedition "D") was now due to leave India in company at first with the main convoy on the 15th from Karachi.⁶ In the meantime, the Admiralty ordered the *Swiftsure* to search for the enemy and

¹ F. 89.

² F. 88.

³ F. 91.

⁴ F. 79, 90, 95.

⁵ For earlier movements of *Askold* (Russian) and *Chikuma* (Japanese light cruiser), see Monograph: *China and Emden*.

⁶ F. 93, 99.

protect trade to the West of India, in accordance with which she left Bombay on the 10th at 6 a.m. and searched the Laccadive Islands, returning to Bombay on the 14th. Further, the *Duke of Edinburgh* was sent up at the Admiralty's suggestion from Karachi to search the entrance to the Persian Gulf for the hostile cruiser.¹ She was occupied with this service from the 9th to the 14th, and, as will be seen, was in plenty of time to proceed with the convoy as arranged.

33. **A Convoy from China.**—Apart from the large convoy next due to leave India another collection of transports² had left Colombo on the 6th for Aden under the escort of the *Dupleix* (French) and *Askold* (Russian),³ which last had brought the British transports from Hong Kong. This convoy reached Aden on the 15th, and was taken on through the Red Sea by the *Dupleix* alone, which, on the 12th, had been put under Admiral Peirse so long as the *Fox* remained with the East African Expedition.⁴

There was also another British force at Colombo awaiting escort; this was the Ceylon contingent booked to sail in the Bibby liner *Worcestershire* on the 20th of October, and the idea was for the ship to be brought to Bombay to join one of the convoys leaving there. Admiral Peirse could offer no prospect of supplying an escort from his squadron before the end of October, by which time it was hoped he could have disposed of the large convoy, but this did not satisfy the people in Ceylon who had been impressed by the apparently unchecked activities of the *Emden*. The Governor telegraphed home that: "Trade confidence in the Navy will be further shaken if the contingent cannot sail." It was finally decided that the Ceylon contingent should join the *Amiral Olry*, another French transport from Saigon which had arrived at Singapore on October 8 with the *Zhemchug* (Russian light cruiser), where two more French transports (the *Polynésien* and *Magellan*) were waiting. These three left Singapore on the 13th escorted as far as Penang by the *Zhemchug* and from Penang to Colombo by the *Yarmouth*, which was then to take them and the Ceylon contingent to Bombay, where they would join the convoy leaving next after their arrival.⁵

34. **Departure of the Fifth Indian Convoy.**—As usual, the convoy due next to sail was delayed, this time by the difficulties of escort. It was, as we have seen, a triple one, part to go to the Persian Gulf, a large section to Egypt and later to France, and a third detachment to East Africa and Mauritius, and Admiral Peirse considered it advisable to wait for the arrival

¹ F. 98.

² *Arcadia*, *Nile*, *Carnarvonshire* with British Garrisons from China; *Cordillere* and *El Kantara* with French guns and ammunition.

³ F. 92.

⁴ F. 104.

⁵ F. 94, 97, 100, 101. For earlier movements of *Yarmouth*, see Monograph: *China and Emden*.

of the *Goliath* at Bombay on the 16th before starting; the *Ocean*, his other reinforcement, required three days' repair at Aden, but could meet the convoy *en route*.¹ His orders to the *Duke of Edinburgh* were for her and the *Hardinge* to leave Karachi on the 16th with Groups I and L² in time to meet the Bombay convoy at the rendezvous, now in 18.55 N., 61.30 E. Group N³ was to sail from Karachi on the 18th unescorted for the Persian Gulf, for which place Group M⁴ would sail from Bombay with the main convoy and be detached with the *Dufferin* as escort on arrival at the rendezvous. The large convoy to leave Bombay on the 16th under the escort of the *Swiftsure*, *Goliath*, and *Dufferin*, consisted of Group H⁵ for Egypt and Group K⁶ for East Africa and Mauritius.⁷

As expected, the *Goliath* arrived at Bombay at 2 a.m. on the 16th,⁸ and at 6.25 p.m. the convoy proceeded. Group K was led by the *Goliath*, and Groups H and M by the *Swiftsure*, while the *Dufferin* guarded the rear. At 7 next morning the *Duke of Edinburgh* and *Hardinge* started from Karachi with their convoy (Groups I and L) for the rendezvous, where they were to meet the Bombay Groups. The junction took place in the afternoon of the 19th; the *Ocean* had been met that morning by the Bombay convoy before the *Duke of Edinburgh* had been sighted, and at noon had gone instead of the *Dufferin* with four transports for the Persian Gulf. At 5 p.m. the *Goliath* also departed with eight transports for Mombasa and Mauritius.⁹ After the meeting of the Bombay and Karachi convoys, the small Group L of three ships parted company and proceeded for Mombasa with the *Hardinge*, and the remainder¹⁰ continued its course for Aden with the *Swiftsure*, *Duke of Edinburgh*, and *Dufferin* as escort. Off the Khorya Morya Islands the *Minerva* joined the Admiral at 3 p.m. on October 20, and next morning the *Duke of Edinburgh* went on

¹ F. 102, 103.

² Group I.—*City of Calcutta*, *Chanda*, *Glenlee*, *Islanda*, *Leicestershire*, *Onda*, *Sealda*, *Tara*, *Ujina*, for Egypt—nine ships. Group L.—*Bharata*, *Homangun*, *Muttra*, for Mombasa—three ships.

³ Group N.—*Okhla*, *Umta*, and *Freienfels*.

⁴ Group M.—*Varela*, *Amaria*, *Berbera*, *Masunda*.

⁵ Group H.—*Aragon*, *Aratoon Apcar*, *Avon*, *Ballarat*, *Bangala*, *Caledonia*, *Clan Macfarlane*, *Clan Macphie*, *Chilka*, *City of Baroda*, *Dewa*, *Dunera*, *Franz Ferdinand*, *Glen Cluny*, *Gregory-Apcar*, *Ionian*, *Ismailia*, *Itonus*, *Itria*, *Laomedon*, *Locksley Hall*, *Mashobra*, *Neuralia*, *Ormara*, *Pundit*, *Rajput*, *Saturnia*, *Seang Bee*, *Seang Choon*, *Surada*, *Veteria*, for Egypt—31 ships.

⁶ Group K.—*Abassieh*, *Assouan*, *Barjora*, *Jeddah*, *Karmala*, *Khosron*, *Lai Sang*, *Nairung*, *Pentakota*, *Rheinfels*, for Mombasa, and *Varsova*, for Mauritius—11 ships.

⁷ Convoy orders. M. 03564/15.

⁸ *Dufferin's* log.

⁹ These arrived at Mombasa, October 31st, 1914, and Mauritius, November 4th, 1914.

¹⁰ Thirty-eight ships according to the log of *Duke of Edinburgh*.

ahead to Aden to coal in preparation for taking the convoy on through the Red Sea. She came out again early in the morning of the 24th with the *Northbrook* and took over the convoy from *Swiftsure*. The voyage had not been without incident. Shortly after leaving the rendezvous the transport *Franz Ferdinand* of Group H, carrying part of the 1st King's Dragoon Guards and other details, broke down and had to drop out of the convoy. Admiral Peirse recalled the *Dufferin*, which had gone on ahead, and gave her charge of the disabled transport. After an unsuccessful attempt to get her going, the *Dufferin* took her in tow at 4 p.m., October 21, and managed to proceed at about 6 knots till the morning of the 23rd, when the hawser parted. By a day's work on the *Franz Ferdinand's* engines the *Dufferin* succeeded in getting her to go by her own steam, but she broke down again next morning, and the *Dufferin* had to tow her the remaining 280 miles to Aden, which she reached at 10 p.m. on the 25th.¹

Just outside, the *Swiftsure* had passed her. The flagship had coaled and was on her way back for the next convoy. At Aden Admiral Peirse received information of the approach of the Wessex Territorials on their way out to India to relieve the British Regulars; nine transports containing the Wessex men were due at Suez on October 26, and about a fortnight later the Home Counties Territorials would arrive there. It was arranged that the *Dupleix* should bring the Wessex Division from Suez as far as Aden, and having settled this matter, Admiral Peirse left Aden on October 25 for Bombay.²

The convoy he had brought from India went on without stopping at Aden with the *Northbrook*, *Minerva*, and *Duke of Edinburgh*, but the last, being required for the next convoy due to leave Karachi early in November, parted company on the morning of the 25th and turned back for Karachi, examining the Khorya Morya and Masira Islands *en route*. The convoy reached Suez safely on October 30.

35. Operations against Emden.—During the passage of the convoy the *Emden* had been continuing her attacks on merchant shipping, and on October 20 a steamer, the *Saint Egbert*, arrived at Cochin, on the Malabar coast, with the crews of five steamers sunk and one captured by her near the focal point at Minikoi. Most serious of all was her capture of the British collier *Exford*, whose coal would presumably keep her active for some time.

In search of the raiding cruiser were the *Hampshire*, *Empress of Asia*, and *Chikuma* (Japanese), while the *Zhemchug* had visited the islands in the Bay of Bengal in search of her colliers. The C.-in-C., China, who was in charge of the operations against the *Emden*, now withdrew the *Empress of Russia* from Manila, over which as a suspected base for colliers he had been keeping

watch, and ordered her to Singapore to assist in the search for the *Emden*. The *Askold* had left Aden on the 20th, and was due at Colombo on the 27th. The *Yarmouth* also had arrived on the 20th at Colombo with the French transports *Amiral Olry*, *Polynésien*, *Magellan*, and *Empire*, which it had been intended she should take on to Bombay to join the next convoy from there; but on the 21st the Admiralty sent orders for the French convoy to wait at Colombo, the *Yarmouth* being used for operations against the *Emden* and stationed on the trade route between Ceylon and Minikoi.¹

There were repeated reports from Constantinople that the *Emden* intended to go to Basra, and the Admiralty ordered Admiral Peirse, who was then half way to Aden with his convoy, to send the *Duke of Edinburgh* to the Persian Gulf if she had enough coal, but on learning from him that the *Ocean* with the transports for the Persian Gulf was due at Bahrain on the 23rd they rescinded the order.²

Admiral Jerram further asked the Japanese to send, if possible, the *Hirato* and one or two more cruisers to Singapore to assist in the search for the *Emden*, as there were so many demands on his own ships for escort duty. The Japanese Admiralty acceded to Admiral Jerram's wish rather more strongly than he had hoped, and stated that they would form a squadron in East Indian waters to consist of the *Tokiwa*, *Yakumo*, *Ibuki*, *Chikuma*, *Yahagi*, and *Nisshin* to be under a Japanese Vice-Admiral to whom they asked him to turn over the *Hampshire*, *Minotaur*, and *Yarmouth*, the British authorities to arrange for the whole squadron's supplies of coal and water. The arrival of a Japanese Vice-Admiral in East Indian waters would reduce the British C.-in-C., Rear-Admiral Peirse, to a subordinate position, and the Japanese proposal was not welcomed with much enthusiasm by Admiral Jerram; but before any steps to secure a reduction in the proposed squadron had been taken, the Japanese had given Vice-Admiral Tochinai orders to sail with the *Tokiwa* and *Yakumo* to operate against the *Emden*. He had been instructed to keep a good understanding with the C.-in-C., China, and to co-operate with Admiral Peirse; and he was leaving Japan shortly. Admiral Jerram sent to Tokyo a telegram expressing his thanks.¹

The *Askold* arrived at Colombo on the 26th from Aden, and as the Admiralty had suggested that she should take the Ceylon contingent and French transports waiting there on to Bombay she left with them on the 27th at 11 p.m., and arrived at Bombay on the 31st in time for the next convoy for home.³

36. Emden at Penang; Königsberg located.—Though when the *Askold* had started from Colombo there was some fear that

¹ *Dufferin's log.*

² F. 109, 111, 112.

¹ See Monograph: *China and Emden.*

² See Monograph: *Mesopotamia.*

³ F. 108, 113.

the *Emden* might be near her, that enterprising German ship was 1,000 miles away by that time. At daybreak on October 28 she had made an appearance at Penang, and had sunk the Russian cruiser *Zhemchug* and a French destroyer. The incident had occurred in waters outside the East Indies station, and was dealt with by Admiral Jerram.¹ The only ship available on the spot to add to the squadron hunting the *Emden* was the Japanese light cruiser *Yahagi*, which had arrived at Singapore with the French transports *Euphrate* and *Latouche Tréville*; these, it had been intended, she should have taken on to join the Australasian convoy off the Cocos Islands, but Admiral Jerram cancelled this arrangement and ordered the *Yahagi* to act with another Japanese cruiser between Penang and Rangoon. The Australasian convoy which the *Yahagi* was to have joined was bringing to Europe the first Australian and New Zealand contingents, and had now assembled in King George Sound, Albany. It left there for Colombo on November 1 escorted by the *Minotaur*, *Ibuki*, *Sydney*, and *Melbourne*.²

Apart from the *Emden* the various convoys and trade routes in the India Ocean had little to fear, for the *Königsberg*, which so far had not been definitely located since August 10, was found on October 30 by the *Chatham* to be in hiding up the Rufiji river in German East Africa, and though it was some months before she was disposed of she could thenceforward be definitely considered as out of the game.³

CHAPTER VI.

WAR WITH TURKEY: CORONEL: END OF EMDEN.

37. **Egypt and Persian Gulf.**—The removal of the *Königsberg* from the board lightened the burden on Admiral Peirse's Squadron for only a very short time, for on arrival at Bombay on October 31 with the *Swiftsure* and *Dufferin* he found that a new force had arisen, whose entry into the conflict on the side of Germany altered the problems of his station and shifted its centre of gravity further West. The new enemy was Turkey, whose attitude since the arrival of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* on August 10 at the Dardanelles had been increasingly hostile towards us, till we had at last to send an ultimatum by which the Turkish Government was called upon to dismiss all German officials from their public services. This they refused to do, and on October 31 at 2.30 p.m. the Admiralty sent orders to

¹ See Monograph: *China and Emden*.

² For details, see Monograph: *Australasian Convoy*.

³ For details, see Monograph: *East Africa*.

Admiral Peirse and to the S.N.O., Persian Gulf, to commence hostilities. The operations in the Persian Gulf, though under the ultimate direction of the C.-in-C., East Indies, are geographically distinct from the general operations in the Indian Ocean, and they are not treated here but in a separate monograph entitled *Mesopotamia*.

So far as the East Indies was concerned the declaration of war on Turkey could not at once affect the squadron under Admiral Peirse. The *Minto*, which had been lent to the Resident at Aden, was indeed free for action, and was ordered by the Admiralty to proceed up the Red Sea sinking every Turkish steamer she could find¹; but, at the moment, all the ships in the Arabian Sea were fully occupied with convoy work. The next large detachment of Indian troops was due to leave on November 2, and the 1st Wessex Division had left Suez for India on October 27, escorted by the *Dupleix*; it arrived at Aden on November 2² just as the large Indian convoy was starting from India.

The Commander-in-Chief was no longer in the *Swiftsure*. The complexity of the work entailed in the control of his command was having the same effect as in the neighbouring China Station. The arrangement of escorts and convoys; the general supervision of operations in the Persian Gulf and East Africa; the protection and encouragement of shipping; the interpretation of intelligence; the necessity of keeping touch with the Government of India; all these things combined led to only one conclusion. A Commander-in-Chief afloat could not carry on the work of the Station, and the Admiralty, feeling this even before the entry of Turkey into the war, had given him the option of remaining on shore. He did not at once exercise this option, for it arrived on October 16 just as the fifth convoy was starting; he proceeded with the Bombay group as already arranged, and it was not till his return that he hoisted his flag ashore.³

38. **The Sixth Indian Convoy.**—On November 2 at 11.20 a.m. the *Swiftsure* and *Dufferin* proceeded from Bombay with 25 British and 3 French transports,⁴ and next day at 6.15 a.m. the *Duke of Edinburgh* left Karachi with 10 more ships.⁵ Both groups, as before, made for the rendezvous in 18.55 N., 61.30 E., where they sighted one another at 6 a.m. on the 5th.

¹ F. 115.

² F. 116.

³ F. 105, 107, 114.

⁴ Group O.—*Akbar*, *Amiral Olry* (French), *Atlantian*, *Bindra*, *Barala*, *Begum*, *Castalia*, *Circassia*, *City of Glasgow*, *Craftsman*, *Elysia*, *Fultala*, *Glenn'ive*, *Gloucester Castle*, *Itaura*, *Itinda*, *Itola*, *Magellan* (French), *Mongara*, *Monteagle*, *Norseman*, *Polynésien* (French), *Sardinia*, *Ula*, *Umballa*, *Upada*, *Worcestershire*. (Convoy Orders, Sheet 23, M. 03564/15.)

⁵ Group P.—*City of Manchester*, *City of Nagpur*, *Edavana*, *Ellenga*, *Freienfels*, *Mullah*, *Nurani*, *Sutlej*, *Takada*, *Testa*. (Convoy Orders, Sheet 23, M. 03564/15.)

During the 6th and 7th the faster transports *Amiral Olry*, *Edavana*, *Fultala*, and *Takada*, went on ahead for Aden, and at 6 a.m. on the 8th the *Duke of Edinburgh* was detached from main convoy to coal at Aden, taking with her at 12 knots the *City of Manchester* and *Murani*. She reached Aden at 9.53 a.m. on the 9th, and began to coal.

39. Effect of Battle of Coronel.—Since the convoy's departure from Bombay events of great importance had occurred. Our South American Squadron under Admiral Cradock had at last located the German Pacific Squadron commanded by Admiral von Spee, who had at first, it will be remembered, been considered not unlikely to come into the Indian Ocean. He had, however, proceeded steadily eastward to the coast of Chile, where, on November 1, he had defeated and dispersed the force with Admiral Cradock, an event whose effect reached even to the East Indies. Steps were taken by the Admiralty to provide sufficient force to oppose the German Squadron at whatever point it was likely to attack; one of these was German South West Africa where we were landing troops, and to strengthen the defence there the Admiralty removed the *Minotaur* and *Dartmouth* from the Indian Ocean, ordering the *Hardinge*, which had taken the *Mauritius* garrison back from there to Mombasa, to take the *Dartmouth's* place on the East African Station.¹ They also decided to send to South America two battle cruisers from the Grand Fleet, and, to replace them, ordered home such of the armoured cruisers as could best be spared. One of these was the *Duke of Edinburgh*; and concerning the arrangements that her removal would necessitate they sent to Admiral Peirse, who had remained behind at Bombay, the following telegram:—

"266. *Duke of Edinburgh* is to return to Home Waters accompanying convoy to Malta where she can be docked if necessary.

"*Swiftsure* should accompany convoy to Suez, returning with the convoy of Territorials² to India.

"*Ocean* to return to Karachi for convoy leaving middle of November; *Dupleix* escorting convoy from Bombay.

"Report if any objection seen; if not, arrange accordingly.

"*Hampshire* will escort convoy from Bombay, sailing about November 28 unless *Emden* is dealt with previously." (7.35 p.m., 6.11.14.)

In acknowledging this Admiral Peirse pointed out that the Captain of the *Ocean* was conducting combined operations in the Persian Gulf which would be delayed by his removal; and, as regards the *Duke of Edinburgh*, urged that his ships were

¹ The *Minotaur* was bringing the First Australasian Convoy home, and the *Dartmouth* and *Weymouth* had been ordered on the 4th from East Africa to join in the *Emden* hunt.

² This was the Home Counties Division due to leave Suez on the 15th of November.

falling into such bad condition from continuous running that he could not carry out his programme unless a ship was sent to relieve her.¹ In the desire to keep secret their despatch of the battle cruisers to deal with the South American situation the Admiralty had not let him know the necessity for the presence of the *Duke of Edinburgh* in Home Waters; but now they decided to give him some reason for her removal, and on the 9th telegraphed:—

"271. *Duke of Edinburgh* is required for important duties suited to her fighting powers.

"*Emden* is only enemy cruiser known to be within striking distance of convoys, and is located and being searched for by numerous cruisers.

"It appears that one strong ship with armed transport should suffice for moderate sized convoys in Indian Ocean, and one cruiser in Red Sea. Suggest *Dupleix* for Red Sea; she is to be relieved by *Desaix* shortly.

"Previous orders for *Hampshire* stand for one trip Bombay to Aden unless *Ocean* can be spared.

"Consider on these lines and report proposals." (12.40 p.m., 9.11.14.)

They also gave permission for the *Hardinge* to return to escort work, whereupon Admiral Peirse ordered her to Colombo for convoys from Calcutta to Rangoon.²

The Admiralty's convoy programme which had just reached Admiral Peirse at Bombay laid down sailings at 16-day intervals of the groups of transports with Territorials; the idea was for the escort which had brought to Aden a group of Indian transports to return to Bombay, immediately after coaling, with a group of Territorials, repeating the process at Bombay. From Aden to Karachi is 1,470 miles; from Aden to Bombay 1,657 miles; and if the 16-day intervals were to be kept it was essential that the outward bound convoys should maintain a speed of 12½ knots between Aden and Bombay. However, the first territorial convoy,³ which had left Southampton on October 9, and arrived at Bombay on November 9 under escort of the *Dupleix*, was found to be incapable of more than 10 knots. In pointing this out Admiral Peirse showed that delay was inevitable unless more ships were spared for escorting.⁴ The difficulty seemed a real one, but that day all difficulties were removed.

40. Emden destroyed.—The First Australasian Convoy had left Albany for Colombo on November 1 under the escort of the *Minotaur*, *Melbourne*, *Sydney* and *Ibuki* (Japanese). The *Minotaur* departed on the 8th for the Cape; and on the 9th, shortly after the convoy had passed Cocos Island, that wireless

¹ F. 120.

² F. 122, 123.

³ *Alnwick Castle*, *Assaye*, *Braemar Castle*, *Cawdor Castle*, *Ultonia*, *Dunluce Castle*, *Kenilworth Castle*, *Nevasa*, *Galeka*—9 ships with troops; and *Thongwa*, *Ingoma*, *Kelvingrove*, without troops.

⁴ F. 124, 126.

station was heard giving out a message that a hostile cruiser was in sight. Captain Silver of the *Melbourne*, in charge of the convoy, decided to detach the *Sydney* (Captain Glossop) to investigate, and she had the good fortune to come up with the enemy. The hostile cruiser turned out to be the *Emden*. After a short engagement the *Emden* ran ashore and surrendered, and the Indian Ocean was thereby cleared of hostile ships.

This freed our cruisers for work elsewhere. Egypt was in need of more naval force, both for offensive and defensive operations against the Turks; the Grand Fleet was short of light cruisers; and in the Atlantic, Admiral von Spee was expected to become active before long. The Admiralty at once ordered the *Weymouth* and *Gloucester* back to Malta; the latter had left there on October 31 for the East Indies, with all despatch, and had been ordered on November 6 from Aden to Colombo, passing north of the Laccadives to hunt for the *Emden*. The *Melbourne* and *Sydney* also were both ordered to leave the Australasian Convoy and push on to Malta.¹

As regards the Indian Convoys then at sea, the Admiralty telegraphed to the *Swiftsure* that she was to leave the convoy and proceed with despatch to Suez; if no Indian Marine ships were available, the transports were to proceed independently and as fast as possible. The telegram was addressed to Aden; but the *Swiftsure* had already left for Suez with the convoy, and although Port Sudan was asked to pass it to her, the Governor refused to accept the message. The only way to get it to her was for the Eastern Telegraph Company to hand it to a British man-of-war by whom it could be made by wireless to the *Swiftsure*, who meanwhile was following her former orders, knowing nothing of the changed situation.² The *Duke of Edinburgh* was not with her. After coaling at Aden on November 9, she had proceeded with three fast transports, *Edavana*, *City of Manchester*, and *Nurani*, on a special mission.³

41. **Shaikh Said.**—On the Arabian Coast, opposite Perim, is the little bay of Shaikh Said, defended by a few forts, and, at the time, held by a garrison of Turkish troops. From its position it was a menace to our station at Perim, and to our trade, which, at this narrow strait, must pass within a few miles of it; and the arrival of the convoy with its powerful escort in Turkish waters had prompted the Government of India to ask Admiral Peirse for naval assistance in reducing these forts and dispersing the troops. Without waiting for the Admiralty's concurrence the Admiral had acceded to the request, and by his orders the *Duke of Edinburgh*, after consultation with General Cox at Aden, carried out a bombardment of Fort Turba, and covered by gunfire a landing of troops from

¹ F. 118, 127.

² F. 128, 134.

³ *Duke of Edinburgh's Log.*

the transports with her to demolish the Turkish works and drive off the enemy. While engaged in this operation she saw the rest of the convoy pass with the *Swiftsure* and *Northbrook* as its escort;¹ it had spent the night of the 9th at Aden, and was now on its way to Suez. At 5.47 p.m. on the 11th, the operations at Shaikh Said being concluded, the troops re-embarked and the *Duke of Edinburgh* proceeded with the *Edavana* and *City of Manchester* for Suez at 12 knots while the *Nurani* returned to Aden. It was not till 2 a.m. on the 14th that the *Duke of Edinburgh* sighted the large convoy ahead of her. The *Swiftsure* was still unaware of the Admiralty's latest order. When she joined, the *Swiftsure* at 9.45 a.m. left the main portion to her and went on ahead to Suez with the faster transports. The *Duke of Edinburgh's* section reached Suez on the 16th.

CHAPTER VII.

DISPERSAL OF THE EAST INDIES SQUADRON.

42. **Escorts no longer necessary.**—This was to be the last convoy in the Indian Ocean to be escorted by British ships. On November 11 the Admiralty telegraphed:—

278. Convoys are not necessary except in the Red Sea, and homeward bound should collect and outward bound convoys disperse at Aden.

Let *Dupleix* take her convoy as arranged.

Swiftsure must remain in Egypt for the present. Send her reserve ammunition to Suez at once.

Outward bound territorial convoy will be escorted to Aden by *Minerva* or *Proserpine* if no Indian Marine ship is available, the escort then returning to Suez.

Make arrangements for Red Sea convoys using Empress liners and Indian Marine ships as escorts.

(Sent 10.55 a.m., 11.11.14.)

As, however, no Indian Marine ship could be ready at Suez before the 16th, when the *Northbrook* was due there, the Admiralty ordered the S.N.O., Egypt, to detach the *Minerva* for that duty.²

As regards the recall of the light cruisers, there were several hitches. The *Gloucester* did not get her orders to return till her arrival at Bombay on the 13th, when she found she had to go the whole 4,000 miles back again. Before leaving, she obtained permission to go into Bombay dock for three days. The *Weymouth* seemed so necessary for the East African operations that the captain of the *Chatham* strongly recommended her retention on the station, but the Admiralty on the

¹ Log of *Duke of Edinburgh*.

² F. 131, 135.

12th ordered her to Simon's Bay, recalling also the *Chatham*, *Hampshire*, and *Yarmouth* to Gibraltar.¹ The *Yarmouth* left Colombo on the 18th at 6 a.m. and the *Hampshire* sailed from the same port on the 17th with the Australasian convoy.

Now that the *Emden* was disposed of, the Admiralty wished to finish off the *Königsberg*, the attack on which seemed to them to have been lacking in energy. On the 12th Captain Caulfeild of the *Fox* who had been conducting the operations,² was ordered home in the *Chatham*, and Captain Drury-Lowe of that ship was ordered to exchange into the *Fox* with the appointment of S.N.O., East African Coast. Under him were placed the *Fox*, *Goliath*, and *Kinfauns Castle*, and he was ordered to make out a definite plan of operations in consultation with General Tighe, Commanding in East Africa, and to bombard Tanga and Dar-es-Salaam if they should attempt any defence. The removal of the *Chatham* did not commend itself to the officers on the spot, who pointed out that the *Goliath* and *Fox*, owing to their draught, could not bring any covering fire to bear in landing operations, and on the 14th the retention of both the *Chatham* and Captain Caulfeild in command were approved.

43. **Admiral Peirse goes to Egypt.**—By the appointment of Senior Naval Officers in Egypt, the Persian Gulf, and East Africa, and the transfer of the Bay of Bengal to the C.-in-C., China, himself stationed at Singapore, very little of the original East Indies Station remained to Admiral Peirse and most of his ships had been ordered to other stations. In further reduction of his command he was told on November 16, in reference to orders he had given to the *Minto*, that he was not to direct operations even in the Red Sea.³ In fact, the only area left to him was the Arabian Sea and his squadron was represented by the *Dufferin* at Karachi, the *Dupleix* at Bombay, and the *Hardinge*, which, after taking the garrison to Mauritius, had left Seychelles for Colombo on the 14th. This anomalous situation did not last long, for at 9 p.m. on the 16th the Admiralty sent him

"292. It is necessary that you take charge of naval operations in Egypt as soon as possible.

"You should proceed to Egypt by the quickest route, and hoist your flag in *Swiftsure*.

"You will retain command of East Indies Station while employed in Egypt."

His duties were further explained to him next day by

"293. Naval operations in the Red Sea and Egypt cannot be directed from India. Your presence in Egypt is imperative. You should join your flagship *Swiftsure* at Port Said by the quickest route

¹ F. 130, 132, 133.

² For details see Monograph: *East Africa*.

³ M. 03564/14; M. 03567/14; F. 136.

at once. *Gloucester* can take you if she has not already sailed. Telegraph what date you expect to arrive at Suez. On arrival you should consult with G.O.C., Egypt, and work hand in hand with the British authorities. The Government of India will make its views known to the British Government, who will transmit all necessary orders to the G.O.C. and yourself.

"The following ships will be at your disposal in the Red Sea—*Swiftsure*, *Minerva*, *Doris*, *Proserpine*, *Philomel*,¹ and six torpedo boats from Malta. Measures are also being taken to organise armed launches and improvised gunboats for use in the canal."

"Telegraph whether you feel able to discharge the other duties of your command, namely, convoy and Persian Gulf operations at the same time, or what temporary arrangements you suggest during your absence in Egyptian waters."

(Sent 2.10 p.m., 17.11.14.)

Admiral Peirse replied that he could perfectly well do all the work laid down; he retained general command of the operations in the Persian Gulf, but as they were chiefly military, turned over all details to the captain of the *Ocean* as S.N.O., Persian Gulf, giving him authority to correspond direct with the Admiralty, the Government of India, and the Director of the Royal Indian Marine.² The *Gloucester* had left, but the Admiral took passage in the next P. & O. and rehoisted his flag in the *Swiftsure* at Port Said in the afternoon of December 1.

44. **Goa.**—In addition to the entry of Turkey into the conflict it seemed likely that Portugal might decide to join in, though on the side of the Entente. The Admiralty were anxious not to let the German merchantmen sheltering at Goa escape, and on November 17 ordered Admiral Peirse to send there such vessels as he had available to capture any ships that might get away from the port. The *Hardinge* was on her way to Colombo, but he ordered her instead to Goa, where she arrived on the 19th. She remained off the port three days, paid a visit to Bombay to report, and went back to Goa on the 24th to resume her watch. She reported that the *Lichtenfels*, *Marienfels*, and *Kommodor* had officers and a short supply of coal on board, but no crews; the *Brisbane* had 500 tons of coal and a full German crew; the *Numantia* had a full crew of Arabs but very little coal, and the *Vorwaerts* (Austrian) had 350 tons of coal and a full Austrian crew. These were all the enemy ships in port. The Portuguese Government had a gunboat (*Sado*) with steam up, and was prepared to resist their departure by force, calling upon the *Hardinge* to assist, but the captain of the latter had little faith in the gunboat's power to stop an evasion. The Admiralty accordingly sent orders for him to remain off the port watching the German ships, and this watch constituted the main duty of vessels in Indian waters for some time to come.³

¹ She was coming from the New Zealand Station.

² F. 138.

³ F. 137, 139, 143.

45. **The Final Convoys.**—There were several convoys at sea. The *Philomel* had left Singapore on November 16 with three French transports, *Euphrate*, *Latouche Tréville*, and *Chile*, and arrived with them at Colombo on the 23rd. She went on with the first two for Aden on the 26th, the *Chile* having proceeded independently.¹ The Australasian convoy had been taken from Colombo on the 17th by the *Hampshire* and *Ibuki*; it reached Aden on the 25th, and left there for Suez next morning with *Hampshire*, the *Ibuki* returning to the Far East. The Home Counties Territorial Division for India left Suez on the 18th, their departure having been delayed till the *Minerva* could be relieved in Egypt by the *Swiftsure*. On the way down the Red Sea the *Minto* relieved the *Minerva* and had brought them on to Aden, where they arrived on the 23rd. They sailed on the 26th for Bombay² unescorted, and arrived there during the first three days of December.³ The sloop *Clio*, coming from China to join the force in Egypt, escorted the transport *Monmouthshire* bringing R.G.A. details from Hong Kong and Japanese rifles and ammunition; they left Colombo on November 30 for home.

46. **The Seventh Indian Convoy.**—The largest convoy was, however, that from India, which left Karachi⁴ on November 20, escorted by the *Dufferin*, and Bombay⁵ on the 19th with the *Dupleix*, which had arrived 10 days previously with the Wessex Territorials. The two groups met at the rendezvous and continued with the *Dupleix* alone, the *Dufferin* returning to Bombay. At Aden the *Dupleix*, which was required to bring off the French Consul from Hodeidah and to visit Djibouti for stores, was relieved by the *Northbrook* which took the convoy on to Suez, arriving there on December 2.

This concluded the work of escorting convoys from India which had so severely taxed the East Indian Squadron. During the escort period, which had started with the *Nairung* on August 19, over 200 transports had left India and had arrived safely at their destinations.

¹ F. 141.

² F. 142.

³ December 1, *Alaunia*, *Royal George*; December 2, *Corsican*, *Descado*, *Bongola*, *Somali*; December 3, *Dilwara*, *Grantully Castle*. (H.S. 32, p. 751.)

⁴ Group R.—*Arankola*, *Baroda*, *Barpeta*, *Cocanada*, *Devanha*, *Galeka*, *Nevasa*—7 ships.

⁵ Group Q.—*Alnwick Castle*, *Assaye*, *Bankura*, *Braemar Castle*, *City of Birmingham*, *City of Exeter*, *City of Lahore*, *City of Poona*, *Craftsman*, *Dunluce Castle*, *Euryalus*, *Gloucester Castle*, *Havildar*, *Huntsman*, *Ingoma*, *Kelvingrove*, *Kenilworth Castle*, *Malda*, *Manora*, *Rajah*, *Ranee*, *Risaldar*, *Sumatra*, (for Mombasa) *Tactician*, *Ulltonia*, *Urlana*—26 ships.

APPENDIX F.

TELEGRAMS.

(TO AND FROM EAST INDIES.)

(1914.)

- | | | |
|-------|--|-----------------------------------|
| F. 1. | From Admiralty.
To C.-in-C.'s, East Indies and Cape. | July 28th. |
| | 82. Until <i>Nottingham</i> joins Cape Station <i>Dartmouth</i> must be prepared to shadow German cruiser <i>Königsberg</i> now at Dar-es-Salaam. | |
| F. 2. | From Admiralty.
To Navy, Bombay. | July 30th. |
| | 86. <i>Dartmouth</i> is to proceed to Zanzibar. Acknowledge. | |
| F. 3. | From C.-in-C., East Indies.
To Admiralty. | July 30th.
Received 11.15 p.m. |
| | 83. Movements ordered <i>Fox</i> to Colombo; <i>Espiègle</i> to Aden; <i>Alert</i> to Bombay; <i>Sphinx</i> to Bombay preparing to pay off; <i>Dartmouth</i> to Zanzibar as soon as possible; undock Bombay, shadowing <i>Königsberg</i> ; <i>Swiftsure</i> remaining Colombo ready for sea; <i>Odin</i> remaining at Persian Gulf. | |
| F. 4. | From C.-in-C., East Indies.
To Admiralty. | July 30th.
Received 3.50 p.m. |
| | Your telegram 86. <i>Dartmouth</i> will not be ready to proceed until August 8. | |
| F. 5. | From C.-in-C., East Indies.
To Admiralty. | July 31st.
Received 6.5 a.m. |
| | 88. Considering probable enemies submit desirable transfer <i>Dufferin</i> and <i>Hardinge</i> to Navy and issue proclamation to that effect on outbreak of war. Have requested Government of India in anticipation to authorise shipment of armaments and preparations for vessels forthwith. | |
| F. 6. | From Admiralty.
To C.-in-C., East Indies. | July 31st. |
| | 87. Order one of the sloops to Colombo ready to move to Singapore if crew are wanted for <i>Triumph</i> . | |
| F. 7. | From Admiralty.
To C.-in-C., East Indies. | July 31st.
10 p.m. |
| | Approved to arm and prepare <i>Dufferin</i> and <i>Hardinge</i> . Informing Government of India. | |
| F. 8. | From Admiralty.
To C.-in-C., East Indies. | August 1st. |
| | 88. Consul, Dar-es-Salaam, reports <i>Königsberg</i> left 4.30 p.m. Northerly with decks clear coal, provisions, water. <i>Königsberg</i> sighted by <i>Hyacinth</i> 6 p.m. 31st July off Dar-es-Salaam steaming fast to Eastward unable to follow owing to her speed. C.-in-C., Cape confidently believes she will remain on Coast. Communicate to <i>Dartmouth</i> . | |

F. 9. *Copy of Eastern Telegraph Company's Cable:—*

From Superintendent, Zanzibar.
To Managing Director.

August 4th.
7 a.m.

German residents here active. Several thousand native German subjects residing Zanzibar, large number of whom likely receive arms if Zanzibar attacked. German cruiser and gunboat, also four large German steamers in neighbourhood latter supported by well equipped guns. Two Maxims with trained gun teams at Bawi, which fortified. Maxim to be mounted at station morning. To-night Resident General call to arms informed we received message saying attack expected be made on Station before war declared. Staff armed guarding station, military guard doubled. Cruisers cleared action, men sleeping at guns. Mombasa strongly guarded, attack expected there also. Sounds firing notified this morning reported by native guard.

F. 10. From Admiralty.
To C.-in-C., East Indies.

August 4th.

100. What movements are you proposing? Zanzibar reports German cruiser and four large German armed steamers. *Astraea* at Zanzibar. These steamers may get on Indian trade route.

F. 11. From C.-in-C., East Indies.
To Admiralty.

August 5th.
1.38 a.m.

92. Propose to leave for Singapore in *Swiftsure*. Is a sloop required there to complete *Triumph*?

F. 12. From C.-in-C., East Indies.
To Admiralty.

August 5th.
Received 9.31 a.m.

94. Urgent. Have told (?) C.-in-C., China, I shall not require *Triumph* unless Holland becomes hostile. Request instructions as to the likelihood of this and whether I should proceed to Singapore immediately.

F. 13. From C.-in-C., East Indies.
To Admiralty.

August 6th.
Received 8.55 a.m.

98. Your telegram 100. Am leaving in *Swiftsure* to patrol Colombo-Aden trade route. *Espiegle* to-day to patrol Colombo-Singapore trade routes. Both ships will keep in wireless touch with Colombo.

F. 14. From Admiralty.
To C.-in-C., East Indies.

August 7th.
1.55 p.m.

110. *Dartmouth* left Bombay for Zanzibar this morning G.M.T. and you should now order her to assist you in protection of trade route between India and Aden. Similar telegram sent *Dartmouth*, Bombay, wireless. Acknowledge.

F. 15. From C.-in-C., Cape.
To Admiralty.

August 7th.
Received 8.27 p.m.

98. Following telegram sent Britannia,¹ Bombay, and repeated Britannia, Colombo, begins:—

For *Dartmouth*. Have lost touch with *Königsberg* since August 3. She is believed to have been joined by collier. It is possible she may go mouth of Red Sea. Proceed Aden quickly looking out for her and if in that locality destroy her. On arrival at Aden if there is no news of her proceed Zanzibar. My telegraphic address Simonstown. Acknowledge receipt of this by telegraph.

¹ Telegraphic address of S.N.O.

F. 16. From Admiralty.
To C.-in-C., East Indies.

August 9th.

113. *Swiftsure* and *Dartmouth* are to return to Bombay forthwith at highest possible speed and complete with coal. Report expected date of arrival. Prepare to convoy troops to Aden. Order all armed Indian Marine ships to assemble at Bombay.

F. 17. From Secretary of State.
To Viceroy.

August 9th.

No. 399. . . . If Naval situation permits it may be necessary to send the force of 3 Battalions in advance to Zanzibar and East Africa to ensure safety of those Colonies. These troops should, therefore, be prepared for immediate despatch. Please report Units and Commander selected and when probably ready.

As regards expedition for German East Africa it is believed there may be strong opposition. . . .

Under these circumstances the force now recommended on such information as Admiralty and Colonial Office can give is put at 7 Battalions Indian troops including Imperial Service, one Mountain Battery, 1 Company Sappers, and, if possible, a Howitzer Battery. . . .

F. 18. From Admiralty.
To R.A., Defence, through C.-in-C.,
Mediterranean.

August 10th.
6.25 p.m.

382. *Black Prince* and *Duke of Edinburgh* to proceed at once through Suez Canal and thoroughly search Red Sea for hostile armed merchant cruisers, proceeding southward at moderate speed and reporting result on arrival at Aden to Admiralty and C.-in-C., East Indies, Bombay, there await further orders.

F. 19. From C.-in-C., East Indies.
To Admiralty.

August 12th.
Received 10.52 a.m.

110. Arrived in *Swiftsure* 10 a.m. disposition of Squadron *Dartmouth*, Aden; *Dufferin*, *Hardinge*, *Mintc*, Bombay, arming, will be ready 15th August. *Northbrook* expected at Bombay shortly to arm. *Dalhousie*, Aden, ordered to proceed as soon as possible to Bombay, armed. All above will be employed on convoy duty. First transport expected to be ready to leave August 20. *Fox*, *Espiegle* base Colombo, protection of trade routes. *Pioneer* protection of trade routes Fremantle. *Odin* Persian Gulf. *Sphinx* Bombay paid off. *Alert* Bombay about to be paid off. *D'Iberville* and 3 French Destroyers off Singapore searching for *Geier* and *Kleist*. Supply ships and station colliers ready for service.

F. 20. From C.-in-C., East Indies.
To Admiralty.

August 12th.
Received 11.13 a.m.

111. Urgent. In view of report unsuccessful attacks upon cable station at Perim Island nights of 7th and 8th August and German men-of-war reported in the Red Sea suggest that *Dartmouth* now at Aden be sent to search. She could be spared from convoy and trooping, she would¹ not commence to leave before August 20. What arrangements have been made for conveying beyond Aden?

¹ "They will" was meant; the code group used had either reading. T.S.D.D.

- F. 21. From Admiralty. August 12th.
To Marine, Paris.
6. In order to escort British Transports in the Red Sea, *Black Prince* and *Duke of Edinburgh* have been withdrawn from Mediterranean.
One light cruiser goes to Port Said and may be sent down Red Sea to catch *Königsberg*.
- F. 22. From Admiralty. August 12th.
To C.-in-C., East Indies. 6.40 p.m.
119. Owing to delay in troops leaving Bombay, use *Dartmouth* to search Gulf of Aden and the Aden end of route from Bombay for *Königsberg* and then meet convoy. Two cruisers from Mediterranean ordered to Aden for convoy duties.
- F. 23. From C.-in-C., East Indies. August 13th.
To Admiralty. Received 2.39 p.m.
115. Government of India now reports leading unit, 1st Division, will not be ready for sea till about August 20. Escorting ships comprise *Swiftsure*, *Dufferin*, *Hardinge*, *Minto*, all armed, ready August 15. Total number transports leaving Bombay and Karachi with 1st Division, 20. It is uncertain yet whether all will sail in company, but shall keep as many as possible transits without unduly delaying main body. No armed Royal R.I.M. ships used as transports. [This is the precise wording. T.S.D.D.]
- F. 24. From Admiralty. August 13th.
To *Dartmouth*.
123. As the expedition has been postponed until the 28th, *Dartmouth* to return to Bombay complete with coal and await orders from C. in-C. for convoying the transports.
- F. 25. From Admiralty. August 13th.
To C.-in-C., East Indies.
123. The *Alert* is not to be paid off, but to be sent to the Gulf of Aden to search for *Möwe* and destroy her. Coal at Aden and report arrival.
- F. 26. From C.-in-C., East Indies. August 14th.
To Admiralty. Received 10.18 p.m.
117. Your telegram 123. *Alert* has been paid off and crew and armament have been distributed among additional auxiliary cruisers, without which they could not be commissioned. She cannot steam more than 5 knots against the monsoon, and carries insufficient coal to reach Aden direct. Submit that present arrangements may be allowed to stand.
- F. 27. From Admiralty. August 14th.
To C.-in-C., East Indies. 4.40 p.m.
126. Your telegram 117. Approve arrangements for *Alert* to stand.
Can *Odin* be used for this service instead?
- F. 28. From Zanzibar. August 14th.
To Admiralty. Received 10.51 p.m.
12. *Möwe* sunk by German authorities inside Dar-es-Salaam, 3½ miles from entrance to harbour, in 2½ fathoms.

- F. 29. From Viceroy. August 15th.
To India Office. Received 5.56 p.m.
H. 276. 29th Punjabis and 1 section Field Ambulance will sail in *Naidisag*,¹ leaving Karachi 19th. Zanzibar will be informed.
- F. 30. From C.-in-C., East Indies. August 16th.
To Admiralty. Received 7.12 a.m.
119. *Fox* and *Espiegle* captured Australian Line ships *Australia* and *Fürth* respectively off Ceylon 10th August and took them to Colombo.
- F. 31. From Admiralty. August 16th.
To Navy, Bombay.
131. Following telegram sent to *Duke of Edinburgh* and *Black Prince*, begins:—
On arrival at Aden both ships to coal. The first ship ready is to proceed to Bombay, get in touch with R.A., *Swiftsure*, and act under his orders for convoying transports to Aden. The second ship is to remain at or near Aden and convoy transports up the Red Sea to Suez. Acknowledge.
- F. 32. From India Office. August 17th.
To Viceroy, Army Department.
No. 507. Reference previous correspondence regarding Expeditions A, B, and C, situation is changed by ambiguous attitude of Turkey. In circumstances most desirable to reinforce Egypt as rapidly as possible. Consequently Expeditions B and C will be postponed and the remainder of Expedition A expedited. 29th Punjabis may, however, proceed to Zanzibar if naval arrangements still admit.
- F. 33. From India Office. August 17th.
To Viceroy, Army Department.
No. 514. My telegram of 17th of August, No. 507. Lord Kitchener most anxious that first echelon of Expedition A should sail by 20th instant if possible without delaying for Hospitals or other accessories as owing to new situation most important to show Egypt troops commencing to arrive from India. . . .
- F. 34. From Admiralty. August 17th.
To C.-in-C., East Indies.
133. Order *Fox* to meet at a suitable rendezvous the transport carrying the 29th Punjabis to Zanzibar and convoy her to Zanzibar, India Office anxious for this force to be sent at once. Acknowledge.
- F. 35. From Viceroy. August 18th.
To India Office. Received 7.2 p.m.
H. 327. Your 514, of August 17th. Following troops will be ready to start from Bombay 20th, Karachi 21st if Navy can arrange escort. We are consulting Naval C.-in-C. as to this.
9 Battalions Indian Infantry.
2 Companies Sappers and Miners.
1 Battery R.F.A.
- F. 36. From C.-in-C., East Indies. August 19th.
To Admiralty. Received 6.40 a.m.
126. Your telegram 133. Transport *Nairung* with 29th Punjabis left Karachi to-day. Will be met by *Fox* North Seychelles and thence convoyed to Zanzibar.

¹ Error in coding. The ship's name was *Nairung*.

- F. 37. From Admiralty.
To C-in-C., East Indies.

August 19th.

138. Admiralty are informing War Office and India Office that naval escort will be ready to-morrow, 20th August, for Egyptian and East African forces,
Important; no delay.

- F. 38. From Aden.
To Admiralty.

August 19th.
Received 12.25 p.m.

Superintendent of Telegraphs, Zanzibar, reports that telegraph cable Zanzibar-Seychelles interrupted 40 miles from Zanzibar; also Seychelles-Mauritius telegraph cable interrupted. Seychelles completely cut off. Intelligence Officer, Colombo, informed.

- F. 39. From Viceroy.
To India Office.

August 20th.
Received 8.54 p.m.

H. 363. We hope we can despatch whole of leading division partly on 24th and remainder from Karachi 25th, both under escort. Admiral reports that no date earlier than 24th will suit naval arrangements.

- F. 40. From C-in-C., Cape.
To Admiralty.

August 21st.
Received 7.10 a.m.

133. Following telegram received from Censor, Pretoria, begins:--

Following cable (two corrupt groups) for your information begins Mozambique 19th August to Department, Delagoa, confidential. German steamer *Zieten* came in to-day. When sailing from Colombo to Aden on 9th instant met near Cape Guardafui German cruiser *Koenigsberg*, 3 funnels, who had captured British steam vessel *City of Winchester*. *Koenigsberg* ordered *Zieten* to reach neutral port with her passengers 268 including 31 German seamen coming from New Guinea and took 17 men of captured ship's crew including all Captains. *Zieten* has not coaled. She took 250 tons from British ships at anchor for the purpose on Arabian coast. *Zieten* has plenty of flour as cargo and no coal. Ends. Repeating to ships on East Indies Station.

- F. 41. From *Black Prince*, Aden.
To Admiralty.

August 21st.
Received 10 p.m.

22. No hostile armed mercantile cruisers sighted in Red Sea. German ships reported at Massawa Channel *Persepolis*, *Christian X.*, *Segovia*, *Ockenfels*, *Borkum*, *Ostmark*, *Turmfels*. Austrian ships *Moravia*, *Ambra*. One of the above-mentioned reported as communicating with passing vessels, German and Austrian, ordering them to Massawa. Reported German Auxiliary cruiser *Zieten* landed part complement of *City of Winchester* at Mozambique, latter having been captured by *Koenigsberg* near Khorya Morya Island about 10th August. Eastern Telegraph Co. reports unknown ships in company sighted 16 miles off Mombasa 18th August. *Zieten* reported painted funnels British India S.N. Co. funnel bands and flying red Ensign. Resident at Perim Island reports one Turkish gunboat at Hodeida and 4 Turkish gunboats at Camaran (1409).

- F. 42. From A.S., Malta.
To Admiralty.

August 22nd.
Received 3.3 a.m.

417. *Chasseur* reports that Eastern Telegraph Co. cable ship *Cambria* reports both Seychelles Is. cables interrupted since 19th August. Seychelles Is. Mauritius cables about 48 miles from

Seychelles Is. and Zanzibar. Seychelles Is. cables about 40 miles from Zanzibar. British ship *City of Winchester* long overdue at Suez. Left Colombo July 30 with orders to report when passing Perim Is. She has not done so. Captain of German ship *Südmark* states German cruiser sank *City of Winchester* after removing passengers and crew.

- F. 43. From Admiralty.
To Chatham, Suez.

August 23rd.

You are to escort transports *Dongola* and *Somali* as far as Aden. They are now at Port Said. Acknowledge.

- F. 44. From Admiralty.
To French C-in-C, Mediterranean,
via, F.N.A. to Paris.

August 23rd.
Sent 8.10 p.m.

256. With reference to your directions to Admiral Superintendent Malta for R.A. *Indefatigable* to be responsible for the protection of the trade route between Malta and Port Said detaching the *Dublin* and *Weymouth* for that purpose the British Admiralty feel that the trade route is reasonably safe; but would wish to employ those cruisers in the Indian Ocean to hunt out *Königsberg* which is now a threat to the transport of our troops across that ocean. May the Admiralty ask you to prevent any Austrian raiding vessel getting away.

- F. 45. From Chatham, Port Said.
To Admiralty.

August 24th.
Received 10.11 a.m.

294. *Dongola* arrived at Suez half past 8 o'clock this morning G.M.T. *Somali* expects to arrive half past 1 o'clock this afternoon G.M.T. *Chatham* leaves (for) Aden with both transports on arrival of *Somali*. Following received from Aden (begins): Suez-Aden route clear. Cannot guarantee Aden-Ceylon route. *Black Prince*. (ends)

- F. 46. From Britannia, Zanzibar.
To Admiralty.

August 27th.
Received 3.12 p.m.

18. Communication restored between here and Seychelles. All quiet there.

- F. 47. From Naval Attaché.
To Marine, Paris.

August 27th.

276. (Translation). There is reasonable safety on the Madagascar-Suez route. Several British cruisers are now operating on or near this route, but the position of the *Königsberg* is not exactly known. We believe that she has gone East towards the Dutch East Indies.

- F. 48. From Admiral Supt., Malta.
To Admiralty.

August 29th.
Received 2.35 a.m.

492. August 25. *Duke of Edinburgh*¹ transported 20 men, two guns to Perim at request of Resident at Aden.

- F. 49. From Marine, Paris.
To Admiralty.

August 31st.

The cruiser *Königsberg* appeared in the morning of August 30 before the Bay of Majunga, cruised from 6 till 8 o'clock before the entrance, and then departed in a North-Westerly direction without further manifestation.

¹ Should be *Black Prince*. T.S.D.D.

- F. 50. From Admiral Supt., Malta. August 31st.
To Admiralty. Received 4.38 p.m.
519. Following received from *Warrior* :—
Steamship *Orsova* reports following from steamship *City of Calcutta* forenoon August 25.
German Cruiser operating off Socotra. Also afternoon August 28 steamship with call sign ASG calling DGD ends.
C-in-C., East Indies, *Black Prince*, *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Chatham*, have been informed.

- F. 51. From *Fox*, Mombasa. September 2nd.
To Admiralty. Received, 10.0 a.m.
- It is most desirable that *Fox* if time permits should *en route* to Bombay visit Zanzibar and Seychelles Islands in connection with reports of proximity of *Königsberg* and other matters. Request approval by telegraph.

- F. 52. From Admiralty. September 2nd.
To *Fox*, Mombasa.
- Yours to-day. In view of *Königsberg's* superior speed this visit useless. Proceed as ordered to Bombay for convoy duties. *Pegasus* can be sent to Zanzibar if desirable.

- F. 53. From Admiralty. September 3rd.
To C-in-C., East Indies.
151. Expedition B for operations in German East Africa will not be sent from India at present. Expedition C for Mombasa, and one Battn. Indian Infantry for Mauritius will be ready about 16th. Suggest *Fox* might act as escort. She is now returning to Bombay from Mombasa *via* Seychelles, and should arrive Bombay about September 14. *Fox* on return voyage from Mauritius is to form escort to British Battn. *en route* to England from Mauritius as far as Aden. Large movements of troops from India to Egypt have been arranged, and will be leaving about September 10 and later. You should arrange escorts with Indian Govt. reporting proposals.

- F. 54. From C-in-C., East Indies. September 4th.
To Admiralty.
141. Your telegram 151. Proposed convoy programme is as follows :—
Northbrook with 7 transports conveying remainder 1st Division will be joined by *Chatham* off (port ?) 6th September ; transports to be escorted from Aden to Suez by *Chatham*.
Dartmouth with 7 transports conveying troops 2nd Division and Cavalry Brigade due at Aden September 12 ; transports to be escorted to Suez by *Northbrook*.
Transports conveying next echelon of 2nd Division will leave Bombay, Karachi, September 9–10 with *Dufferin* and *Hardinge* : they will be met half way by *Swiftsure* who will take them to Aden and then *Black Prince* and *Duke of Edinburgh* take them to Suez.
Further echelon will depart from India about September 15 under escort *Fox* or with *Dalhousie* and *Minto*.
If Force C is ready about same date *Dartmouth* will accompany whichever group is most likely to fall in with *Königsberg*, and *Fox* will accompany other groups.

Next echelon will be ready between 23rd and end of September and will leave with *Dufferin* and *Hardinge*, and so on.
It is suggested that *Black Prince*, *Duke of Edinburgh* and *Chatham* may be placed temporarily under my orders for work between Aden and Suez to ensure continuous escort from here onwards.

- F. 55. From Admiralty. September 4th.
To C-in-C., East Indies. 9.12 p.m.

152. Approved to put *Black Prince*, *Duke of Edinburgh* and *Chatham* under your orders and use as you require.
S.N.O. Malta informed.

- F. 56. From C-in-C., East Indies. September 5th.
To Admiralty. Received 6.5 p.m.

143. Your telegram No 153,¹ revised proposals as follows :—
14 Transports due by September 12 Aden to be escorted by convoy of *Chatham* and *Northbrook* and met by *Black Prince* and *Duke of Edinburgh* about two days out, who would turn back with them to Suez.

This means delaying first 7 transports here 5 days.
Swiftsure leaving here for Bombay to-morrow and *Dartmouth* about September 12.

These two with *Fox*, *Dufferin*, *Hardinge* could then leave India with Second Division about September 18.

Next sailing some 16 days later. Request approval.
I understood that departure of troops was urgent plans made accordingly taking into consideration *Königsberg's* movements which are being closely watched.

- F. 57. From C-in-C., East Indies. September 6th.
To Admiralty. Received 11.43 a.m.

146. *Chatham*, *Northbrook*, and 7 transports arrived Aden, September 6. and will be detained 6 or 7 days until arrival of *Dartmouth*, to comply with instructions contained in your telegram 153.

In view of safe condition of Red Sea request consideration whether *Chatham* alone may escort these 7 transports immediately and 7 transports with *Dartmouth* may be escorted from Aden to Suez by an early opportunity, *Northbrook* coming from India about September 12. This will cause least delay and ensure earliest return of ships to Bombay for large convoy Second Division. Reply should be addressed to S.N.O., Aden.

Swiftsure will sail to-day.

- F. 58. From Admiralty. September 6th.
To C-in-C., East Indies.

155. Your 143. Proposals approved, but it is suggested if Second Division and detachments for Mombasa leave together about September 16, *Dartmouth* could join half way between India and Aden, when *Fox* could be detached with transports to East Africa.

Subsequent 16-day sailings approved. Acknowledge.

- F. 59. From Admiralty. September 7th.
To C-in-C., East Indies. 12.12 a.m.

156. Until the China Squadron have searched the Dutch East Indies for *Gneisenau* and *Scharnhorst*, *Espiegle* should not proceed east of Colombo.

- F. 60. From *Chatham*, Aden. September 6th.
To Admiralty. Received 5.10 a.m.

487 N. Request reply to C-in-C., East Indies, telegram No. 146, *Chatham* and 7 transports are now ready to leave for Suez if approved.

¹ See p. 20.

F. 61. From C.-in-C., East Indies.
To Admiralty.

September 7th.
Received 9.19 a.m.

150. Your telegram 155. Proposal would not comply with instructions regarding minimum escort ordered in your telegram 153.¹

Next convoy will consist of nearly 40 ships sailing from Bombay and Karachi.

To leave before *Dartmouth* arrives will entail Karachi group starting with *Mayo*² only, which was my original proposal. Moreover, to detach *Fox* half way, will leave large convoy with only two warships in the more dangerous area, and is contrary to your orders.

When East African Force is sent, I propose *Dartmouth* should escort it, being the only match for *Königsberg* in speed, and having to pass through waters where likely to meet her.

F. 62. From Secretary of State.
To Viceroy, Army Department.

September 7th.

846. Please understand that remainder, Force C., must leave on 16th at latest for Mombasa as arranged.

F. 63. From Intelligence Officer, Singapore.
To Admiralty.

September 8th.
Received 6.22 a.m.

Referring to my telegram of August 29, Second Officer *City of Winchester* arrived at Singapore yesterday, reported personally to me that *Goldenfels* was not accompanied by an armed vessel of any kind whatever.

F. 64. From Viceroy.
To Admiralty.

September 8th.
Received 10.5 p.m.

H. 735. Reference to your 846 of September 7, His Excellency the Naval C.-in-C., East Indies, has since informed us he has received order from Admiralty that the minimum strength of escort in future is to be two ships, one of which must be superior to the *Königsberg*, armed transports not being counted, and that one more regular ship of war must be added for a large convoy. Consequently, no naval escort on above conditions can be ready till 18th instant and the echelon of 24 ships which was to have sailed on 9th and 10th instant consisting of remainder of 9th Cavalry Brigade, remainder of 7th Division and two British Battalions in relief, must now be detained until that date, when it is hoped that in addition to above, Force C. and about 18 ships can sail with 3 Artillery Brigades, 1 British Battalion in relief and supplies. Later sailings must also be proportionately delayed until escort returns unless Admiralty can be moved to make additional ships available to assist East Indies Squadron in this duty.

F. 65. From Admiralty.
To C.-in-C., East Indies.

September 9th.

158. Re your 143 and following telegrams re escort:—

It has been decided in view of the urgency of hastening the transport of troops from Egypt that the previous orders as to the numbers of warships attached to convoys can be modified to meet the number of vessels available for this duty unless a change for the worse occurs in the naval situation in the Indian Ocean and Red Sea.

Black Prince, *Duke of Edinburgh*, and one armed troopship should suffice for Red Sea.

¹ See p. 20.

² Probably coding error. T.S.D.D.

Swiftsure, *Dartmouth*, *Chatham*, and armed troopship for Indian Ocean.

Fox and armed troopship for East African convoy.

Could not fortnightly sailings be arranged if convoy changes escorts in Long. 47 E. the escorts to coal at Suez and India, not calling at Aden.

Fox could start with the first large convoy till *Chatham* joins and then proceed to East Africa.

Unless objection seen arrange for this and report.

F. 66. From H.M.S. *Pegasus*, Zanzibar.
To Admiralty.

September 9th.
Received 8.50 p.m.

By wireless telegraph intercepted and impression conveyed to us at Tanga, (German East Africa), consider *Königsberg* is in this vicinity.

F. 67. From C.-in-C., East Indies.
To Admiralty.

September 12th.
Received 9.30 a.m.

151. Your telegram 158 does not expedite departure first large convoy which awaits return of *Dartmouth* to Karachi. Have already arranged (17th) *Chatham* to meet us in Long. 55 E., when *Dartmouth* and *Hardinge* will be detached with East African Force. *Dartmouth* considered preferable to the *Fox* for this service as *Königsberg* on September 6 was reported in vicinity of Zanzibar.

Did not consider it safe in present conditions of monsoon for escort to omit coal at Aden, and time saved, even if timing of meeting proved practicable, would be small and completely nullified by bad coaling facilities at Bombay.

F. 68. From C.-in-C., East Indies
To Admiralty.

September 13th.
Received 11.5 a.m.

157. Disposition of Squadron September 13:—

Swiftsure, *Dufferin*, *Dalhousie*, Bombay.

Dalhousie leaves here to-day for Persian Gulf.

Fox arrived here September 13.

Dartmouth left Aden for Karachi September 12.

Hardinge, *Minto*, at Karachi.

Odin, Bushire; *Espiegle*, Colombo; both of them about to leave for Shatt-al-Arab.

Black Prince, *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Chatham*, *Northbrook*, Red Sea.

Swiftsure, *Fox*, *Dufferin* leave Bombay September 18 with 31 transports.

F. 69. From Admiralty.
To A.C. 9th C.S.

September 20th.

51. Ocean is required for convoy duties in the East Indies.

F. 70. From Resident, Zanzibar.
To Admiralty.

September 20th.
Received 7.53 a.m.

Following from Captain *Pegasus* begins:—

Regret *Pegasus* obliged to strike flag bombarded by *Königsberg* Zanzibar Harbour at dawn to-day while repairing engines and cleaning boilers

Our guns could not reach enemy (message ends).

Königsberg has disappeared towards the South.

F. 71. From Bombay.
To Admiralty.

September 20th.
Received 9.19 a.m.

171. Owing to excessive rain several transports could not be got ready for sea on September 18. At request of Govt. of India

departure of whole of convoys, therefore, postponed. *Swiftsure*, *Fox*, *Dufferin* leaving Bombay September 20 with about 29 transports. *Dartmouth*, *Hardinge*, *Minto* leaving Karachi September 21 with 11 transports. My telegraphic address is here at Bombay.

- F. 72. From A.S., Malta. September 21st.
To Admiralty. Received 3.52 p.m.
728. *Minerva* asks if she is to continue to convoy transports after passing Malta p.m. September 21.

- F. 73. From Admiralty. September 21st.
To A.S., Malta.
Your 728. *Minerva* to relieve *Weymouth* on escort duty to Marseilles, *Weymouth* to escort *Minerva's* transports to Egypt and at once proceed *via* Suez Canal to join *Dartmouth* and *Chatham* in hunt for *Königsberg*.

- F. 74. From Aden. September 21st.
To Admiralty. Received 2.32 p.m.
Chatham arrived.

- F. 75. From Admiralty. September 21st.
To C.-in-C., East Indies.
177. *Ocean* and *Goliath* are now *en route* to replace *Chatham* and *Dartmouth* for escort duties.
Ocean is now half way to Malta from Gibraltar, *Goliath* off Finisterre.

- F. 76. From Admiralty. September 24th.
To C.-in-C., East Indies.
184. *Ocean* and *Goliath* are delayed by defects, but are ordered to proceed to Suez and should arrive October 4th and 5th respectively, and then carry out escort work under your orders.
Minerva will be ordered to Suez to relieve *Black Prince* and arrive at Suez about October 23.
Vengeance will relieve *Duke of Edinburgh* later.
If Red Sea is considered safe *Duke of Edinburgh* might return with you to Bombay for next convoy.
Reconsider escorts on this basis and report proposals.

- F. 77. From C.-in-C., East Indies. September 27th.
To Admiralty. Received 2.20 a.m.
182. Your telegram 184. Consider it quite safe for present convoy to proceed Suez with *Black Prince* and *Northbrook*. Escort for next convoy from Bombay, *Swiftsure*, *Dufferin*. From Karachi, *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Hardinge* (group corrupt, ? would be advisable for,) these groups to join and form one convoy. East African Force to leave with *Ocean* and *Goliath* on arrival at Bombay.

- F. 78. From C.-in-C., East Indies. September 27th.
To Admiralty. Received 10.24 p.m.
184. *Swiftsure*, *Dufferin*, arrived Aden September 27 and leave for Bombay September 28. *Black Prince*, *Northbrook* have proceeded with convoy of 35 transports to Suez. *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Hardinge* leave for Karachi September 28.

Minto expected to arrive at Aden shortly and will remain at disposal of Political Resident, Aden.

- F. 79. From Admiralty. September 30th.
To C.-in-C., East Indies.

192. In view of *Emden* possibly being in the locality of Laccadives, can you make a detour to the southward on the way to Bombay without delaying the next convoy?

- F. 80. From Admiralty. September 30th.
To C.-in-C., East Indies.

195. Date of next convoy from Bombay will be October 10. Escort should be strengthened by *Ocean* and *Goliath* as soon after leaving as possible, as it is a very large one.

Give directions accordingly. Subsequent sailings are to be every 16 days, and dates adhered to as closely as possible.

Convoy from China will probably proceed direct from Colombo to Aden with *Dupleix* and *Askold*. If not, you will be informed. Acknowledge.

- F. 81. From Admiralty. October 1st.
To Navy, Aden, for *Weymouth*.
Intelligence Officer, Colombo, for *Hampshire*.
C.-in-C., East Indies.
H.M.S. *Dartmouth*, Mombasa.

Weymouth is to coal as quickly as possible and proceed to cruise in the vicinity of Socotra. She should keep not further than about 200 miles from Socotra, picking up all the information possible from passing ships and by W/T from Aden and deal with *Emden* if she comes into that locality.

Königsberg also might come North. Acknowledge.

- F. 82. From Admiralty. October 1st.
To C.-in-C., East Indies.

199. In view of pressure on resources of C.-in-C., Cape, the East Coast of Africa North of Latitude of Delagoa Bay is transferred to your command forthwith. Arrange accordingly. Acknowledge.

- F. 83. From Admiralty. October 2nd.
To C.-in-C., East Indies.
Swiftsure, *via* Bombay.

201. My 195, *Goliath* and *Ocean* have been directed to proceed at good speed to Bombay coaling at Aden to be ready to strengthen escort for convoy ready to leave about 12th for Egypt, Mombasa, and Mauritius. Sailing may be slightly delayed.

Give them detailed instructions and report proposals for escort. Acknowledge.

- F. 84. From Admiralty. October 2nd.
To S.N.O. Malta (495).
C.-in-C., East Indies (202).

Minerva is not now required to remain at Suez she is to proceed South for escort duties and act under the orders of C.-in-C., East Indies.

- F. 85. From C.-in-C., East Indies. October 4th.
To Admiralty. Received 6.55 a.m.

193. Your telegram 201. Escort proposals for next convoy. *Swiftsure*, *Dufferin* leave Bombay October 12. *Duke of Edinburgh* (corrupt group, probably *Hardinge*), leave Karachi October 13 for rendezvous position 18.55 N., 61.30 E.

Ocean and *Goliath* join at rendezvous and proceed thence with *Hardinge* to Mombasa.

Transports for Mauritius to be detached with *Hardinge* reinforced if necessary by battleship or light cruiser till in safe waters.

Swiftsure, *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Dufferin* proceed from rendezvous to Aden.

Black Prince or *Weymouth* and *Northbrook* from Aden to Suez.

Should not propose awaiting arrival of *Ocean*, *Goliath* at Bombay as this would delay departure by at least 3 days.

F. 86. From C.-in-C., East Indies. October 4th.
To Admiralty. Received 7.28 a.m.

194. I wish to point out that by gradual withdrawal of all fast cruisers from escort duties I shall be left with no ships approximating to speed of German cruisers.

Minerva inadequate for escort if *Königsberg* or *Emden* slip into Red Sea, and as long as they are at large I submit that *Duke of Edinburgh* at least should be left under my orders.

F. 87. From C.-in-C., East Indies. October 4th.
To Admiralty. Received 10.1 a.m.

197. My telegram No. 193. Proposed escort from Aden to Suez should be *Duke of Edinburgh*, *Minerva*, *Northbrook* instead of as stated.¹

F. 88. From Admiralty. October 4th.
To C.-in-C., East Indies.

205. Your 193, 194, and 197. General arrangements approved, but as convoy may be delayed in sailing after 12th *Ocean* and *Goliath* should join as far east as possible. They are ahead of time previously given and one is sufficient for Mombasa.

Question retaining *Duke of Edinburgh* will be considered and further instructions given.

Fox will be required at Mombasa to assist G.O.C. Expedition "B" and is to be given orders to co-operate with him and assist him in disembarkation and operations on coast of German East Africa. *Fox* should assist in search for enemy cruisers till required for above operations in the vicinity of Zanzibar.

F. 89. From Admiralty. October 4th.
To C.-in-C.'s, East Indies & Cape.

206. Intercepted messages from German Admiralty through Windhuk to *Königsberg*, which are to be repeated twice a day through Muanza from October 4th to 7th show that *Königsberg* may be in East African waters.

F. 90. From C.-in-C., East Indies. October 5th.
To Admiralty. Received 10.50 a.m.

199. *Swiftsure*, *Dufferin* arrived Bombay. En route from Aden made detour Northwards Laccadive Archipelago, but nothing suspicious seen or heard.

F. 91. From C.-in-C., East Indies. October 5th.
To Admiralty. Received 12.42 p.m.

201. Your telegram 205. Following telegram sent to S.N.O. East Africa, begins:—

Fox (?) is to take *Chatham*, *Dartmouth* and *Weymouth* under orders and assume charge of search for *Königsberg* so long as

¹ In his telegram No. 193 of October 4, C.-in-C. proposed *Black Prince* or *Weymouth* and *Northbrook* as escort from Aden to Suez.

operations remain in area convenient to control by *Fox*, but in the event of *Königsberg* being reported at a distance from Mombasa charge is again to be transferred to *Chatham* and *Fox* is to remain in vicinity of Mombasa.

Inform ships concerned.

Details of search programme already approved are to be obtained from *Chatham* and are not to be interfered with but *Fox* may suggest modification.

F. 92. From Intelligence Officer, Colombo. October 6th.
To Admiralty. Received 3.16 p.m.

22. . . . *Dupleix* (French), *Askold* (Russian) and 5 transports left Colombo . . .

F. 93. From Admiralty. October 6th.
To C.-in-C., East Indies.

209. Very Secret. Indian Government are sending small force to Abadan leaving India with main convoy about 13th instant and to be called Expedition "D" Direct S.N.O. Persian Gulf to co-operate with G.O.C. and give Naval assistance in disembarking and as necessary to forward the operations. After you have consulted with Military Authorities report arrangements you have made.

F. 94. From Admiralty. October 6th.
To C.-in-C., East Indies.

210. Contingent from Ceylon ready about middle of October. Can you arrange to escort it from Colombo to Bombay in time for it to join next Indian convoy sailing about October 26? If possible to do so, arrange direct with Governor of Ceylon. Report arrangements made to Admiralty.

F. 95. From Intelligence Officer, Colombo. October 6th.
To Admiralty. Received 7.40 p.m.

21. *Hampshire* reports *Emden* seen off Felidu Atoll Maldiv Islands for 3 days—left about October 1, steaming Northerly direction.

F. 96. From C.-in-C., East Indies. October 7th.
To Admiralty. Received 3.2 p.m.

208. *Weymouth* did not receive Admiralty telegram No. 198 of October 1st at Aden. S.N.O. Mombasa has been directed to send her back to Sokotra in accordance therewith.

F. 97. From C.-in-C., East Indies. October 7th.
To Admiralty. Received 5.42 p.m.

210. Your telegram 210. I see no present prospect of escort being available from Colombo to Bombay for Ceylon Contingent before next convoy leaves at end of October. If *Emden* has been located by end of October it is considered contingent should proceed to Bombay unaccompanied.

F. 98. From Admiralty. October 7th.
To C.-in-C., East Indies. Received 8.7 p.m.

215. As the *Emden* is at large on the western side of India and the large expedition will not be ready to sail till 14th or 15th cannot *Swiftsure* search and protect trade and *Duke of Edinburgh* search to the entrance of the Persian Gulf for *Emden* or *Königsberg*? You might remain behind to complete escort arrangements.

¹ See F. 81.